critchley stay illusion

Patrícia Vieira and Michael Marder In LA Times, review Stay, Illusion! by Simon Critchley and Jamieson Webster

According to the two authors, the tragedy of Hamlet (and that of the modern subject) is that he is trapped in an unsustainable situation.

On the one hand, “Hamlet does not accept what is,” including the death of his father, his mother’s likely betrayal, and his uncle’s usurpation of the throne. On the other hand, he is unwilling to act in order to change the rotten state of things.

In a nihilistic dead-end, he loses his foothold in the present and forfeits a different future. That is why he announces his death thrice before he actually joins the “pile of corpses.” The entire play, then, unfolds in the delay between a de jure death of the subject and the body’s de facto transformation into a corpse.

Before going any further, we ought to ask, “Why Hamlet?” Why not, for instance, add an “Oedipus doctrine” to the Oedipus complex? The key difference between ancient and modern tragedies is that in the former tragic heroes recognize the catastrophic nature of their condition belatedly, while in the latter anagnorisis (or recognition) is present from the beginning.

In contrast to ancient tragedies, where action unfolds — whether consciously or not — in pursuit of knowledge, modern drama evinces the paralysis of action by an excess of knowledge. The more one knows the worse off one fares, realizing one’s impotence to change the current state of things. Knowledge and its pursuit are devoid of meaning because they do not lead anywhere, or better, they lead to a nihilistic Nowhere.

Nihilism is the outcome of Hamlet’s collision with the unadorned, raw reality of his father’s murder, which provokes an intense feeling of disgust in the son. As in Lacanian psychoanalysis, the Real harbors a traumatic core, unmediated by subjective representations. If Hamlet is the typical (or prototypical) modern subject, then his nihilistic disgust cannot be explained away by an individual pathology.

Even assuming that his violence, his response in kind to his clash with reality, is “the violence of failed mourning,” the failure must be one we all share with the tragic character.

What would successful mourning look like in a place where the very possibility of working through trauma is precluded by a sober view of history as a pile of corpses? (Just think of Benjamin’s Angel of History, who sees “one single catastrophe that keeps piling ruin upon ruin” instead of a mere succession of events.) What can we do before we are swept into the pile? How to respond to nihilism?

critchley occupy

Occupy and the Arab spring will continue to revitalise political protest

The Arab spring, notably in Egypt and Syria, seems to be running out of steam. The vivacious drive of the Occupy movement has faltered and it is not clear what new life will appear. Can popular protest regain its energy and inspiration, or is that it?

Rather than retreating into the comfort of despair or cynicism, perhaps this is a moment in which we can try and gain a broader view of matters.

Power is the ability to get things done. Politics is the means to get those things done. Democracy is the name for regimes that believe that power and politics coincide and that power lies with the people. The problem, as Zygmunt Bauman has reminded us, is that power and politics have become divorced. What we call democracy has become a sham. Power has evaporated into the supra-national spaces of finance, trade and information platforms, but also the spaces of drug trafficking, human trafficking and immigration – the many boats that cross the Mediterranean and other seas.

But the space of politics has remained the same as it has for centuries, localised in the nation state with its prosaic variations of representative, liberal democracy. Politics still feels local – we might feel British or Greek or whatever – but it isn’t. Normal state politics simply serves the interests of supra-national power. Sovereignty has been outsourced.

The premise of western representative democracy is the following: citizens exercise political power through voting; representatives are elected; governments are formed and these governments have power to get things done, a power identical to the will of the people.

The belief that many of us had (or perhaps still have) is that if we work for a certain party, then we can win an election, form a government, and have the power to change things. But every day this is proven to be wrong.

Take Greece, where last November the former prime minister George Papandreou had the idea of holding a referendum to ratify a eurozone bailout deal negotiated at an EU summit in Nice. It was a democratic gesture of a rather old-fashioned kind. Of course, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were appalled because they knew that such a popular referendum showed a deep misunderstanding of the nature of contemporary political reality. Contemporary power is not the people and is not located in local or national governments. It lies elsewhere, with the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the interests of various financial institutions that the European states serve. How could Papandreou be so naive?

Now we have unelected governments of technocrats in Greece and Italy, and elected technocrats elsewhere. At this point in history, representative liberal democracy is no more than a kind of ideological birdsong. Politics does not have power. It serves power. And power is supra-political and out of the reach of common citizens.

The casualty of this separation of politics and power is the state. The state has become eviscerated, discredited, its credit rating has been slashed. Greece is only a slightly more extreme example of the situation here in the US, where I live, and elsewhere, in Britain, say. The state is in a state.

