Panitch

Panitch and Gindin’s story of the rise of finance is straightforward and compelling. The US was a financial and manufacturing powerhouse by the end of WWI but lacked the vision and institutional capacity to play a leading role in the global economy. Through the New Deal, World War II, and the formation of Bretton Woods, the US developed this capacity and emerged, at war’s end, a superpower ready to re-launch global capitalism.

Coming out of World War II, “The explicit long-term goal of the American state was to create the material and legal conditions for the free movement of capital throughout the world.” Panitch and Gindin argue that a key element of this project for an American empire was the regulation and expansion of US finance. By the 1950s US finance was growing in step with (and often ahead of) US manufacturing, “deepen[ing] markets at home, expand[ing] abroad, and lay[ing] the basis for the explosion of global finance that occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century.”

But as finance got stronger, the cradle of Bretton Woods turned into a cage. The regulatory framework of the New Deal became a barrier finance sought to overcome. US banks followed US companies overseas, setting up shop outside the US to avoid restrictions. At the same time the contradictions of Keynesianism (strong capital plus strong labor) intensified. Profits for US corporations declined amidst new competition from Europe and Japan, and US workers grew unruly, demanding (and getting) increased wages and benefits. By the late 1960s the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and capital controls was strained to the breaking-point.

As the crisis of stagflation and dollar devaluation increased during the 1970s the US state fumbled around for a solution. To overcome what Panitch and Gindin call a “crisis of business confidence” the US needed to show that it could resolve the contradictions of Keynesianism at home and Third World nationalism abroad. Ultimately it did, through Volcker’s ‘shock and austerity’ campaign.

The imposition of class discipline to break the great inflation and the wage militancy of US labor strongly confirmed the American state’s commitment to property, the value of the dollar, and the inviolability of its debt. The way in which this was achieved – high interest rates, a deep recession, and the liberalization of markets – also laid the basis, not only for the new age of finance, but also for the restructuring of US industry.

In addition to the Volcker shock, Congress phased out ‘Regulation Q’ ceilings beginning in 1980, continuing an ongoing policy of deregulation to keep pace with developments in the private financial sector. Cutting the New Deal apron strings enabled finance to develop its global capacity further, while Volcker’s monetary shock swiftly re-directed capital flows toward the US, re-establishing Wall Street as the center of the global financial world.

But Gindin and Panitch don’t define the 80s and 90s by the rise of finance as many scholars do. Instead, they see the rise of finance as one of a number of transformations occurring at the time, along with the “restructuring of manufacturing, the explosion of high-tech, the ubiquity of business services, and the profound weakening of working-class organization and labor identity.” Collectively, these transformations “re-constituted the material base of American empire,” enabling a deep restructuring of the US economy to restore competitiveness and profitability. In the process a truly global capitalism was made.

The machinations of the US state revived corporate profitability with a vengeance. But, it also created a volatile global economy dominated by the whims of finance. There were seventy-two financial crises in the 1990s alone. To keep the whole thing going the US state had to increase its capacity for regulation and rescue. The US Treasury’s ability to “control contagion and orchestrate supplemental interventions,” along with the Fed’s function as “lender of last resort,” were increasingly called upon as global financial crises (Mexico, East Asia, Argentina) got bigger and bigger.

The 2007 US financial crisis was the mother of them all, and pushed the US state’s role as container of crises further: it became “market maker of last resort.” Yet, the crisis wasn’t a sign of systemic breakdown. Instead, Panitch and Gindin argue that the crisis actually strengthened the US empire, that the ability of the US to rein in the crisis demonstrated its centrality to the functioning of global capitalism. Muted criticism of quantitative easing, and the continued Treasury bond feeding frenzy, showed that the US was the only game in town. The power of finance was also bolstered by the crisis: “[I]n spite of the widespread anger at the role of Wall Street in causing the crisis, US finance emerged not only more concentrated, but also still encompassing the general interest of capital amid a broad neoliberal consolidation of class power.”

