Category: methodology

Interstitial Strategy

Erik Olin Wright, Envisioning Real Utopias New York: Verso, 2010.

Chapter 10: Interstitial Transformation

WHAT IS AN INTERSTITIAL STRATEGY?

The adjective “interstitial” is used in social theory to describe various kinds of processes that occur in the spaces and cracks within some dominant social structure of power. One can speak of the interstices of an organization, the interstices of a society, or even the interstices of global capitalism. The underlying assumption is that the social unit in question can be understood as a system within which there is some kind of dominant power structure or dominant logic which organizes the system, but that the system is not so coherent and integrated that those dominant power relations govern all of the activities that occur within it. Even in so-called “totalitarian” systems in which centralized power penetrates quite deeply into all spheres of social life there are still spaces within which individuals act in relatively autonomous ways, not following the dictates of the logic of the system. This need not imply that such interstitial practices are subversive or that they necessarily corrode the dominant logic of the system, but simply that they are not directly governed or controlled by the dominant power relations and dominant principles of social organization.

Interstitial processes often play a central role in large-scale patterns of social change. For example, capitalism is often described as having developed in the interstices of feudal society. Feudal societies were characterized by a dominant structure of class and power relations consisting of nobles of various ranks who controlled much of the land and the principle means of military violence and peasants with different kinds of rights who engaged in agricultural production and produced a surplus which was appropriated by the feudal dominant class through a variety of largely coercive mechanisms. Market relations developed in the cities, which were less fully integrated into feudal relations, and over time this created the context within which proto-capitalist relations and practices could emerge and eventually flourish. Whether one believes that the pivotal source of ultimate transformation of feudalism came from the dynamics of war-making and state-building, from contradictions in process of feudal surplus extraction, from the corrosive effects of markets, from the eventual challenge of emerging capitalists, or some combination of these processes, the interstitial development of capitalism within feudal societies is an important part of the story.

While interstitial processes and activities clearly play a significant role in social change, it is less obvious that there are compelling interstitial strategies for social transformation. The urban artisans and merchants in feudal society whose interstitial activities fostered new kinds of relations did not have a project of destroying feudal class relations and forging a new kind of society. They were simply engaged in profit-seeking activities, adapting to the opportunities and possibilities of the society in which they lived. The broader ramifications for long-term social change were basically unintended by-products of their interstitial activities, not a strategy as such. An interstitial strategy, in contrast, involves the deliberate development of interstitial activities for the purpose of fundamental transformation of the system as a whole.

There are certainly many interstitial activities in contemporary capitalist societies which are candidates for elements of an interstitial strategy of social emancipation: producer and consumer coops, battered women’s shelters, workers factory councils, intentional communities and communes, community-based social economy services, civic environmental councils, community-controlled land trusts, cross-border equal-exchange trade organizations, and many other things. All of these are consciously constructed forms of social organization that differ from the dominant structures of power and inequality. Some are part of grand visions for the reconstruction of society as a whole; others have more modest objectives of transforming specific domains of social life. Some are linked to systematic theories of social transformation; others are pragmatic responses to the exigencies of social problem-solving. What they have in common is the idea of building alternative institutions and deliberately fostering new forms of social relations that embody emancipatory ideals and that are created primarily through direct action of one sort or another rather than through the state. (page 230)

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Many socialists, especially those enmeshed in the Marxist tradition, are quite skeptical of such projects. The argument goes something like this: While many of these efforts at building alternative institutions may embody desirable values and perhaps even prefigure emancipatory forms of social relations, they pose no serious challenge to existing relations of power and domination. Precisely because these are “interstitial” they can only occupy spaces that are “allowed” by capitalism. They may even strengthen capitalism by siphoning off discontent and creating the illusion that if people are unhappy with the dominant institutions they should just go off and live their lives in alternative settings. Ultimately, therefore, interstitial projects constitute retreats from political struggle for social transformation, not a viable strategy for achieving radical social transformation. At best they may make life a little better for some people in the world as it is; at worst they deflect energies from real political challenge to change the world to something better. There are certainly instances in which this negative diagnosis seems plausible. The hippy communes of the 1960s may have been inspired by utopian longings and a belief that they were part of the “dawning of the Age of Aquarius,” but in practice they functioned more as escapes from the realities of capitalist society than as nodes of radical transformation. Other examples, like organic grocery cooperatives, while not escapes from capitalist society, neverthelessseem constrained to occupy small niches often catering to relatively affluent people who can afford to “indulge” their preferences for a particular kind of “life style”. Organic grocery cooperatives may embody some progressive ideals, but they do not pose a threat to the system.

