Logics of Critical Explanation – Page 2

Excitable Speech

Vicki Kirby. JB: Live Theory. 2006. Continuum

Language is not a mere instrument or tool in this account, a technology used to different effects by a sovereign subject who controls it. The complication here is that if we ourselves are an effect of language then the complexity of its ontology resonates with our own constitution (88).

There is a life a discourse that exceeds the subject’s own temporality (92).

In Excitable Speech Butler specifically interrogates the act of hate speech because although great suffering can be attributed to these injurious acts she disputes the juridical model of power which informs campaigns to stop it. … Butler’s point here is that ‘the sovereign conceit’ which installs a causal equivalence between the speaker’s intention to wound, the actual representation of hate and the impact felt by the victim shows little appreciation of the problematic nature of communication. Further to this, this style of analysis inadvertently constitutes the victim of hate speech as a powerless object of the act, a passive recipient of injury whose incapacity renders them totally vulnerable. Lacking agency, the subject’s only hope of protection is that the state will exercise its power to prohibit and police such acts (94).

From Butler’s 1999 interview with Vicki Bell:

I think there are all kinds of reasons to stop a person when they speak such things [racist and homophobic speech]… I think that’s important. But I think a politics that begins and ends with that policing function is a mistake, because for me the question is how is that person, as it were, renewing and reinvigorating racist rituals of speech, and how do we think about those particular rituals and how do we exploit their ritual function in order to undermine it in a more thorough-going way, rather than just stopping it as it’s spoken. What would it mean to restage it, take it, do something else with the ritual so that its revivability as a speech act is really seriously called into question? (Butler and Bell 1999, 166)

… her intention is to destabilize correspondence theories of language and to complicate what is actually meant by this notion of ‘discursive constitution’.

An important consideration for Butler is that the outcome of language is always threatened by incoherence, contingency and ambiguity, for it involves an intricate web of dispersed causality where the presumed integrity of authorship and authority, meaning and intention, are ‘spoken through’ by convention. This means that discursive convention is not a static structure but one which ‘suffer[s] destructuration through being reiterated, repeated, and rearticulated’. With this in mind, Butler asks, ‘[m]ight the speech act of hate speech be understood as less efficacious, more prone to innovation and subversion, if we were to take into account the temporal life of the “structure” it is said to enunciate? (Butler from Excitable, quoted in Kirby 2006, 95)

illocutionary act (performative utterance) language that performs an action as it is said.
“speech acts that in saying do what they say, and do it in the moment of that saying”. The illocutionary speech act is itself the deed that it effects

“I bet” when said to a casino employee, or “I do” when said in a marriage ceremony to a future spouse, respectively constitute the fact of bettting and marrying. The actual practice of language can here be described as truth producing.

… if I am a heterosexual man standing in front of a registrar in a Register Office and I utter the words ‘I do’ in answer to the question, ‘Do you take this woman to be your wife?’, then I am actually performing the action by making the utterance: statements like these are called performative utterances or illocutionary acts. ‘To name the ship is to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words “I name &c.” When I say, before the registrar or altar &c., “I do”, I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it’ (Austin 1955: 6) (Salih 2002. p 88).

perlocutionary act (constative utterance) language that describes the world
“speech acts that produce certain effects as their consequence; by saying something, a certain effect follows.” The perlocutionary merely leads to certain effects that are not the same as the speech act itself.

In Bodies That Matter Butler once again draws from these lectures on linguistics, How To Do Things With Words. Austin distinguishes between two types of utterances, those that describe or report on something, and those that, in saying, actually perform what is being said.

Austin calls constative utterances, might be the statement, ‘It’s a sunny day’, or ‘I went shopping’ (Austin also calls these perlocutionary acts); by saying ‘I went shopping’, I am not doing it, I am merely reporting an occurrence.

political logics of equivalance and difference

In sum, the political logics of equivalence and difference comprise a descriptive framing devise which is derived from a particular understanding of discourse and the importance accorded to processes of signification. They enhance our approach to social science explanation by furnishing us with a conceptual grammar with which to account for the dynamics of social change. They help us show how social practices and regime are contested, transformed, and instituted, thereby extending our grammar beyond social logics (145).

self-interpretations

The reason social science explanation cannot be entirely reduced to the contextualized self-interpretations of the subjects under study is not simply because these are structured by broader social processes that are too complicated and complex in their interactions to grasp, but more fundamentally because social structures are themselves constitutively lacking. But, again, the social structures making possible the subjects’ self-interpretations, and the limits of social structures themselves, are locatable and understandable only by identifying correlative limit experiences by passing through, and relating them explicitly to, the self-interpretations of subjects. Lapses, bungled actions, and slips of tongue comprise examples of just such limits within the psychoanalytic domain (102).

