{"id":10029,"date":"2012-12-04T15:42:48","date_gmt":"2012-12-04T20:42:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=10029"},"modified":"2012-12-04T18:05:34","modified_gmt":"2012-12-04T23:05:34","slug":"zupancic-fifth-condition","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2012\/12\/04\/zupancic-fifth-condition\/","title":{"rendered":"zupancic fifth condition"},"content":{"rendered":"

Zupancic, Alenka. “The Fifth Condition.” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. <\/em>Ed.\u00a0<\/em>Peter Hallward, New York: Continuum. 2004. 191-201.<\/p>\n

Most modern philosophers are ready to subscribe (and thus to abandon) \u2018their\u2019 philosophy to one of its conditions. One could say that in this case they are, strictly<\/p>\n

speaking, no longer philosophers, but thinkers<\/span>.<\/p>\n

four generic procedures are being systematically replaced by other names which aim at effacing the procedures of truth involved in them: culture instead of art, technique instead of science, management instead of politics, sexuality instead of love.<\/p>\n

One could\u00a0add to this list: thinkers<\/span> instead of philosophers. Except that thinkers<\/span>, in the above-defined sense, are precisely those who usually fight against such re-nominations, especially those concerning the generic procedures to which they themselves subscribe their thought.<\/p>\n

In this sense ‘scientific thinkers’<\/span> would be the last to fail to distinguish between science and technology, \u2018poetic thinkers\u2019 the last to confuse culture and art, engaged \u2018political thinkers\u2019 the last to abandon the name politics in favour of management . . . On the other hand, more than a few of those who, in recent decades, were happy to be called \u2018philosophers\u2019 have indeed embraced these re-nominations as signs of modernity, progress and the ongoing secularization of society.<\/p>\n

This is probably why Badiou maintains, more or less explicitly, that modern anti-philosophy<\/span> (and its ‘thinkers’<\/span>) have been for quite some time the only guardians of the philosophical flame, so to speak. If philosophy did not die, but has continued to live in\u00a0the element of its own suspension, this is largely the merit of<\/strong> anti-philosophy,<\/span>\u00a0i.e. of thinkers<\/span>. 194<\/p>\n

The relation of philosophy to its conditions is not simply that of certain conditions that have to be satisfied in order for philosophy to be possible. Although this is also true to a certain extent, the main accent of Badiou\u2019s proposal is elsewhere: it is the thinking within<\/strong> <\/em>(the dimension of truth produced by) its conditions that constitutes the condition of philosophy. Philosophy is work that takes place at a distance from its conditions, yet within the realm of these conditions<\/strong>. 194<\/p>\n

One way of understanding more precisely the conceptual stakes of this \u2018fifth condition\u2019 leads to an interesting question that we have so far left unanswered. We saw that Badiou himself maintains that something did happen in the nineteenth century, \u2018just after Hegel\u2019 (MP49), something that changed the course (as well as the \u2018nature\u2019) of philosophy.\u00a0<\/span> But what?<\/strong> Could one try to determine what exactly happened? Badiou does not address this question directly. He often hints, however, that it has to do with a destitution of the One, i.e. with the replacement of the<\/span> \u2018authority of the One\u2019 with the \u2018authority of the multiple\u2019<\/span>.<\/p>\n

He also hints that (the development of) capitalism had an important role in this: \u2018It is obviously the only thing we can and must welcome within Capital<\/span>: it exposes the pure multiple as the foundation of presentation; it denounces every effect of One as a simple, precarious configuration<\/span>; it dismisses\u00a0the symbolic representations in which the bond [lien<\/em>] found a semblance of being\u2019 (MP37\/56).<\/p>\n

One could say that what happened in the nineteenth century is that a slow but massive shift took place from one dominant social bond to another. Yet what is at stake in this shift of the social bond is not simply the alternative between or the replacement of One with multiple. 194-5<\/p>\n

In order to appreciate this properly it is important to determine what exactly the expression ‘authority of the One’<\/span> refers to. There is, first of all, an important difference between what Badiou calls the ‘authority of the One’<\/span> and what he calls the ‘count for one’<\/span>.<\/p>\n

The latter is simply the condition of any thinkable situation or thing: whereas the purely multiple is inconsistent and is a pure \u2018excess beyond itself\u2019<\/strong>, all consistent thought supposes a structure, a<\/strong> counting-for-one<\/span>, such that every presented or presentable multiple is consistent. Every presentable multiple<\/strong> is presented, in other words, precisely as a set<\/em> or consistent being-together of a certain collection of elements.<\/p>\n