As a general indictment of interstitial strategies of transformation, these negative judgments are too harsh. They assume both that there is an alternative strategy which does pose a serious “threat to the system” and also that this alternative strategy is undermined by the existence of interstitial efforts at social transformation. The fact is that in present historical conditions no strategy credibly poses a direct threat to the system in the sense that there are good grounds for believing that adopting the strategy today will generate effects in the near future that would really threaten capitalism. (page 231) This is what it means to live in a hegemonic capitalist system: capitalism is sufficiently secure and flexible in its basic structures that there is no strategy possible that immediately threatens it. The strategic problem is to imagine things we can do now which have reasonable chances of opening up possibilities under contingent conditions in the future. Interstitial strategies, of course, may ultimately be dead-ends and be permanently contained within narrow limits, but it is also possible that under certain circumstances they can play a positive role in a long-term trajectory of emancipatory social transformation.

The question, then, is this: what is the underlying model of social transformation in which interstitial activities can be viewed as part of an overall strategy for emancipatory social empowerment? What is the implicit theory of the ways in which such activities can cumulatively transform the society as a whole? Writers in the anarchist tradition devote remarkably little attention to this problem. While anarchist writing criticizes existing structures of capitalist and statist power and defends a vision of a federated cooperative alternative without the coercive domination of the state, there is very little systematic elaboration of how to actually “build the new society within the shell of the old” and how this can lead to a systemic transformation.

pass through subjects

Methodologically we argue that the development of an explanation must start with intentions and self-interpretations, not only as part of the process of problematization, but also to arrive at an understanding of the character of social logics, as well as political and fantasmatic logics.  In conceptual terms, logics are aligned with self-interpretations against causal mechanisms, because it is through self-interpretations and thick descriptions that hte ontic is connected to the ontological, and social logics connected with political and fantasmatic logics (161).

self-interpretations

The reason social science explanation cannot be entirely reduced to the contextualized self-interpretations of the subjects under study is not simply because these are structured by broader social processes that are too complicated and complex in their interactions to grasp, but more fundamentally because social structures are themselves constitutively lacking.  But, again, the social structures making possible the subjects’ self-interpretations, and the limits of social structures themselves, are locatable and understandable only by identifying correlative limit experiences by passing through, and relating them explicitly to, the self-interpretations of subjects.  Lapses, bungled actions, and slips of tongue comprise examples of just such limits within the psychoanalytic domain (102).

Laclau and Mouffe’s new theoretical grammar

… it is important to stress the way in which Laclau and Mouffe sought to construct the problem they encountered in terms of a ‘crisis of Marxism’, which had then to be resolved in a particular way.

… In sum, Laclau and Mouffe proposed a new theoretical grammar that was rooted in a particular ontological standpoint, which they used to render intelligible a series of recalcitrant empirical phenomena and strategic dilemmas confronting a particular intellectual tradition. In so doing, the logic of their approach partakes of a retroductive form of reasoning. But why should we accept their new theoretical grammar. What are the criteria for its acceptance? It is clear that in developing their new approach Laclau and Mouffe did not rely upon the standard positivist model of testing a set of falsifiable hypotheses against all empirical evidence so as to demonstrate their validity. As against positivism, with its rigid separation of discovery and testing, the answer as to why we could or should accept their intervention depends, first, upon a range of criteria, which are internal to the production of their theoretical approach itself and, second, upon a nexus of persuasive practices, and theoretical and strategic interventions, which are designed to convince a range of relevant communities of both their validity and strategic importance.

The internal criteria we can mobilize to evaluate their theoretical solution comprise the degree to which the new approach is able to render intelligible the anomalous phenomena that arose within the existing paradigms in a a way that was more plausible than rival attempts to resolve the crisis of Marxism; the consistency of its ontological presuppositions and theoretical claims; the fecundity of the research programme in identifying and addressing new possibilities of theoretical endeavour and empirical research; and the cogency and effectiveness of the critiqus developed in its name, coupled with the new ethical and political possibilities the new approach makes possible. In all these respects, it is our view that Laclau and Mouffe’s approach does indeed consitutte a valid project of theory construction, which successfully addresses many of the anomalies they confronted, thus disclosing new possibilities for research and intervention. IN fact, this book can be read a sattamept to make good this claim (43).