So if we sum up the properties of global capitalism according to Panitch and Gindin, the system is locally volatile but globally stable. Why? The global ruling classes (North and South) benefit from and support the system, and the global working class is in a state of near total defeat, eliminating the greatest potential source of change. Until the working classes rebel and put new political systems in place the US Empire isn’t going anywhere. And as for finance:

Žižek Croatia May 2013, Brazil July 2, Greece

July 8, 2013 Only 14 minutes and mostly a gloss on his ideas developed in Zagreb, Croatia

May 16, 2013 Croatia

June 2013 Greece with Costas

How do we experience ourselves as persons, we are now directly linking our thoughts directly to things, a wheelchair that runs directly on thoughts.  What will become of us, our very identity is based on this difference between my inner life and outer life.
Greatest philosophical book of all times, a story but a crazy story, Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit.  We should let readers discover for themselves why big fat book is relevant.
To return to Hegel is answer to deadlock failure of today’s left. Stalinist commie failed, I told Fukuymama, maybe capitalism won, but did commies prove they are best managers. We should not play boring game, idea is good they just did it wrong in Russia, no Hegel says if idea goes wrong in reality, there is something wrong with the idea itself.
Hegel was fully aware for logical conceptual necessity to realize itself, it has to attach itself to contingent moment. Monarch, he is not divine, he is idiot like all of us, if you have a government justified by higher right, divine right, you get alienation, no at the top there must be an idiot like all of us.  We need a jury for example, selected from our peers, the Monarch is just representation of utter contingency.
LOVE
Retroactive reversal of contingency into necessity, something contingently happens but once its here it is necessary.
Subject is reduced to point of emptiness, but at this moment there is a possibility of reversal
what crisis? East Asia is growing, Africa in some parts is progressing.  There is only a crisis in western Europe.  You leftists love to be anti-Euro, but hey … yes I agree, first at this immediate economic level, its only west Europe in crisis, what this NEW FORM of capitalism, WHAT WILL IT BE?  This new capitalism will be more and more capitalism with Asian values, not despotism, simply autocratic capitalism.  Eternal marriage of democracy and capitalism is on deathbed.  Lee Quan Yew founder of modern Singapore.
Gradual opening gives rise to expectations, not in darkess Stalinism, its when relative expansion of capitalism will render situation even more destabilizing
Hegel’s refined dialectical paradox This is my message in India, in strict correlation to their class status. The very loss of something creates the lost dimension. We don’t have pre-colonial india then brutal colonization which makes them aware of what they lost and then they struggle to get it back.  NO!  This new dimension that they are craving for, new modern democratic India, the very program of decolonization is engendered by colonialism itself.
Malcolm X and Buthelezi in South Africa, fake multiculturalism
Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin: an important thinker in the development of German Idealism, particularly his early association with and philosophical influence on his seminary roommates Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
Mandel: No we should beat whites at their own game BY BEING MORE UNIVERSAL THAN THEY ARE.
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Ž strategy protests

London Review of Books, 28 June 2013
Trouble in Paradise Slavoj Žižek on the protests in Turkey and Greece

It is also important to recognise that the protesters aren’t pursuing any identifiable ‘real’ goal. The protests are not ‘really’ against global capitalism, ‘really’ against religious fundamentalism, ‘really’ for civil freedoms and democracy, or ‘really’ about any one thing in particular. What the majority of those who have participated in the protests are aware of is a fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands. The struggle to understand the protests is not just an epistemological one, with journalists and theorists trying to explain their true content; it is also an ontological struggle over the thing itself, which is taking place within the protests themselves. Is this just a struggle against corrupt city administration? Is it a struggle against authoritarian Islamist rule? Is it a struggle against the privatisation of public space? The question is open, and how it is answered will depend on the result of an ongoing political process.

Today’s protests and revolts are sustained by the combination of overlapping demands, and this accounts for their strength: they fight for (‘normal’, parliamentary) democracy against authoritarian regimes; against racism and sexism, especially when directed at immigrants and refugees; against corruption in politics and business (industrial pollution of the environment etc); for the welfare state against neoliberalism; and for new forms of democracy that reach beyond multi-party rituals. They also question the global capitalist system as such and try to keep alive the idea of a society beyond capitalism.