In this respect, the counting-for-one<\/span> (and with it the notion of ‘one’<\/span>) is perfectly compatible with the notion\u00a0of pure multiplicity. However, excess beyond itself<\/span>, which is the very being of\u00a0Being<\/strong> as purely multiple, also takes place on the level of what is already\u00a0counted for one<\/span>, i.e. on the level of presentation<\/strong>, within a set, or within what Badiou calls a ‘situation’<\/span> (which is just another word for \u2018set\u2019): it takes place as\u00a0the excess<\/span> of the parts of a given multiple or set over its elements: if we have a multiple of, say, five elements, the possible combination of these elements \u2013 i.e. the number of the \u2018parts\u2019 \u2013 exceeds by far the number of elements (more precisely, this number amounts to two to the power of five).<\/p>\n

This excess<\/span>, that Badiou also calls l\u2019exc\u00e8s errant<\/em>, a ‘wandering excess’<\/span>, is one of the crucial notions of his ontology<\/strong>, for he holds \u2018the wandering [errance] of the excess<\/span> to be the real of being\u2019<\/strong> (MP61\/81).<\/p>\n

What he calls the \u2018state\u2019 of a situation<\/strong> (playing on the double meaning of this word) involves the operation whereby this excess<\/span> itself is counted-for-one<\/span>, and thus fixed (or made consistent).<\/strong> The count-for-one<\/span> itself, which takes place on the level of presentation, is thus counted-for-one<\/span>. This is what Badiou also calls representation<\/span>, or meta-structure. \u00a0195<\/p>\n

Now, what is involved in the expression the ‘authority of the One’<\/span> is something quite different than the<\/strong> count-for-one<\/span> which makes any multiplicity presentable or intelligible, as well as something other than a \u2018state\u2019. \u00a0 Badiou usually employs the statement \u2018the One is not\u2019<\/strong> as synonymous with \u2018God is not\u2019, or else as directly synonymous with the \u2018death of God\u2019. Yet at the same time he also identifies this statement with what is involved in his own fundamental ontological stance:<\/p>\n

a multiple is always a multiple of multiples (of multiples, of multiples . . .),<\/span><\/p>\n

and the eventual \u2018stopping point\u2019 can in no way be a<\/strong>\u00a0\u00a0‘one’<\/span> but only a void<\/span>.<\/p>\n

However, I would maintain that the ‘One is not’<\/span> (in the sense of \u2018God is not\u2019) cannot be situated on the same level as the positing of a<\/strong> void<\/span> as\u00a0\u2018the stuff that being is made of\u2019. \u00a0 The reason for this is that \u2013 as Badiou himself points out \u2013 \u2018God is dead\u2019 is not an ontological statement but a statement that belongs to an evental horizon or, more precisely, to its closure.<\/p>\n

In other words, I would suggest that we take the formulation \u2018authority of the<\/strong> One<\/span>\u2019 to refer to a structurally as well as historically determinable social bond, and not as primarily referring to a conceptual choice between One<\/span> and multiple.<\/p>\n

The ‘authority of the One’<\/span> is a social bond which roughly corresponds to\u00a0what Lacan conceptualized as the discourse of the Master.<\/span> The Master\u2019s discourse<\/span> is not exactly a \u2018state\u2019 in Badiou\u2019s sense. In it, the wandering excess<\/span> is\u00a0fixed, not by being counted as one, but by being subjected and attached, as\u00a0Other, to the agency of the One.<\/p>\n

The authority of the One<\/span> is not based upon a totalization of a multiple, it is not a \u2018forcing\u2019 of the multiple by the One<\/span>. It is\u00a0based upon relating the One and Other in the element of their pure disjunction.<\/p>\n

The Master\u2019s discourse<\/span> functioned so well and so long because it succeeded in transforming the \u2018weakest\u2019 point of a given multiple (the point of its very inconsistency) into the strongest lever, as well as the source, of its own power.<\/p>\n

