butler affirmative deconstruction

Žižek defines deconstruction in the light of its own ostensible prohibitions, as if the concepts it interrogates become unspeakable by virtue of their deconstruction.  Here, it seems, he overlooks the now prevalent circulation of ‘affirmative deconstruction’, elaborated in different ways by Derrida, Spivak and Agamben.  There are conditions of discourse under which certain concepts emerge, and their capacity for iteration across contexts is itself the condition for an affirmative reinscription. Thus, we can ask: what can the ‘human’ mean within a theory that is ostensibly anti-humanist?  Indeed, we can — and must — ask: what can the human mean with post-humanism? And surely Derrida would not cease to ask the question of truth, though whatever ‘truth’ is to be will not be separable from the ‘question’ by which it appears. This is not to say that there is no truth, but only that whatever it will be, it will be presented in some way, perhaps, through elision or silence, but there precisely as something to be read (279).