Two traps are to be avoided here: false radicalism (‘what really matters is the abolition of liberal-parliamentary capitalism, all other fights are secondary’), but also false gradualism (‘right now we should fight against military dictatorship and for basic democracy, all dreams of socialism should be put aside for now’). Here there is no shame in recalling the Maoist distinction between principal and secondary antagonisms, between those that matter most in the end and those that dominate now. There are situations in which to insist on the principal antagonism means to miss the opportunity to strike a significant blow in the struggle.

Only a politics that fully takes into account the complexity of overdetermination deserves to be called a strategy. When we join a specific struggle, the key question is: how will our engagement in it or disengagement from it affect other struggles? The general rule is that when a revolt against an oppressive half-democratic regime begins, as with the Middle East in 2011, it is easy to mobilise large crowds with slogans – for democracy, against corruption etc.

But we are soon faced with more difficult choices. When the revolt succeeds in its initial goal, we come to realise that what is really bothering us (our lack of freedom, our humiliation, corruption, poor prospects) persists in a new guise, so that we are forced to recognise that there was a flaw in the goal itself. This may mean coming to see that democracy can itself be a form of un-freedom, or that we must demand more than merely political democracy: social and economic life must be democratised too.

In short, what we first took as a failure fully to apply a noble principle (democratic freedom) is in fact a failure inherent in the principle itself. This realisation – that failure may be inherent in the principle we’re fighting for – is a big step in a political education.

[…]

In a more directly political sense, the US has consistently pursued a strategy of damage control in its foreign policy by re-channelling popular uprisings into acceptable parliamentary-capitalist forms: in South Africa after apartheid, in the Philippines after the fall of Marcos, in Indonesia after Suharto etc.

This is where politics proper begins: the question is how to push further once the first, exciting wave of change is over, how to take the next step without succumbing to the ‘totalitarian’ temptation, how to move beyond Mandela without becoming Mugabe.

July 1 abstract

Between Animal and Human: the Death Drive in Civilization and Its Discontents

In his now classic study Civilization and Its Discontents Freud takes on an age old distinction between the individual and collective and translates this distinction into one between an ego and the death drive. In particular what interests me is Freud’s discussion of the death drive which was  first introduced in an earlier work as that which is ‘beyond’ the pleasure principle. In what way can we say the death drive is ‘beyond’ in any sense? Going some way towards answering this, Freud, in Civilization and Its Discontents, famously wonders aloud regarding the genesis of the animal versus human:

In the case of other animal species it may be that temporary balance has been reached between the influence of their environment and the mutually contending instincts within them, and that thus a cessation of development has come about. It may be that in primitive man a fresh access of libido kindled a renewed burst of activity on the part of the destructive instinct. There are a great many questions here to which as yet there is no answer.” (C&D 70)

Freud draws a contrast here between homeostatic balance that results in the cessation of development (death) and paradoxically the death drive as inauguration of movement and a breakthrough to the human.

Hence stealing a page from Slavoj Žižek’s work, I will make the argument that the Freudian death drive represents an important theoretical innovation for the analysis of politics and society and in particular the relation between the particular and universal.

I will also argue that in Civilization and its Discontents Freud’s rebuttal of a humanist ethics, revealed in his critical reading of “Thou shalt love thy neighbour” can be extended to critically formulate a possible outline for an ethical theory.  In other words, the ‘monstrosity’ of the other that Freud only hints at can be made the basis for an ethical universality.

Overall this paper presentation will seek to offer a modest Lacanian inspired update to Freud’s classic text.

solipsism of enjoyment

politics of enjoyment: love for one’s neighbour rather than solipsism of enjoyment

this evil enjoyment not just in the other but in me as well

enjoyment as this extimate otherness is the foundation of sameness

love as a gift without recompensation,

a nonreciprocal love for thy neighbour severed from all utility, is the point at which politics and psychoanalysis necessarily meet. 105

unconscioius affects eh? guilt (conscience)

Adrian Johnston and Catherine Malabou. Self and Emotional Life. Columbia University Press 2013.

What is an unconscious affect? How are affects able to be unconscious?  For Lacanians, unconscious affects are a contradiction in terms.

Guilt = Affect  yes or no?