What was entirely mobilized or absorbed in the One was not the colourful multiplicity of Being, but the point of its potential generic power: its loose end, the point on account of which no multiplicity can be intrinsically \u2018counted as One\u2019.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The important thing to remember in relation to the Master\u2019s discourse<\/span> (or the authority of the One)<\/span> is that the agent of this social bond is not the excessive multiplicity<\/span> counted-for-one<\/span>, it is not a unified totality of the excessive multiplicity, but an (empty) signifier of its impossible totalization.<\/span><\/p>\n

In other words, the way multiplicity is attached (and fixed) to the<\/span> One<\/span> is that the One<\/span> gives body to, or incarnates, the constitutive void of the multiple<\/strong>. This is how the master signifier<\/strong>, as agent<\/span> of this social bond, fixates the excess<\/span>, assigns it its place and keeps it there.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

What happens with the destitution of the authority of the One is that the bond between the One and multiple, the bond that was there in their very disjunction, dissolves. The result is that the excess, as the very real of Being, emerges as a free-floating element and appears in a form of a \u2018passionate
\ndetachment\u2019.<\/p>\n

For what happens is not that excess loses its signifier or representation (since it never really had one), what it loses is its attachment to the One. One could say that a spectre of excess starts haunting the society, in its different spheres; and its \u2018spectral\u2019 form is in no way insignificant.<\/p>\n

The Master\u2019s discourse (or, if one prefers, the authority of the One) is a social bond in which this excessive element is, if one may say so, in the \u2018ideal\u2019 place, in the service of the hegemonic power of the One, which reigns by assumingthe very excessiveness of excess.<\/p>\n

What happens with the destitution of this bond is, so to speak, that the ghost of excess escapes from the bottle.<\/p>\n

This process could be said to have started with the French Revolution, to have reached its full extent in the nineteenth century, and to have continued through a part of the twentieth century.<\/p>\n

The nineteenth century in particular was deeply haunted by this excessive element in all possible forms, from the conceptual to the phantasmagoric.<\/p>\n

Perhaps no single phrase can capture, so to speak, the spirit of the thought of this period (regardless of different schools and orientations) better than this:there is something rotten in the State of Things.
\nSome thinkers of the time attributed this rot to the still-remaining pockets of the authority of the One,
\nbelieving that redemption would come only with their definitive elimination.<\/p>\n

Others, on the contrary, saw the origin of discontent in the very destitution of the authority of the One.<\/p>\n

But we can say, without oversimplifying things, that virtually all serious thinkers sought to think at a maximal proximity to, if not in a direct confrontation with, this excess. A \u2018tarrying with the excess\u2019 thus became the most prominent figure of thought. Utopias, designed to eliminate social and other injustice, mostly proposed to achieve this by eliminating this very excess. To a certain extent, even Marx was tempted by the possibility of eliminating, once and for all, the excessive, disharmonious element of society \u2013 the element in which he himself recognized its truth, its real and its symptom.<\/p>\n

As for Nietzsche, one could say that a \u2018tarrying with the excess\u2019 constituted the very core of his writings, although he certainly did not seek to eliminate it. In his recent book,On the Psychotheology of Everyday life: Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig, Eric Santner develops a reading of these two authors around the central notion of a \u2018constitutive \u2018\u2018too muchness\u2019\u2019 \u2019<\/p>\n

which corresponds perfectly to the notion of \u2018wandering excess\u2019. In literature, the explosion of a \u2018wandering excess\u2019 is even more directly perceptible: the undead dead, spectral, unplaceable
\nfigures and \u2018Things\u2019, fromFrankensteintoDracula, passing through all kinds of phenomena that Freud treated under the title ofDas Unheumliche, the uncanny. Not to mention that one of the most popular serials of the middle of the nineteenth century was Eug\u00e8ne Sue\u2019s The Wandering Jew (Le Juif errant\u2013 another name forl\u2019exce`s errant?).<\/p>\n

And at the same time this (wandering) excess was increasingly becoming recognized as, precisely, the real of being, and also as the locus if its truth. If, for modern (anti-)philosophy, Hegel became one of the most criticized (if not directly loathed) of philosophers it is precisely since it seems that, in his
\nspeculative edifice, everything adds up: there are no loose ends, no scars (\u2018the wounds of the spirit heal without scars\u2019), no cracks. In short: no wandering excess.<\/p>\n

Philosophy in general did not escape this mocking contempt: there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in (our) philosophy. Or, in another version of this objection: instead of disclosing it, philosophy conceals the real of being, its cracks and its critical points.<\/p>\n

