This is the real ‘miracle’ involved in ethics. The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus not “how can we eliminate all the pathological elements of will, so that only the pure form of duty remains?” but, rather, “how can the pure form of duty itself function as a pathological element, that is, as an element capable of assuming the role of the driving force or incentive of our actions?”. 15-16
Pure form of duty as the sole motive for performing an act that is called ethical. Alenka wants to propose an ethics based solely on the drive.
surplus jouissance equals the objet petit a
What both Lacan and Kant are trying to get their heads arounds is articulating, conceptualizing a certain SURPLUS. 17
Triebfeder (drive or incentive) as one of the pivotal points of Kant’s practical philosophy. This Triebfeder is nothing but the object drive of the will. Now even if Kant makes a point of stressing that the ethical act is distinguished by its lack of any Triebfeder, he also introduces what he calls the echte Triebfeder, the ‘genuine drive’ of pure practical reason.
This genuine object-drive of the will is itself defined precisely in terms of pure form as an absence of any Triebfeder.
We can see here, as well, that the Lacanian notion of the objet petit a is not far off: the objet petit a designates nothing but the absence, the lack of the object, the void around which desire turns.
After a need is satisfied, and the subject gets the demanded object, desire continues on its own ; it is not ‘extinguished’ by the satisfaction of need. The moment the subject attains the object she demands, the objet petit a appears, as a marker of that which the subject still ‘has not got’, or does not have — and this itself constitutes the ‘echte’ object of desire.
Thus we can see that the object-drive involved in Kant’s conceptualization of ethics is not just like any other pathological motivation, but neither is it simply the absence of all motives or incentives.
The point, rather, is that this very absence must at a certain point begin to function as an incentive. It must attain a certain ‘material weight’ and ‘positivity’, otherwise it will never be capable of exerting any influence whatsoever on human conduct. 18