issue of class

Marx’s theory of class struggle can legitimately be understood as a response to the problem of collective agency in capitalist societies. However, the initial formulation of a theoretical (or, indeed, empirical) response to a problem may in certain respects be problematic: it may partake of an essentialist form of reasoning or may be ensnared in a reductionist framework. The aim of deconstruction in this regard is to lay bare these sorts of ambiguities and exclusions, thus weakening any essentializing projections into the concept and/or exploring repressed possibilities foreclosed by reductionist proclivities.  It may turn out, for example, that class struggles are only one form of collective agency amongst others; indeed, its particular embodiment may be overdetermined by other forms of struggle and identity, such as race, gender or ethnicity.  If this is the case (which we think it is), then a practice of commensuration is required to rework the theoretical concept so as to render it compatible with our ontological presuppositions, while the practice of articulation involves its reinscription in a new explanatory framework (181).

Discourse Theory Methodology

Howarth, David. “Applying Discourse Theory: the Method of Articulation” in Discourse Theory in European Politics. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds). Palgrave: Great Britain. 2005., pp. 316-349.

The application of post-Marxist discourse theory (PMDT) to empirical objects of investigation

Discourse Theory and the Question of Method

PMDT is best understood as a research programme or paradigm, and not just an empirical theory in the narrow sense of the term.  It thus consists of a system of ontological assumptions, theoretical concepts and methdological precepts, and not just a set of falsifiable propositions designed to explain and predict phenomena such as the behaviour of the capitalist state, or different forms and logics of collective action (317).

– discourse theory is to be differentiated from discourse analysis
– discourse theory does not overlap with the different varieties of discourse analysis
– discourse theory is not just a toolkit to analyse ‘language in use’

as the conduct of discourse analysis is only meaningful within a particular social and political theory, alongside its core ontological assumptions and overall political purposes.  At most, therefore, the various tools of discourse analysis constitute one particular set of techniques that can help us to understand and explain empirical phenomena which have already been constituted as meaningful objects of analysis.  They do not exhaust the concept of discourse theory itself (318).

– discourse theory is “problem-driven”: akin to Foucault’s technique of problematization in that it begins with a set of pressing political and ethical problems in the present, before seeking to analyse the historical and structural conditions which gave rise to them, while furnishing the means for their critique and transgression.

this method is not simply a matter of analysing ‘behaviour or ideas, nor societies and their “ideologies”, but the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought — and the practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.

In so doing Foucault synthesizes his archeological and genealogical moments of analysis:

Archaeological: makes possible the examination of ‘forms themselves’, describing the rules that condition the elements of a particular discourse —its objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies — in a given period say, the discourse of ‘madness’ or ‘illness’ in the nineteenth century, archaeology provides the means to delimit research objects (318).

Genealogical: accounts for their contingent emergence and production, analyses their constitution by recounting the historical practices from which they were constructed, enabling research to show the contingency of identities and practices and foreground possibilities foreclosed by the dominant logics.

Finally while the focus of research is the interrogation of a specific problematized phenomenon, it is important to stress the these problems are not specified in a completely independent and atheoretical fashion. On the contrary, as against empiricism or rationalism, the emergence and constitution of research problems always presupposes the ontological assumptions and categories of discourse theory for their initial discernment and description (319).

Deconstructive Genealogy/Onto-ethical critique

What then does the task of incorporating a self-reflexive and self-critical ethos into the concrete problematization and explanation of social phenomena entail?  On the one hand, the ontological postulates of our approach concerning radical contingency have to inform the construction, investigation and explanation of social phenomenon (155).

We must develop a style of research that builds contingency into its very modus operandi, and which is open and attentive to possibilities disclosed by the research itself.

A Deconstructive Genealogy of a social practice or regime

The task here is to reactivate and make evident options that were foreclosed during the emergence of a practice – the clashes and forces which are repressed or defeated – in order to show how the present configuration of practices relies on exclusions that reveal the non-necessary character of the present social formation, and to explore the consequences and potential effects of such ‘repressions’.  On the other hand,

Onto-ethical critique

In the mode of what we could call an onto-ethical critique the task is to critically interrogate the conditions under which a particular social practice or regime grips its subjects despite its non-necessary character.  This mode of critique furnishes us with a means of critically interrogating the will to (fantasmatic) closure. 

However, both modes of critique are informed by an ethos of exercising a fidelity to contingency itself, by displaying other possibilities for political decision and identification as well as other modalities of identification.  Together they contribute to a practice of ethico-political interpretation. (155)

Problematization

Problematization

Changing face of higher education in the UK: Problematize the different way it has been problematized by key social actors.