The post-Hegelian philosophy (or, if one prefers, anti-philosophy) started off with this fundamental claim: symbolic representations which were traditionally considered as access to the truth and to the real of Being in fact alienate us from Being and deform it (or our perception of it). And classical philosophy (or \u2018metaphysics\u2019) was suddenly recognized as the queen of this representative
\nmisrepresentation.<\/p>\n

Indeed, if one were to name one central issue that distinguishes the rise of modern thought it is perhaps none other than precisely the issue of representation (and the question of the One and\/or Multiple is part of this issue), its profound interrogation, and the whole consequent turn against (the logic of) representation. This is perhaps most perceptible in (modern) art, which frontally attacked the notion of art as representation. G\u00e9rard Wajcman was right when he defined the central problem of modern art as follows: \u2018How to find access to the world in some other way than through image? How to aim at the world, at the real, without at the same time interposing the screen of repre-sentation?\u2019<\/p>\n

In politics, this also was a central issue: who represents people and how they can be properly represented? Why are some represented and some not? And what if the very idea of representation is the source of society\u2019s evils and its alienation? The realm of politics is especially interesting in this respect since the introduction of a \u2018representative\u2019 system coincided with the very questioning of its pertinence. Something similar took place in respect to the generic procedure of love: a simultaneous demand that love be properly represented by the institution of marriage (the new imperative that one should marry out of love), and a massive \u2018observation\u2019 that this is in fact impossible, i.e. that marriage can never truly represent the real of love.<\/p>\n

It was this general interrogation of representation and, to put it simply, the conviction that the real of being escapes representation (or else is falsified, distorted by it), which drew philosophy towards embracing the immediacy of one or another of its conditions. Paradoxically, Badiou emphatically shares this view of representation, although he is as emphatic in rejecting the consequences
\nthat philosophy drew from it.<\/p>\n

Philosophy embraced the immediacy of its conditions since this immediacy seemed to be the only bond remaining between thought and being. It is not so much that philosophy was seized by a passion for a direct access to the production of truths (as I suggested earlier) as it is that this direct access seemed to remain the only possible bond between philosophy and the ontological layer of its conditions. The either\/or of modern (anti-)philosophy sprang from what appeared as the very impossibility of a position that could satisfy Badiou\u2019s \u2018fifth condition\u2019 (again, that philosophy has to pull itself away from the immediate grip of its conditions, while nevertheless remaining under these conditions).<\/p>\n

Before, the scene for such composing of truths was provided by the faith in representation. I use the word \u2018faith\u2019 deliberately, since the correlation of an object and its representation presupposed an Other vouching for this correlation and its unchangeableness.<\/p>\n

This Other (or, perhaps better, this other One), by fixingthe relationship between, for instance, words and things, corresponds to what Badiou calls representation as meta-structure. For this is exactly one of the ways we could resume Badiou\u2019s distinction between presentation and representation: presentation involves naming the things (or \u2018elements\u2019), whereas representation involves fixing the relationship between things (or elements) and \u2018their\u2019 names.<\/p>\n

For Badiou, representation also constitutes the crucial operation of the institution of a state, and as such he views it as repudiation of a truth procedure.<\/p>\n

Hence Badiou\u2019s principled position against representation and the state \u2013 a position he adopts while remaining, at the time, well aware of the difficulty of simply putting an end to all representation (or all state). Badiou acknowledges that the state is co-original to any situation, which is to say that \u2018there is always both presentation and representation\u2019 (EE110).<\/p>\n

The end of representation and the \u2018universality of simple presentation\u2019 (an egalitarian counting-for-one) remains a goal that bears some resemblance to the Kantian notion of a \u2018regulative idea\u2019, i.e. an idea that cannot be realized but in view of which one orientates one\u2019s engagement in reality.<\/p>\n

This question of presentation and representation (and their distinction) is indeed a very difficult one, and constitutes a perhaps not yet entirely worked-out aspect of Badiou\u2019s conceptual edifice.<\/p>\n

At the same time, it is undoubtedly one of its central aspects. If nothing else, it is essential for the very possibility of philosophy (its \u2018fifth condition\u2019), for it seems that philosophy as composition and configuration of truths (produced elsewhere) cannot exactly be said to be a \u2018simple presentation\u2019.
\nMore: could one not say that what comes the closest to philosophy as simple presentation is
\nprecisely what Badiou calls modern anti-philosophy?<\/p>\n

