{"id":2011,"date":"2009-02-20T17:08:12","date_gmt":"2009-02-20T22:08:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=2011"},"modified":"2013-04-21T19:26:24","modified_gmt":"2013-04-22T00:26:24","slug":"zizek-replies-to-butler","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2009\/02\/20\/zizek-replies-to-butler\/","title":{"rendered":"\u017di\u017eek Butler 2000 CHU historicism sexual difference"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u017di\u017eek<\/span><\/p>\n

[According to Butler] Lacan gets stuck in a negative-transcendental gesture. That is to say: while Butler acknowledges that, for Lacan, the subject never achieves full identity, that the process of subject-formation is always incomplete, condemned to ultimate failure, her criticism is that Lacan elevates the very obstacle that prevents the subject’s complete realization into a transcendental a priori ‘bar’ (of symbolic castration’).<\/strong> So, instead of acknowledging the thorough contingency and openness of the historical process, Lacan posits it under the sign of a fundamental, ahistorical Bar or Prohibition. 108-109<\/p>\n

Underlying Butler’s criticism, therefore, is the thesis that Lacanian theory, at least in its predominant ‘orthodox’ form, limits radical historical contingency: it underpins the historical process by evoking some quasi-transcendental limitation, some quasi-transcendental a priori that is not itself caught in the contingent historical process.\u00a0 Lacanian theory thus ultimately leads to the Kantian distinction between some formal a priori framework and its contingent shifting historical examples. She evokes the Lacanian notion of the ‘barred subject’: while she recognizes that this notion implies the constitutive, necessary, unavoidable incompletion and ultimate failure of every process of interpellation, identification, subject-constitution, she none the less claims that Lacan elevates the bar into an ahistorical a priori Prohibition or Limitation which circumscribes every political struggle in advance.<\/p>\n

My first, almost automatic reaction to this is: is Butler herself relying here on a silent proto-Kantian distinction between form and content? In so far as she claims that ‘the subject-in-process is incomplete precisely because it is constituted through exclusions that are politically salient, not structurally static’, is not her criticism of Lacan that Lacan ultimately confounds the FORM of exclusion (there will always be exclusions; some form of exclusion is the necessary condition of subjective identity …) with some specific particular specific CONTENT that is excluded?\u00a0 Butler’s reproach to Lacan is thus, rather , that he is not ‘FORMALIST’ enough: his ‘bar’ is too obviously branded by the particular historical content \u2014 in an illegitimate short circuit, he elevates into a quasi-transcendental a priori a certain ‘bar’ that emerged only within specific ultimately contingent historical conditions (the Oedipus complex, sexual difference).\u00a0 This is especially clear apropos of sexual difference: Butler reads Lacan’s thesis that sexual difference is ‘real’ as the assertion that it is an ahistorical frozen opposition, fixed as a non-negotiable framework that has no place in hegemonic struggles (109)<\/p>\n

I claim that this criticism of Lacan involves a misrepresentation of his position, which here is much closer to Hegel. That is to say the crucial point is that the very FORM, in its universality, is always rooted, like an umbilical cord, in a particular content \u2014 not only in the sense of hegemony (universality is never empty; it is always coloured by some particular content), but in the more radical sense that the very FORM of universality emerges through a radical dislocation, through some more radical impossibility or ‘primordial repression’.<\/p>\n

The ultimate question is not which particular content hegemonizes the empty universality (and thus, in the struggle for hegemony, excludes other particular contents); the ultimate question is: which specific content has to be excluded<\/strong> so that the very empty form<\/strong><\/em> of universality emerges as the ‘battlefield’ for hegemony? (110)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Let us take the notion of ‘democracy’: of course the content of this notion is not predetermined \u2014 what ‘democracy’ will mean, what this term will include and what it will exclude (that is, the extent to which and the way women, gays, minorities, non-white races, etc., are included\/excluded), is always the result of contingent hegemonic struggle. However, this very open struggle presupposes not some fixed content as its ultimate referent, but ITS VERY TERRAIN, delimited by the ’empty signifiers’ that designates it (‘democracy’ in this case). Of course, in the democratic struggle for hegemony, each position accuses the other of being ‘not really democratic’: for a conservative liberal, social democratic interventionism is already potentially ‘totalitarian’; for a social democrat, the traditional liberal’s neglect of social solidarity is nondemocratic … so each position tries to impose its own logic of inclusion\/exclusion, and all these exclusions are ‘politically salient, not structurally static’; in order for this very struggle to take place, however, its TERRAIN must constitute itself by means of a more fundamental exclusion (‘primordial repression’) that is not simply historical-contingent, a stake in the present constellation of the hegemonic struggle, since it SUSTAINS THE VERY TERRAIN OF HISTORICITY. 110<\/p>\n