Freud in mid mature career around 1920 or so, 180 degree change, he added the notion of superego to his theoretical vocabulary.  Hints in 1914, On Narcissism.  But coming out in The Ego and the Id (1923)

Superego: there are unconscious dimensions of the superego.  What analysts see often are patients who feel guilty but don’t know why, some commit a crime just so in order to give a cause to this unbearable feeling of guilt: guilt-in-search-of-a-crime.  79

There are unconscious dimensions of the superego.  Is it possible for someone to feel guilty without being (fully) conscious of feeling this way?  79  If affects are felt then they have to be conscious right?

Kant phenomenal noumenal split subject Johnston

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek‘s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Northwestern University Press, 2008.

That is to say, if psychoanalysis is indeed correct to maintain that the subject ontogenetically emerges through and comes to constitute itself by a sort of radical, primordial gesture of negating rejection (whether as Freud’s primal/primary repression as original Verwerfung or Verneinung, Lacan’s “cut” of symbolic castration, or Julia Kristeva’s abjection) , then feelings of revulsion toward the corporeal substratum of the mortal body essentially are indicative of the presence of a form of subjectivity resistant to being collapsed back into its material foundation. (Johnston ŽO 25)

The subject is inherently barred from any form of phenomenal self-acquaintance in which it would know itself as finite in the ontological-material sense. The nothingness fled from, the void that Kant allegedly labors so hard to avoid, is nothing other than the very absence of the subject itself, the negation of the insurmountable “transcendental illusion” of its apparent immortality. (31)

The split within the structure of the subject that Zizek credits Kant with having discovered is that between the phenomenal and noumenal dimensions of subjectivity, namely, between the subject as it appears to itself in an experiential fashion (i.e., through conceptual and spatio-temporal mediation) and the subject as it exists/subsists “in itself.”

The subject an sich that makes experience possible cannot itself fall, as a discrete experiential, representational element, within the frame of the field it opens up and sustains (a point already grasped by Descartes in his second meditation). Hence, Kant famously speaks of “this lor he or it (the thing) that thinks”. The noumenal subject is just as much of a permanently shrouded mystery as things-in-themselves. The entire thrust of the first Critique (particularly the “Dialectic of Pure Reason”) is to establish the epistemological grounds for forbidding any and every philosophical reference to the noumenal realm beyond the familiar limits of possible experience. (Johnston ŽO 30)

According to Zizek’s heterodox juxtaposition of Kant and Lacan, the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy has direct relevance to this splitting of subjectivity between, on the one hand, the noumenal subject of (unconscious) enunciation and, on the other hand, the phenomenal subject of utterances (as determinate signifier-predicates). [ŽO 32]

If… one bears in mind the fact that, according to Lacan, the ego is an object, a substantial “res,” one can easily grasp the ultimate sense of Kant’s transcendental turn: it desubstantializes the subject (which, with Descartes, still remained “res cogitans,” i.e., a substantial “piece of reality”)—and it is this very desubstantialization which opens up the empty space (the “blank surface”) onto which fantasies are projected, where monsters emerge. To put it in Kantian terms: because of the inaccessibility of the Thing in itself, there is always a gaping hole in (constituted, phenomenal) reality, reality is never “all,” its circle is never closed, and this void of the inaccessible Thing is filled out with phantasmagorias through which the trans-phenomenal Thing enters the stage of phenomenal presence—in short, prior to the Kantian turn, there can be no black hulk at the background of the stage. (Zizek Enjoy Your Symptom 1992, 136) [Johnston ŽO 32]

Elsewhere Zizek draws out the consequences of this, maintaining that every mediated identity, all signifier-predicates appended to the original nothingness of subjectivity in its raw negativity, are “supplements” aiming to “fill out this void”:

Lacan’s point here is that an unsurmountable gap forever separates what I am “in the real” from the symbolic mandate that procures my social identity: the primordial ontological fact is the void, the abyss on account of which I am inaccessible to myself in my capacity as a real substance — or, to quote Kant’s unique formulation from his Critique of Pure Reason, on account of which I never get to know what I am as “I or he or it (the thing) which thinks [Ich, oder Er, oder Es (das Ding), welches denkt]”