In this general context, an apparent puzzle has emerged concerning the lack of meaningful resistance by academics to the new regime of audit practices … Why are higher education audit reforms frequently not abandoned or activetly resisted by academics?  … Why are these reforms often allowed to intensify further, becoming even more deeply institutionalized and sedimented. 170

An object of study is constructed.  This means that a range of disparate empirical phenomena have to constituted as a problem, and the problem has to be located at an appropriate level of abstraction and complexity.  Thus our approach shares a family resemblance with Foucault’s practice of problematization, which in his view synthesized the archaeological and genealogical methods of analysis.

… problematization constitutes the first of three moments in the overall logic of critical explanation.  The second moment entails the furnishing of a retroductive explanation that addresses key features which emerge out of our initial problematization.

1. Identifying relevant social (What), political (Why)  and fantasmatic (How) logics.  We must thus start by characterizing the practices under investigation … this involves the task of retroductively identifying the assemblage of social logics that are currently being installed in UK universitites.  There are 4 such social logics:

4 social logics informing the practices of the new regime:1. competition, 2. atomisation, 3. hierarchy, 4. instrumentalization.  Which when articulated together enable us to characterize the emergent regime of audit practices (171).

2. The important point to keep in mind here is how, for us, the identification and operation of social logics requires some reference to — or passage through — the self-interpretation of subjects.

3.  Having established what the logics structuring the various audit practices in higher education are, we can also ask why and how they came about and continue to be sustained.  This turns our attention to the operation of political and fantasmatic logics

deductive-nomological, hypothetico-deductive

Our more concrete object of critique was the subsumptive character of the dominant mode of social and political theorizing.  Subsumption in the field of method is evident when mainstream social scientists either deduce explanation from higher order laws or generalizations — the so-called deductive-nomological form of explanation — or deduce predictions which are subjected to exhaustive tests — the so-called hypothetico-deductive form of validation.  Empirical objects are thus subsumed under the theoretical concepts, and do not modify or transform the latter, thus giving rise to what Althusser calls ‘a relation of exteriority’ between theoretical categories and empirical phenomena ( citing Althusser Reading Capital: 49) (210)

Method of critical logics

Several consequences follow from our account of logics:

1) Methodologically we argue that the development of an explanation must start with intentions and self-interpretations.  It is absolutely crucial to pass through subjects’ self-interpretations, not only as part of the process of problematizaton, but also to arrive at an understanding of the character of social  logics, as well as political and fantasmatic logics. In conceptual terms, logics are aligned with self-interpretations against causal mechanisms, because it is through self-interpretations and thick descriptions that the ontic is connected to the ontological, and social logics connected with the political and fantasmatic logics … Contextualized self-interpretations are necessary but not sufficient components of a social science explanation.  Showing why and how this is possible allows us to carve out a space beyond the domains of causal laws and mechanisms on the one hand, and self-interpretations and thick descriptions on the other. (161)

… [T]he process of social science explanation ought to be understood in terms of articulation rather than subsumption. It is evident from our account that any fully-fledged explanans contains a plurality of different kinds of logics and concepts, which have to be linked together to critically explain.  This raises a question about the conditions under which it is possible to bring together these heterogeneous elements into an explanation without subsuming them under higher-order laws or abstractions and without falling into a pure descriptivism … [W]e should understand critical explanation as part of an articulatory practice, by which we mean ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice’ (cited in LM 1985: 105) (162).

2) This is not voluntarism:

Siding with hermeneutics against naturalism we argue that contextuallized self-interpretations are an essential and ineluctable aspect of any critical explanation. But now siding with naturalism, we argue that critical explanations cannot be reduced to contextualized self-interpretations, because we bring to each particular object of study a set of concepts and logics that necessarily transcends the particularity of context.

[D]iscursive practices exhibit varying degrees of sedimentation, ranging from regimes and institutions to social habits.  While the social logics structuring them are literally buoyed up by subjects — they do not exist except through the activity of subjects — they are not necessarily cognitively accessible to subjects, at least not immediately and without some form of intervention.  This means that logics can have significant explanatory and critical leverage independently of the consciously held self-interpretations of agents … (162).

While in our view logics are subject-dependent, in the sense that our explanations require a passage through a subject’s contextualized self-interpretation (the hermeneutical constraint), they also require something that transcends them (15).