Take the case of sexual difference itself: Lacan’s claim that sexual difference is ‘real-impossible’<\/strong> is strictly synonymous with his claim that ‘there is no such thing as a sexual relationship’.\u00a0 For Lacan, sexual difference is not a firm set of ‘static’ symbolic oppositions and inclusions\/exclusions (heterosexual normativity which relegates homosexuality and other ‘perversions’ to some secondary role), but the name of a deadloc, of a trauma, of an open question, of something that RESISTS every attempt at its symbolization.<\/strong> Every translation of sexual difference into a set of symbolic opposition(s) is doomed to fail, and it is this very ‘impossibility’ that opens up the terrain of the hegemonic struggle for what ‘sexual difference’ will mean.<\/strong> What is barred is NOT what is excluded under the present hegemonic regime.<\/p>\n

The political struggle for hegemony whose outcome is contingent, and the ‘non-historical’ bar or impossibility are thus strictly correlative: there is a struggle for hegemony precisely because<\/strong> some preceding ‘bar’ of impossibility sustains the void at stake in the hegemonic struggle.\u00a0 So Lacan is the very opposite of Kantian formalism (if by this we understand the imposition of some formal frame that serves as the a priori of its contingent content):\u00a0 Lacan forces us to make thematic the exclusion of some traumatic ‘content’ that is constitutive of the empty universal form.\u00a0 There is historical space only in so far as this space is sustained by some more radical exclusion (or as Lacan would have it forclusion).<\/em><\/p>\n

So one should distinguish between two levels<\/p>\n

1. the hegemonic struggle for which particular content will hegemonize the empty universal notion;<\/p>\n

2. and the more fundamental impossibility that renders the Universal empty, and thus a terrain for hegemonic struggle.<\/p>\n

So with regard to the criticism of Kantianism, my answer is that it is Butler and Laclau who are secret Kantians: they both propose an abstract a priori formal model (of hegemony, of gender performativity …) which allows, within its frame, for the full contingency (no guarantee of what the outcome of the fight for hegemony will be, no last reference to the sexual constitution …) they both involve a logic of ‘spurious infinity’: no final resolution, just the endless process of complex partial displacements. Is not Laclau’s theory of hegemony ‘formalist’ in the sense of proffering a certain a priori formal matrix of social space?\u00a0 There will always be some hegemonic empty signifier; it is only its content that shifts … My ultimate point is thus that Kantian formalism and radical historicism are not really opposites, but two sides of the same coin: every version of historicism relies on a minimal ‘ahistorical’ formal framework defining the terrain within which the open and endless game of contingent inclusions\/exclusions, substitutions, renegotiations, displacements, and so on, takes place.\u00a0 The truly radical assertion of historical contingency has to include the dialectical tension between the domain of historical change itself and its traumatic ‘ahistorical’ kernel qua<\/em> its condition of (im)possibility.\u00a0 Here we have the difference between historicity proper and historicism: historicism<\/em> deals with the endless play of substitutions within the same fundamental field of (im)possibility, while historicity<\/em> proper makes thematic different structural principles of this very (im)possibility.\u00a0 In other words, the historicist theme of the endless open play of substitutions is the very form of ahistorical ideological closure: by focusing on the simply dyad essentialism-contingency, on the passage from the one to the other, it obfuscates concrete historicity qua<\/em> the change of the very gloval structuring principle of the Social.<\/strong> 112<\/p>\n

Butler Replies<\/span><\/strong>:<\/p>\n

If \u017di\u017eek can writes as he does: “the ultimate question is: which specific content has to be excluded so that the very empty form <\/em>of universality emerges as the “battlefield” for hegemony?” (110), then he can certainly entertain the question: ‘which specific content has to be excluded so that the very empty form<\/em> of sexual difference<\/strong> emerges as a battlefield for hegemony?”<\/p>\n

… who posits the original and final ineffability of sexual difference, and what aims does such a positing achieve? This most unverifiable of concepts is offered as the condition of verifiability itself, and we are faced with a choice between an uncritical theological affirmation or a critical social inquiry: do we accept this description of the fundamental ground of intelligibility, or do we begin to ask what kinds of foreclosures such a positing achieves<\/strong>, and at what expense? (145)<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

It is supposed to be (quasi-)transcendental, belonging to a ‘level’ other than the social and symbolizable, yet if it grounds and sustains the historical and social formulations of sexual difference, it is their very condition and part of their very definition.\u00a0 Indeed, it is the non-symbolizable condition of symbolizability<\/strong>, according to those who accept this view.<\/p>\n