Every symbolic identity I acquire is ultimately nothing but a supplementary feature whose function is to fill out this void. This pure void of subjectivity, this empty form of “transcendental apperception,” has to be distinguished from the Cartesian Cogito which remains a res cogitans, a little piece of substantial reality miraculously saved from the destructive force of universal doubt: it was only with Kant that the distinction was made between the empty form of “I think” and the thinking substance, the “thing which thinks.”  (Zizek Metastases of Enjoyment 1994, 144) Johnston ŽO 32-33

Thus, the entire range of significations and images proposed by the subject to itself in response to the question of self-identity (“Who or what am I?”) falls under the heading of transcendental illusion. That is to say, these fantasmatic productions striving to seal this crack in reality are semblances. And yet they are the inevitable results of a structurally determined dynamic rooted in subjectivity’s internal division: “The subject is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier” (SXH99).  ŽO 33

subject-as-negativity two intersecting lacks

What if the negativity of Cartesian-Kantian-Hegelian subjectivity (as the monstrous cogito, the horrible void of the Thing, and the terrifying abyss of nocturnal dismemberment) is a symptomatic ideality-as-idealization derived from and conditioned by a contingent yet a priori material foundation (what, in psychoanalysis, would be designated as a violent “reaction-formation”) ?

Is the subject-as-negativity a response to its corporeal Grund (ground), to a primordially chaotic and discordant Real that produces its own negation immanently out of itself? Are Zizek’s otherwise inexplicably odd choices of adjectives here indicative of such a link, of a thinly concealed umbilical cord tethering the (pseudo)immateriality of the modern subject to a dark base rendered obscure through a forceful disavowal/abjection? 22

Lacan furthers this Freudian line of thought through his portrayal of the libido in the myth of the lamella (a myth Zizek cites repeatedly). Sexuality is depicted as a frightening monster-parasite that aggressively grafts itself onto the being of the individual and drives him or her toward death.

In the same seminar in which the lamella is invoked (the eleventh seminar), Lacan also sketches a logic of two intersecting lacks, a Real lack (introduced by the fact of sexual reproduction) and a Symbolic lack (introduced by the subject’s alienation via its mediated status within the defiles of the signifying big Other).

The Real lack is nothing other than the individual’s “loss” of immortality due to its sexual-material nature as a living being subjected to the cycles of generation and corruption, albeit as a loss of something never possessed except in primary narcissism and/or unconscious fantasy.

Symbolic lack serves, in away, as a defensive displacement of this more foundational lack in the Real.

Not only are psychoanalytic psychopathologies painful struggles with both of these lacks, but “it is this double lack that determines the ever-insistent gap between the real and the symbolico-imaginary, and thus the constitution of the subject” (Verhaeghe Collapse of Function of Father 2000, 147).

One possible manifestation of the neurotic rebellion against this fundamental feature of the corporeal condition is a strong feeling of disgust in the face of all things fleshly, of everything whose palpable attraction and tangible yet fleeting beauty smacks of a transience evoking the inexorable inevitability of death (an attitude that Freud comments on in his short 1916 piece “On Transience”).  [Johnston ŽO 23]

barred real Being as incomplete internally inconsistent

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Northwestern University Press, 2008

In Organs Without Bodies, Žižek insists,while discussing Kant, that free­dom (in the form of autonomous subjectivity) is possible only if being, construed as whatever serves as an ultimate grounding ontological reg­ister, is inherently incomplete and internally inconsistent. … “Schelling was first and foremost a philosopher of freedom” [Indivisible Remainder, 15]

He goes on bluntly to assert that “either subjectivity is an illusion or reality is in itself (not only epistemologically) not-All (Organs Without Bodies 2004,115).

If being is entirely at one with itself, if material nature is a perfectly functioning machine in which each and every cog and component is organically coordinated into the single, massive whole of an uninterrupted “One-All,” then no space remains, no clearing is held open, for the emergence of something capable of (at least from time to time) transcending or breaking with this stifling ontological closure.

Being must be originally and primordially unbalanced in order for the subject as a (trans-)ontological excess to become operative.

As Schelling himself succinctly states, “Were the first nature in harmony with itself, it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would never become Two” . Those points and moments where being becomes dysfunctional (i.e.,when,to put it loosely, “the run of things” breaks down) signal the possibility for the genesis of subjectivity as that which cannot be reduced to a mere circuit in the machinery of a base material substratum in which everything is exhaustively integrated with everything else.