Philosophy as presentation is nothing other than philosophy abandoning itself to its conditions, philosophy as an immediate part of procedure(s) of truth (or else as a sophistic game of endlessly surfing on the waves of the \u2018wandering excess\u2019).<\/p>\n

So are we then supposed instead to embrace representation as the meta-structure which alone could guarantee a space or scene for philosophy proper? Of course not; this would be falling back to the essentially premodern (or pre-Hegelian) position.<\/p>\n

The answer \u2013 which I will only try to sketch or roughly indicate here \u2013 rather lies in acknowledging something that Badiou strangely refuses to acknowledge or at least to adopt. Something that happened in linguistics and gained a definite form in psychoanalysis (more precisely, in the Lacanian \u2018use\u2019 of linguistics). Something that can in no way be dismissed as yet another expression of the \u2018linguistic turn\u2019 and even less as a \u2018poetic turn\u2019. Something that is as important for contemporary philosophy as is Cantor\u2019s secularization of the infinite: an entirely new conception of representation.
\nA conception which is not that of representation as meta-structure, and does not involve the idea of the signifier (or \u2018name\u2019) representing an object for the subject. A conception which strikingly meets Badiou\u2019s own demand of \u2018destitution of the category of object\u2019 while preserving the category of the subject (cf.MP72\u20133\/91\u20132). A conception that finds its most concise formulation in Lacan\u2019s statement: \u2018a signifier represents a subject for another signifier\u2019.<\/p>\n

This was a major breakthrough of contemporary thought, a breakthrough that could in fact provide philosophy with its \u2018fifth condition\u2019, i.e. its own distinctive conceptual space.<\/p>\n

For in this conception, representation is not a \u2018presentation of presentation\u2019 or the state of a situation but rather a \u2018presentation within presentation\u2019 or a state within a situation.<\/p>\n

In this conception, representation is itself infinite and constitutively not-all (or non-conclusive), it represents no object and does not prevent a continuous un-relating of its own terms (which is how Badiou defines the mechanism of truth).<\/p>\n

Here, representation as such is a wandering excess over itself; representation is the infinite tarrying with the excess that springs not simply from what is or is not represented (its \u2018object\u2019), but from this act of representation itself, from its own inherent \u2018crack\u2019 or inconsistency.<\/p>\n

The Real is not something outside or beyond representation, but is the very crack of representation.<\/p>\n

Page 200<\/p>\n

The problem of representation as meta-structure, and the consequent\u00a0imperative to restrain oneself from representation or to pull oneself away from\u00a0the \u2018state\u2019, is something that belongs to a different ontology than the ontology\u00a0of the purely multiple, of infinity and of contingency.<\/p>\n

It could only concern a\u00a0universe in which the evental statement \u2018God is dead\u2019 for whatever reason does\u00a0not hold true. In an infinite contingent universe (or \u2018situation\u2019), by contrast,\u00a0there is no necessity for the \u2018counting of the count itself\u2019 to be situated on a\u00a0meta-level.<\/p>\n

It can very well be situated on the same level as the counting-for-one itself, only separated from it by an irreducible interval (and it is this\u00a0interval that Lacan calls the Real).<\/p>\n

Moreover, this is precisely what makesa\u00a0situation \u2018infinite\u2019. What makes it infinite is not the exclusion of any operation\u00a0of representation (which would \u2018want\u2019 to count it for one and thus to close it\u00a0upon itself) but its inclusion.<\/p>\n

What makes any particular \u2018presentation\u2019 infinite is precisely that it already includes representation.<\/p>\n

This conception also allows for an effect of unification (or fixation) taking place, yet a different one from what Badiou calls \u2018state\u2019. Lacan links it to his notion of the \u2018quilting point\u2019 (point de capiton).<\/p>\n

This unification of a (potentially) infinite set is not the same as in the case of meta-structure. S1as \u2018point de capiton\u2019 is not a meta-signifier in relation to S2, to the virtually infinite battery of\u00a0signifiers and their combinations that Lacan also calls \u2018knowledge\u2019.<\/p>\n

S1 quilts this set not by counting the count itself, but by \u2018presenting\u2019 the very impossibility of an immediate coincidence of the two counts, i.e. by presenting the very gap between them.<\/p>\n

In other words, S1is the signifier of the impossibility of the two (counting and counting the count itself) to be One.<\/p>\n

