{"id":14245,"date":"2020-09-03T10:11:19","date_gmt":"2020-09-03T14:11:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=14245"},"modified":"2020-09-03T10:51:13","modified_gmt":"2020-09-03T14:51:13","slug":"ed-pluth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2020\/09\/03\/ed-pluth\/","title":{"rendered":"Ed Pluth"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

On Adrian Johnston\u2019s Materialist Psychoanalysis: Some Questions The Southern Journal of Philosophy<\/em> Volume 51, Spindel Supplement 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Psychoanalysis can be seen as a science for a specific set of what I would call practical-historical objects, as opposed to natural objects, and one distinctive feature of it is its peculiar relationship to these objects: it is a science that is as dialectical as it is materialist, in that its theories and its effects have real consequences for the objects they are about, in ways that the natural sciences never do and never can for their objects. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What I mean here is that in the case of the natural sciences, the objects do not change with our knowledge of them; it is hard to avoid an asymptotic view of the natural real in such sciences, the assumption that nature is as it always was, and that theory and science approach it more or less well<\/strong>. Whether one is a realist or not concerning the sciences, I think it is hard to avoid such a view of the natural real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consider, by contrast, Freud\u2019s remarks about how the unconscious found new ways to hide itself after psychoanalysis was popularized. Consider ongoing discussions about the status of Oedipus in contemporary life; consider feminine sexuality and a host of other topics<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All of these controversies are unlike disagreements in the natural sciences, not because there is no basis for determining which theory about them is correct or better\u2014there is, and it is the practice of psychoanalysis itself\u2014but because the changes these controversies introduce into psychoanalytic theory arise in part from effects that psychoanalysis itself has had on its objects. Thus, on my conception, psychoanalysis is not at all an odd dogmatic fetishization of the works of either Freud or Lacan or take your pick, but something that is in constant motion, in need of constant revision, because that is what is happening to its objects as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, these are some reasons as to why the status of psychoanalysis is still
problematic. To be clear, I think much of the difficulty psychoanalysis has,
status-wise, is due to the fact that its objects are not identical to naturalscientific objects; so what makes it distinct, one of its defining features, is also what, for many, calls into question its possible status as a science. Moreover, the fact that it is in a dialectical relationship with its objects probably raises the suspicions of many scientists too, making it seem more like the stuff of mythology and folk wisdom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If my view is correct, it can be asked whether the natural-scientific method is appropriate to, or even informative for, psychoanalytic theory and practice at all. If natural-scientific objects, unlike psychoanalytic ones, do not change with our theories of them\u2014if the natural sciences are necessarily undialectical\u2014then each deals not only with different objects, but each can be considered an entirely different type of science as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In light of this, what I am curious about is figuring out what should be said about the relationship between psychoanalysis and the neurosciences, or any other science for that matter. Is there even a relationship? And this is why Johnston\u2019s work is so important, because it is addressing this issue directly and taking the position that there is, or should be, a relationship<\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If natural-scientific objects, unlike psychoanalytic ones, do not change with our theories of them\u2014if the natural sciences are necessarily undialectical\u2014then each deals not only with different objects, but each can be considered an entirely different type of science as well.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

First of all, on my model, notice that there is no need for sciences like physics, chemistry, biology, neurobiology, on the one hand, and psychoanalysis on the other, to even conflict with each other\u2014they may be just noncomparable, maybe not even parallel<\/strong>\u2014in a manner similar to the way in which no one would think that the ups and downs of the stock market can be reduced to or explained by physical laws. Economics has nothing to learn from physics, and no one takes them to be about the same kinds of things.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But, when engaging with the sciences, it is difficult not to open the door to
verificationism\u2014by which I mean a view according to which if the sciences say there is no basis, no material correlate for X, then philosophers are obliged to say there is not really any such thing as X either. Now, Johnston is in the happy position of finding sciences that confirm the existence and possibility of psychoanalytic objects and phenomena\u2014the structure and position of the thalamus, for example, he writes, is potentially \u201ca leading candidate for the neurobiological ground of the splitting of the drive\u201d (62). And earlier he wrote \u201clike Freud before him, [Lacan] presciently anticipates with a welcoming attitude future empirical confirmations<\/em><\/strong> of core components of psychoanalytic theory via studies of the brain\u201d (emphasis added). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

If we were not to find any neurobiological correlates for psychoanalytic objects I suspect that Johnston would find this to be a serious problem. But putting the neurosciences in the position of confirming psychoanalytic theory (or is it just in that they are in a position to confirm its objects?) almost certainly must degrade the status of psychoanalysis, for does it not make psychoanalysis dependent on another discipline for a large share of its validity?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And even if the neurosciences do not explain anything that really goes on in psychoanalysis, it seems that on this view psychoanalysis is still ontologically dependent on what the neurosciences are finding. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, it is the reference to confirmation that makes me want to ask some
questions about the scope or extent of Johnston\u2019s nonreductionism as well. For, should it not be true that if what psychoanalysis works on is not reducible to neurobiological objects and events, then there is also no sort of confirmation that the neurosciences can offer psychoanalysis at all?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But putting the neurosciences in the position of confirming psychoanalytic theory… almost certainly must degrade the status of psychoanalysis, for does it not make psychoanalysis dependent on another discipline for a large share of its validity?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

On Adrian Johnston\u2019s Materialist Psychoanalysis: Some Questions The Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 51, Spindel Supplement 2013 Psychoanalysis can be seen as a science for a specific set of what I would call practical-historical objects, as opposed to natural objects, and one distinctive feature of it is its peculiar relationship to these objects: it is … Continue reading “Ed Pluth”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[45,65,6,20],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14245","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-badiou","category-dia-mat","category-event","category-zizek"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14245","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14245"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14245\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14253,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14245\/revisions\/14253"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14245"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14245"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14245"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}