Zizek makes the move of identifying the Schellingian-Lacanian subject with this inconsistency internal to the ontological edifice itself: “Sub­ject designates the ‘imperfection’ of Substance, the inherent gap, self deferral, distance-from-itself, which forever prevents Substance from fully realizing itself, from becoming’ fully itself” (The Abyss of Freedom, 7)

barring of the Real origin of experience Johnston

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Northwestern University Press, 2008.

According to this reading, Schelling basically agrees with Kant that attributing a notion such as “existence” to the noumenal ground underlying reality is erroneously to apply a concept forged within the boundaries of already constituted experience to the pre-experiential foundation of this same experiential field (in short,it amounts to a category mistake). Like Kant, Schelling forbids using discursive concepts to analyze and charac­terize the Real.

However, unlike Kant, Schelling refuses to conclude that the question as to the origin of experience (for instance, the enigma of how a thing affects the receptivity of the senses so as to become an ob­ject) is therefore meaningless and not worth asking.

Žižek identifies as the nature of Schelling’s peculiar radicalization of Kant (a radicalization crucial to allowing for the possibility of forging a transcendental materialist account of subjectivity). Žižek alludes to the idea that both Kant and Schelling uncover (although the former, in restricting himself to an epistemological investigation, fails to appreciate the true significance of this discovery/insight) the fact that being itself is shot through with antagonisms and tensions, riddled with cracks, fissures, and gaps (rather than being something homogeneous and harmonious, an ontological plane placidly consistent with itself). What one could call this “barring” of the Real is absolutely essential to Žižek’s philosophical project,a project centered on deploying and defending, in the midst of a prevailing postmodern doxa hostile to the very notion of subjectivity, a robust theory of the subject.  Johnston ŽO 77

preontological Johnston

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Northwestern University Press, 2008

Grund, rather than being the hard, ontological substance behind the ephemeral facade of experience (as it’s been characterized here thus far), is, in fact, “preontological“: “The enigma resides in the fact that Ground is ontologically non-accomplished, ‘less’ than Existence, but it is precisely as such that it corrodes the consistency of the ontological edifice of Existence from within (Žižek 1996b,62; Žižek 1997a,7).

In The Abyss of Freedom, Žižek proclaims that “the Ground is in itself ontologically hindered, hampered, its status is in a radical sense preontological — it only ‘is’ sous rature, in the mode of its own withdrawal” (Zizek1997a,6).

And in The Plague of Fantasies, he utilizes this interpretation of the Schellingian Real as preontological (instead of it being the ontological per se) to identify Schelling as a thinker who completes Kant’s insight into the “ontological incompleteness of reality” 76

Sous rature is a strategic philosophical device originally developed by Martin Heidegger. Usually translated as ‘under erasure’, it involves the crossing out of a word within a text, but allowing it to remain legible and in place.

Žižek quote

German Idealism outlined the precise contours of this pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the ontological constitution of reality… Kant was the first to detect this crack in the ontological edifice of reality, if (what we experience as) “objective reality” is not simply given” out there, “waiting to be perceived by the subject, but an artificial composite constituted through the subject’s active participation — that is, through the act of transcendental synthesis — then the question crops up sooner or later what is the status of the uncanny X which precedes transcendentally constituted reality? It was Schelling, of course, who gave the most detailed account of this X in his notion of the Ground of Existence.. .the pre-logical Real which remains for ever the elusive Ground of Reason which can never be grasped “as such,” merely glimpsed in the very gesture of its withdrawal (Žižek 1997c, 208) 77

johnston subject

Johnston, Adrian. Žižek’s Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity. Northwestern University Press, 2008

“Contradiction” designates the antagonistic relationship between what I am “for the others” — my symbolic determination — and what I am “in myself,”abstractedly from my relations to others.

It is the contradiction between the void of the subject’s pure “being-for-himself” and the signifying feature which represents him for the others, in Lacanian terms: between $ and S1.