So what do we do? The answer is surprisingly simple. We have to take politics back from the political class through confrontation with the power of finance capital and the international status quo – the people who, little more than a year ago, were insisting the Egyptian government was stable. What was so admirable about the various social movements that we all too glibly called “the Arab spring” was their courageous intention to reclaim autonomy and political self-determination.

The protestors in Tahrir Square refused to live in dictatorships propped up to serve the interests of western capital and corrupt local elites. They wanted to reclaim ownership of the means of production, for example through the nationalisation of major state industries. The various movements in north Africa and the Middle East still aim at one thing: autonomy. They demand collective ownership of the places where one lives, works, thinks and plays. This is the most classical and basic goal of politics.

The Occupy movement is fascinating from the standpoint of the separation of politics and power. To be with the Occupy protestors when the chant went up, “this is what democracy looks like”, was really powerful, as was the way in which they conducted general assemblies peacefully, horizontally and non-coercively.

The movement tried to remake direct democracy, with a mixture of the old – concepts such as assembly, consensus and autonomy – and the new, with Twitter feeds and mobile demonstrations organised through messenger services. It has yielded a period of massive political creativity.

It is important to remember that the separation between politics and power did not happen by chance or through the quasi-automatic movement of capitalism. It happened with the connivance of generations of politicians, such as Tony Blair, who embraced free-market capitalism as the engine of growth and personal gain. It has led to a situation where the state, and the entire political class, are discredited.

Occupy is the becoming-conscious of a deep disaffection with normal politics, particularly among the young. And perhaps it is the phenomenon of politicised, radicalised youth that – after two decades of postmodern irony and posturing hipster knowingness – is so striking and exciting.

True politics requires at least two elements: first, a demand, what I call an infinite demand that flows from the perception of an injustice; second, a location where that demand is articulated. There is no politics without location.

If the nation state or the supra-national sphere is not a location for politics, then the task is to create a location. This is the logic of occupation. The Occupy Wall Street protest in Zuccotti Park taught us that much. Otherwise, we are doomed to the abstraction of demonstration and protest. The other thing it taught us is the unpredictable character of location.

It is unclear how the different elements of the Occupy movement will develop. But they certainly will – this genie of popular protest cannot be put back in its bottle. But what it requires is a location or, better, a network of interconnected sites.

So what is the next location? Where to occupy next? It is not for old men like me to offer advice, but a massive occupation of Olympic sites in London in order to stop the dreadful, sad jingoism of the whole tiresome spectacle would be nice.

critchley yo

How might we motivate an ethical subject to commit to a conception of the good

Jay Bernstein and me: motivational deficit, secular liberal democratic institutions suck, and demotivate

An ethics that motivate people to acts of political resistance

DEMAND: a demand that I approve, this begins to shape my ethical subjectivity.

fidelity to a demand that cannot be fulfilled.

divides subjectivity: a ‘dividual’  demand to which it responds and inability to be an equal to that demand, excess of demand over approval.

one can never attain the autarchy of self-mastery

comically ridiculous:

What’s the link between conscience and political action?

neo-anarchism: Seattle protests, anti-war, protests against G-8 in Germany, horizontal aggregation of a collective will by disperse groups, forging of a new language of civil disobedience

non-violence: Peace can be warlike without being violent

ne0 leninists:virile heroic figure

politics of powerlessness, refusal of violence, creative non-violence.

thomas paine deep democracy, pneumatic anarchism

Interstitial distance: creation of spaces of distance from state, Marx’s true democracy, inidigenous rights movements.  Courtney Young, rise of Indigenous Rights Movement in Mexico

creation of new political actor, “indigenous” at a distance from the state.

Appeal to Universality

Infinite Responsibility: provide the glue to think of ethical subject, infinitely demanding, ethical subject, experience of fidelity, what differentiates contemporary anarchist practices turns on freedom and responsibility: 1960 non-repressive sublimation the joy of sex, this is pseudo-liberatarianism of which contemporary Anarchists are critical – ethical outrage of yawning poverty and disenfranchisement, visceral experience of deep democratization

what ties together the various groups? Not common set of theoretical doctrines, a shared sense of grievance and wrong, war is wrong etc.  contemporary anarchism is closer to Levinas than Marcuse, opens me to the other’s infinite demand.

hetero-affectivity: infinite ethical demand

Kant Hegel

Hegel on Kant:

On a Hegelian view, the dilemma at the heart of the Kantian project takes the following form: how can I be subject to a law of which I am the author, given that I can only be legitimately subject to such a law because of the governing principle of autonomy. Hegel shows how this Kantian dilemma requires an intersubjective solution, namely that it is necessary to show, firstly that reason is social, and secondly, that the sociality of reason unfolds historically and cannot be reduced to the formal decision procedure of the Kantian categorical imperative or the solitary activity of the Fichtean ego.