Enjoyment

Enjoyment is not to be understood as a synonym for pleasure, if only because such enjoyment is often though by no means always consciously expereinced as suffering.

– accounts for a ‘symptom’s inertia’

The notion of enjoyment captures a subject’s mode of being, whether individual or collective

The guilt which may accompany the transgression of an officially affirmed ideal is a possible, indeed farily common, mode of experiencing enjoyment (107).

… the notion of enjoyment has been used to characterize and account for the resilience of a host of practices and rituals … In sum by invoking fantasmatic logics we suggest that one condition for subscribing to an existing or promised social practice concerns the extent to which it can tap into the subject’s exisitng mode of enjoyment and thus fantasmatic frame.

Laclau and Mouffe’s new theoretical grammar

… it is important to stress the way in which Laclau and Mouffe sought to construct the problem they encountered in terms of a ‘crisis of Marxism’, which had then to be resolved in a particular way.

… In sum, Laclau and Mouffe proposed a new theoretical grammar that was rooted in a particular ontological standpoint, which they used to render intelligible a series of recalcitrant empirical phenomena and strategic dilemmas confronting a particular intellectual tradition. In so doing, the logic of their approach partakes of a retroductive form of reasoning. But why should we accept their new theoretical grammar. What are the criteria for its acceptance? It is clear that in developing their new approach Laclau and Mouffe did not rely upon the standard positivist model of testing a set of falsifiable hypotheses against all empirical evidence so as to demonstrate their validity. As against positivism, with its rigid separation of discovery and testing, the answer as to why we could or should accept their intervention depends, first, upon a range of criteria, which are internal to the production of their theoretical approach itself and, second, upon a nexus of persuasive practices, and theoretical and strategic interventions, which are designed to convince a range of relevant communities of both their validity and strategic importance.

The internal criteria we can mobilize to evaluate their theoretical solution comprise the degree to which the new approach is able to render intelligible the anomalous phenomena that arose within the existing paradigms in a a way that was more plausible than rival attempts to resolve the crisis of Marxism; the consistency of its ontological presuppositions and theoretical claims; the fecundity of the research programme in identifying and addressing new possibilities of theoretical endeavour and empirical research; and the cogency and effectiveness of the critiqus developed in its name, coupled with the new ethical and political possibilities the new approach makes possible. In all these respects, it is our view that Laclau and Mouffe’s approach does indeed consitutte a valid project of theory construction, which successfully addresses many of the anomalies they confronted, thus disclosing new possibilities for research and intervention. IN fact, this book can be read a sattamept to make good this claim (43).

no typology of practices as such

It is clear regimes remain both entities which structure practices, and entities which are produced by practices. Equally, we have noted the discursive and constructed character of regimes … every regime is marked by an outside that partially constitutes its identity, and which carries the threat of subverting it. And this ontological assumption is linked to our claim that every order and practice arises as a political construction that involves the exclusion of certain possibilities.

There is no typology of practices as such, only practices for which one or more ontological dimensions are foregrounded, bckgrounded, or articulated. For this reason, the boundary between social and political practices is blurred, as is the boundary between regimes and practices. 123

Discourse Theory Methodology

Howarth, David. “Applying Discourse Theory: the Method of Articulation” in Discourse Theory in European Politics. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds). Palgrave: Great Britain. 2005., pp. 316-349.

The application of post-Marxist discourse theory (PMDT) to empirical objects of investigation

Discourse Theory and the Question of Method

PMDT is best understood as a research programme or paradigm, and not just an empirical theory in the narrow sense of the term. It thus consists of a system of ontological assumptions, theoretical concepts and methdological precepts, and not just a set of falsifiable propositions designed to explain and predict phenomena such as the behaviour of the capitalist state, or different forms and logics of collective action (317).