More precisely, “contradiction” means that it is my very ‘alienation’ in the symbolic mandate, in S1, which retroactively makes $ — the void which eludes the hold of the mandate — out of my brute reality.” (Žižek Tarrying 1993,131)

Master signifiers are operators of subjectification. In Žižek’s account of subject formation, ego-level subjectifying identification must first fail in order for the void of $ to be illuminated. 211-212

The Žižekian subject emerges from the failure of subjectifying identifications. 220

The subject truly emerges through the coming to light of the unsuturable gap between itself and its multiple possible operators of identificatory subjectification — the upshot here being that all such operators are ultimately “bones” (in Lacan’s language, subjectification amounts to the progressive “cadaverization”  or “corpsification” of $, its “fading” into the lifelessness of objectified reified identities mediated by skeletal structures consisting of signifier-like elements.)  231

Žižek’s reading of Hegel’s discussion of phrenology [the Spirit is a bone] makes clear yet again that the subject-for-itself, as an explicit, self-relating negativity devoid of any concrete determinateness (i.e., $-as-empty), surfaces only after the implosion of identification. The “That’s not me!” dis-identification bringing into view the void of $ occurs following several unsuccessful attempts at establishing lasting forms of “That’s me!” identification.  231

Of course, this is quite consonant with the basic spirit of Hegelian dialectical philosophy, given that, for Hegel, truth is reached not by avoiding error, but rather precisely by passing through error; the key insights of dialectics require that certain mistakes must be made before these insights disclose themselves.  There are no shortcuts, no safe paths allowing for errors/mistakes to be bypassed in the progress toward subsequent stages of philosophical reflection (in this vein, bypassing the false ultimately blocks further movement in the direction of the true). 231

So it is with the Žižekian delineation of subject formation: the void of the pure self-reflexive negativity of $-as-empty doesn’t reveal itself until after the unfolding of a series of failed attempts to conceal this void through processes of identificatory subjectification. In other words, the faceless anonymity of the cogito-like subject is not, as Žižek sometimes insinuates, an a priori structural emptiness preexisting the sequences of subjectifying identifications that try in vain to fill up this hole in the fabric of constituted reality.  Rather, this hole is gradually hollowed out through the increasingly apparent contingency of all operators of subjectification, a contingency that becomes apparent solely through the rise and fall of various temporarily hegemonic master signifiers of identity jostling and displacing one another. In short, the more frantic is the “mad dance of identification” the more visible is the identityless void of $.  To paraphrase Marx, when all solid identities melt into air, the subject as devoid of any solid identity begins to emerge … 231

Both Dolar and Žižek are committed to a theory of subjectivity according to which the subject (more specifically, the fully constituted subject as a for-itself emptiness) is a forever-alienated X, a homeless misfit, inherently incapable of finding a proper place within the domains of either nature or culture. In fact, this barred S ($), in its various guises and manifestations, is the factor responsible for the barring of both the Real ($-as-in-itself is the immanent negativity perturbing the “not all” of being’s conflict-riddled substance) and the Symbolic ($-as-for-itself is the impossible-to-represent void defying reduction to the mediating sociocultural terms of the big Other — $-as-self-reflexive-negativity is, in a sense that dovetails nicely with Hegel’s equation of of the spirit with a bone, the proverbial “bone in the throat” of the symbolic order) 234

Consequently, Dolar and Zizek insist that there is always a stain/tain,a spot of opacity, on the surfaces of nature and culture interfering with the otherwise smooth two-way flow of dialectical reflection between thinking and being,between subject and object. Without this opaque obstacle i.e., bone), subjectivity would lose itself through full immersion in the immediacy of being; the subject would be drowned in and by the completeness of a self-enclosed substance (i.e.,a subjectless substance). An internal limit to the movement of Aufhebung preserves the (non-) being of $.

Both Dolar and Zizek regard the genuine Hegelian gesture condensed in the infinite judgment of his phrenological formula to be the sudden transformation of the subject’s failure to find itself amidst the debris of the world into a success (i.e., the lack of adequate externally mediated representation by concrete entities is subjectivity at its purest insofar as instances of this lack present the subject with chances to grasp itself self-reflexively as a negativity irreducible to representation). The idea of finally surmounting the division between the spirit of subjectivity and the bone of objectivity is a pseudo-Hegelian (rather than properly Hegelian) notion. 234