Tada: The conservative Kantian in response to the ethical demand, in order to respond sees the ethical response as reflection of his moral autonomy and rationality, in other words, it doesn’t split her into two, doesn’t cause him any psychic imbalance, doesn’t really peturb him or her in the least, because, the ethical response is a moral categorical imperative, it is a reflection of the subject’s own inner reason.

Critichley wants to argue that things are not so ‘neat and tidy’.

It is this moment of incomprehensibility in ethics that interests me, where the subject is faced with a demand that does not correspond to its autonomy: in this situation, I am not the equal of the demand that is placed on me.  … ethics is obliged to acknowledge a moment of rebellious heteronomy that troubles the sovereignty of autonomy (37).

motivational deficit ethical subject

Critchley, Simon.  notes from a talk he gave.

Disappointment: the condition of the world in which we live is pretty grim, a state of war, what might justice be in a violently unjust world? It is this question that provokes the need for an ETHICS.

The main task of this book is responding to that need by offering a theory of ethical experience and subjectivity that will lead to an infinitely demanding ethics of commitment and politics of resistance (3)

active nihilsm, passive nihilism: American Buddhism, contemplative withdrawal where one faces the meaningless chaos of the world with eyes wide shut

Motivational Deficit

where citizens experience the governmental norms that rule contemporary society as externally binding buty not internally compelling, there is a motivational deficit at the heart of secular liberal democracy

Each of these forms of nihilsim express a deep truth: identification of a motivational deficit at the heart of liberal democracy, we are basically indifferent and then fall into active or passive nihilism.

What is required, in my view, is a conception of ethics that begins by accepting the motivational deficit in the institutions of liberal democracy, but without embracing either passive or active nihilism … What is lacking at the present time of massive political disappointment is a motivating, empowering conception of ethics that can face and face down the drift of the present, an ethics that is able to respond to and resist the political situation in which we find ourselves. This brings me to my initial question: if we are going to stand a chance of constructing an ethics that empowers subjects to political action, a motivating ethics, we require some sort of answer to what I see as the basic question of morality. It is to this that I would now like to turn (8).

Ethics of commitment and political resistance

A subject is the name for the way in which a self binds itself to some conception of the good and shapes its subjectivity in relation to that good (10).

Ethics is anarchic meta-politics, it is the continual questioning from below of any attempt to impose order from above. On this view, politics is the creation of interstitial distance within the state, the invention of new political subjectivities. Politics, I argue, cannot be confined to the activity of government that maintains order, pacification and security while constantly aiming at consensus. On the contrary, politics is the manifestation of dissensus, the cultivation of an anarchic multiplicity that calls into question the authority and legitimacy of the state. It is in relation to such a multiplicity that we may begin to restore some dignity to the dreadfully devalued discourse of democracy (13).

Divided Self

Guilt is the affect that produces a certain splitting or division in the subject … This experience of self-division is … the sting of bad conscience … the phenomenon of guilty conscience reveals — negatively — the fundamentally moral articulation of the self. Namely, that ethical subjectivity is not just an aspect or dimension of subjective life, it is rather the fundamental feature of what we think of as a self, the repository of our deepest commitments and values (23).

Humour

super-ego is the cause of suffering

instead, we should find oneself ridiculous, learn to laugh at ourselves, “a super-ego which does not lacerate the ego, but speaks to it words of unsentimental consolation. this is a positive super-ego that liberates and elevates by allowing the ego to find itself ridiculous 83.

‘Super-ego II’ is the child that has become the parent: wiser, wittier and slightly wizened. It is the super-ego that saves the human being from tragic hubris, from the Promethean fantasy of believing oneself omnipotent, autarkic and authentic, and it does this through humour

It is indeed true, as Nietzsche would claim, that withoiut the experience of sublimation, conscinece cruelly vivisects thh subject, it pulls us apart. This is why we require the less heroic but possibly more tragic form of sublimation that I have tried to describe in this chapter (87).


Market Meltdown 101: Richard Wolff on Economic History from Amherst Wire on Vimeo.