– discourse theory is to be differentiated from discourse analysis
– discourse theory does not overlap with the different varieties of discourse analysis
– discourse theory is not just a toolkit to analyse ‘language in use’

as the conduct of discourse analysis is only meaningful within a particular social and political theory, alongside its core ontological assumptions and overall political purposes. At most, therefore, the various tools of discourse analysis constitute one particular set of techniques that can help us to understand and explain empirical phenomena which have already been constituted as meaningful objects of analysis. They do not exhaust the concept of discourse theory itself (318).

– discourse theory is “problem-driven”: akin to Foucault’s technique of problematization in that it begins with a set of pressing political and ethical problems in the present, before seeking to analyse the historical and structural conditions which gave rise to them, while furnishing the means for their critique and transgression.

this method is not simply a matter of analysing ‘behaviour or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought — and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.

In so doing Foucault synthesizes his archeological and genealogical moments of analysis:

Archaeological: makes possible the examination of ‘forms themselves’, describing the rules that condition the elements of a particular discourse —its objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies — in a given period say, the discourse of ‘madness’ or ‘illness’ in the nineteenth century, archaeology provides the means to delimit research objects (318).

Genealogical: accounts for their contingent emergence and production, analyses their constitution by recounting the historical practices from which they were constructed, enabling research to show the contingency of identities and practices and foreground possibilities foreclosed by the dominant logics.

Finally while the focus of research is the interrogation of a specific problematized phenomenon, it is important to stress the these problems are not specified in a completely independent and atheoretical fashion. On the contrary, as against empiricism or rationalism, the emergence and constitution of research problems always presupposes the ontological assumptions and categories of discourse theory for their initial discernment and description (319).

2 key dimensions of ontological framework

2 key dimensions which centre on the notion of subjectivity

hermeneutic-structural: highlights the presumptive centrality of the self-interpretations of subjects in social science explanations. But it is also important to recognize in this regard that discursive practices exhibit varying degrees of sedimentation, ranging from regimes and institutions to social habits. While the social logics structuring them are literally buoyed up by subjects — they do not exist except through the activity of subjects— they are not necessarily cognitively accessible to subjects, at least not immediately and without some form of intervention. This means that logics can have significant explanatory and critical leverage independently of the consciously held self-interpretations of agents. Certainly, social logics are products of past understanding, interpretations and decisions, but they tend to secure a degree of autonomy and not insignificant force when sedimented into practices and regimes. This is one reason why the assent of agents is not conclusive or exhaustive of an explanation’s validity. (162)

poststructural dimension: highlights the way in which social structures are never complete in themselves by foregrounding the dislocatory nature of the symbolic order (the ‘real’ in Lacanian terms) and thus the possible emergence of political subjectivity as such. This means that the hermeneutical-structural dimension fails to exhaust our particular ontological framework. It is at this point that political and fantasmatic logics come into play, thus enabling us to generate critical accounts of the constitution and dissolution of social structures themselves. This is because they assist in the process of revealing and explaining the non-necessary character of social logics and the practices they sustain and animate. This enables us to generate critical explanations that are both sensitive to context and explicit about their ontological, ethical, normative, and sociological presuppositions. (162)

Retroductive explanation

Our main critical argument is that it is problematic to model social processes on natural processes in this way — whether as universal laws, causal generalizations, or robust empirical correlations — because it leads to rather narrow conceptions of testing and explanation, in which the element of prediction is elevated at the expense of contextual and ontological factors. In short, our target is the law-like conception of explanation and testing that the causal law paradigm elevates to the status of an ideal. (19)

As against inductive and deductive modes of reasoning, we argue more positively that retroductive reasoning provides us with a general form or logic of explanation in the social sciences.

More specifically, we challenge the compartmentalizing tendencies of positivist social science investigation — a logic of scientific discovery followed by exhaustive empirical testing and explanation — and propose instead one overarching logic of investigation comprising three interlocking moments: the problematization of empirical phenomena; the retroductive explanation of these phenomena; and the persuasion of — and intervention into — the relevant community and practices of scholars and lay-actors. (19)

What is a Logic

GH talk about the “logic of a practice” which

comprises the rules or grammar of the practice, as well as the conditions which make the practice both possible and vulnerable.