It is the signifier of the very gap or interval or void that separates them in any process of representation: a void that is precisely the cause of the infinite layering of repre-sentation.<\/p>\n

For Lacan, the Real of being is this void or interval or gap, this very non-coincidence, whereas the wandering excess is already its result.<\/p>\n

S1presents this void by naming it, it does not represent it.<\/p>\n

Lacan\u2019s S1, the (in)famous \u2018master signifier\u2019 or \u2018phallic signifier\u2019 is, paradoxically, the only way to write that \u2018the One is not\u2019 and that what \u2018is\u2019 is the void that constitutes the original disjunction in the midst of every count-for-one.<\/p>\n

The count-for-one is always already two. S1is the matheme of what one can describe as \u2018the One is not\u2019.<\/p>\n

It writes that \u2018the One is not\u2019 by presenting the very thing that prevents it from being One.<\/p>\n

This is what S1 says: the One is not; yet what is is not a pure multiple, but two.<\/p>\n

This is perhaps Lacan\u2019s crucial insight: if there is something on which one could lean in order to leave the \u2018ontology of the One\u2019 behind, this something is not simply the multiple, but a Two.<\/p>\n

This, of course, is directly related to the point in which Badiou recognizes a major contribution of psychoanalysis to the conditions of philosophy: psychoanalysis is the first (consistent) thought of the generic procedure of love.<\/p>\n

Which is to say that it is the first thinkable articulation of \u2018a Two that would neither be counted for one nor would it be the sum of one + one.<\/p>\n

A Two that would be counted for two in an immanent way (. . .), where Two is neither a fusion nor a
\nsum; and where Two is thus in excess over that what constitutes it, without there being a Third [term] to join it.\u2019<\/p>\n

Page 201<\/p>\n

This singular notion of the Two is very much related to the question of representation, i.e. of the possibility for the \u2018counting the count itself\u2019 to be situated on the same level as the count (and not on a meta-level), yet dislocated in relation to it.<\/p>\n

For this is precisely what it implies to think a \u2018Two that would be counted for two in an immanent way\u2019.<\/p>\n

Badiou was not only the first philosopher explicitly to conceptualize this singular notion of the Two in philosophy, he also reminded psychoanalysis of the production of this truth that it sometimes tends to forget.<\/p>\n

By conceptualizing it within philosophy, i.e. within the space of a \u2018general compossibility\u2019 of truths, he gave contemporary philosophy one of its most precious concepts which, although it comes from a singular generic procedure, has its universal value and is in no way limited to that procedure.<\/p>\n

I would also add that with this concept, Badiou addresses the question of representation from a new
\nand different angle, an angle which avoids the difficulties sketched out above and which, at the same time, directly concerns the conditions of philosophy.<\/p>\n

If philosophy is to take place within the space of the infinite process of truth without itself being a process of truth, if it is to be situated on the same level as generic procedures yet at a certain distance from them (i.e. dislocated in relation to them), then it has to rely precisely on such an \u2018immanent count-for-two\u2019 as is at work in a Badiouian conception of the Two.<\/p>\n

This would imply, of course, that one of the four conditions of philosophy (love, with its immanent count-for-two) is also its \u2018fifth condition\u2019, the condition that defines the very relationship of philosophy with its conditions and keeps it from merging with them, as well as from appearing as their independent sum.<\/p>\n

As a thought that operates within the field of four generic procedures of truth, without simply merging with this field and becoming indistinguishable from it, philosophy presupposes asc\u00e8ne du Deux, a \u2018stage\/scene of the Two\u2019.<\/p>\n

In other words, in the configuration of conditions of philosophy, one of its conditions \u2013 the immanent count-for-two, which Badiou recognizes in the figure of love \u2013 has itself to be counted-for-two.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Zupancic, Alenka. “The Fifth Condition.” in Think Again: Alain Badiou and the Future of Philosophy. Ed.\u00a0Peter Hallward, New York: Continuum. 2004. 191-201. Most modern philosophers are ready to subscribe (and thus to abandon) \u2018their\u2019 philosophy to one of its conditions. One could say that in this case they are, strictly speaking, no longer philosophers, but … Continue reading “zupancic fifth condition”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[45,65],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10029","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-badiou","category-dia-mat"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10029","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10029"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10029\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":10033,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10029\/revisions\/10033"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10029"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10029"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10029"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}