This definition of ‘logic’ and the way GH use it is hard to pin down. They give example of of they use the term logic, speaking about the logic of:

– logic of chess playing: 1) the dominant pattern of moves, strategies, counter-strategies, tactics and counter-tactics 2) Basic entities and types of relationships between pieces 3) rules of the game

– logic of the market: 1) compirses a particular set of subject positions, objects (commodities and means of exchange) 2) systems of relations and meanings connecting subjects and objects, insitutional parameters (legal system) 3) Also the conditions that make possible the continued operation of a partiuclar market practice, as well as its potential vulnerabilities. What political struggles preceded its institution? What processes ensure its maintenance or question its hegemonic status? Logics must also provide the means with which to answer these sorts of questions.

A social logic can characterize a practice or regime. Take the Thatcherite regime which can be characterized as a network of social logics: 1) a social logic of marketization and centralization, both of which were rooted in the philosophy of the New RIght … Once sedimented, the Thatcherite discourse signified the practices and aspiration of liberating the capitalist economy, with its attendant entrepreneurial practices, from the stranglehold of an overloaded and bureaucratic state, as well as from over-powerful trade unions which were smothering enterprise and innovation. On the other hand, Thatcherism came to represent a demand for a more restrictive, though more powerful, state that would regulate less, but more intensively. (137)

Deconstructive Genealogy/Onto-ethical critique

What then does the task of incorporating a self-reflexive and self-critical ethos into the concrete problematization and explanation of social phenomena entail? On the one hand, the ontological postulates of our approach concerning radical contingency have to inform the construction, investigation and explanation of social phenomenon (155).

We must develop a style of research that builds contingency into its very modus operandi, and which is open and attentive to possibilities disclosed by the research itself.

A Deconstructive Genealogy of a social practice or regime

The task here is to reactivate and make evident options that were foreclosed during the emergence of a practice – the clashes and forces which are repressed or defeated – in order to show how the present configuration of practices relies on exclusions that reveal the non-necessary character of the present social formation, and to explore the consequences and potential effects of such ‘repressions’. On the other hand,

Onto-ethical critique

In the mode of what we could call an onto-ethical critique the task is to critically interrogate the conditions under which a particular social practice or regime grips its subjects despite its non-necessary character. This mode of critique furnishes us with a means of critically interrogating the will to (fantasmatic) closure.

However, both modes of critique are informed by an ethos of exercising a fidelity to contingency itself, by displaying other possibilities for political decision and identification as well as other modalities of identification. Together they contribute to a practice of ethico-political interpretation. (155)

Problematization

Changing face of higher education in the UK: Problematize the different way it has been problematized by key social actors.

In this general context, an apparent puzzle has emerged concerning the lack of meaningful resistance by academics to the new regime of audit practices … Why are higher education audit reforms frequently not abandoned or activetly resisted by academics? … Why are these reforms often allowed to intensify further, becoming even more deeply institutionalized and sedimented. 170

An object of study is constructed. This means that a range of disparate empirical phenomena have to constituted as a problem, and the problem has to be located at an appropriate level of abstraction and complexity. Thus our approach shares a family resemblance with Foucault’s practice of problematization, which in his view synthesized the archaeological and genealogical methods of analysis.

… problematization constitutes the first of three moments in the overall logic of critical explanation. The second moment entails the furnishing of a retroductive explanation that addresses key features which emerge out of our initial problematization.

1. Identifying relevant social (What), political (Why) and fantasmatic (How) logics. We must thus start by characterizing the practices under investigation … this involves the task of retroductively identifying the assemblage of social logics that are currently being installed in UK universitites. There are 4 such social logics:

4 social logics informing the practices of the new regime:1. competition, 2. atomisation, 3. hierarchy, 4. instrumentalization. Which when articulated together enable us to characterize the emergent regime of audit practices (171).

2. The important point to keep in mind here is how, for us, the identification and operation of social logics requires some reference to — or passage through — the self-interpretation of subjects.

3. Having established what the logics structuring the various audit practices in higher education are, we can also ask why and how they came about and continue to be sustained. This turns our attention to the operation of political and fantasmatic logics