My point, however, is that to be the transcendental condition of possibility for any given formulation of sexual difference is also to be, precisely, the sine qua non<\/em> of all those formulations, the condition without which they cannot come into intelligibility. The ‘quasi-‘ that precedes the transcendental is meant to ameliorate the harshness of this effect, but it also sidesteps the question: what sense of transcendental is in use here? … it can also mean: the regulatory and constitutive conditions of the appearance of any given object. The latter sense is the one in which the condition is not external to the object it occasions, but is its constitutive condition and the principle of its development and appearance. The transcendental thus offers the criterial conditions that constrain the emergence of the thematizable.<\/em><\/p>\n

And if this transcendental field is not considered to have a historicity \u2014 that is, is not considered to be a shifting episteme which might be altered and revised over time \u2014 it is unclear to me what place it can fruitfully have for an account of hegemony that seeks to sustain and promote a more radically democratic formulation of sex and sexual difference <\/span>(147).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

If sexual difference enjoys this quasi-transcendental status, then all the concrete formulations of sexual difference (second-order forms of sexual difference) not only implicitly refer back to the more originary formulation but are, in their very expression, constrained by this non-thematizable normative condition.\u00a0 Thus, sexual difference in the more originary sense operates as a radically incontestable principle or criterion that establishes intelligibility through foreclosure or, indeed, through pathologization or indeed, through active political disenfranchisement. As non-thematizable, it is immune from critical examination, yet it is necessary and essential: a truly felicitous instrument of power. If it is a condition of intelligibility, then there will be certain forms that threaten intelligibility, threaten the possibility of a viable life within the social historical world. Sexual difference thus functions not merely as a ground but as a defining condition that must be instituted and safeguarded against attempts to undermine it (intersexuality, transexuality, lesbian and gay partnership, to name but a few) (148-9).<\/p>\n

Precisely because the transcendental does not and cannot keep its separate place as a more fundamental ‘level’, precisely because sexual difference as a transcendental ground must not only take shape within the horizon of intelligibility but structure and limit that horizon as well, it functions actively and normatively to constrain what will and will not count as an intelligible alternative within culture. Thus, as a transcendental claim, sexual difference, should be rigorously opposed by anyone who wants to guard against a theory that would prescribe in advance what kinds of sexual arrangements will and will not be permitted in intelligible culture<\/span>.\u00a0 The inevitable vacillation between the transcendental and social functioning of the term makes its prescriptive function inevitable (148).<\/p>\n

\u017di\u017eek responds<\/strong><\/span>\u00a0 309<\/p>\n

Butler is, of course, aware how Lacan\u2019s il n\u2019y a pas de rapport sexuel<\/em> means that, precisely, any \u2018actual\u2019 sexual relationship is always tainted by failure; however, she interprets this failure as the failure of the contingent historical reality of sexual life fully to actualize the symbolic norm.<\/p>\n

Butler says that for Lacanians: sexual difference has a transcendental status even when<\/em><\/strong> sexed bodies emerge that do not fit squarely within ideal gender dimorphism.<\/p>\n

\u017di\u017eek alters her statement: sexual difference has a transcendental status because<\/em><\/strong> sexed bodies emerge that do not fit squarely within ideal gender dimorphism.<\/p>\n

That is to say: far from serving as an implicit symbolic norm that reality can never reach, sexual difference as real\/impossible means precisely that there is no such norm<\/em>: sexual difference is that \u2018rock of impossibility\u2019 on which every \u2018formalization\u2019 of sexual difference founders.<\/p>\n

… This notion of Real also enable me to answer Butler\u2019s criticism that Lacan hypostasizes the \u2018big Other\u2019 into a kind of pre-historical transcendental a priori: when Lacan emphatically asserts that \u2018there is no big Other <\/span>[il n\u2019y a pas de grand Autre<\/em>]\u2019, his point is precisely that there is no a priori<\/em> formal structural schema exempt from historical contingencies \u2014 there are only contingent, fragile, inconsistent configurations.<\/span>\u00a0 (Furthermore, far from clinging to paternal symbolic authority, the \u2018Name-of-the-Father\u2019 is for Lacan a fake<\/em>, a semblance<\/em> which conceals this structural inconsistency.)<\/p>\n

In other words, the claim that the Real is inherent to the Symbolic is strictly equal to the claim that ‘there is no big Other’<\/span>: the Lacanian Real is that traumatic \u2018bone in the throat\u2019 that contaminates<\/em> every ideality of the symbolic, rendering it contingent and inconsistent. \u00a0\u00a0For this reason, far from being opposed to historicity, the Real is its very \u2018ahistorical\u2019 ground, the a priori of historicity itself<\/em>.<\/p>\n

We can thus see how the entire topology<\/em> changes from Butler\u2019s description of the Real and the \u2018big Other\u2019 as the pre-historical a priori<\/em> to their actual functioning in Lacan\u2019s edifice: in her critical portrait, Butler describes an ideal \u2018big Other\u2019 which persists as a norm, although it is never fully actualized, although the contingencies of history thwart its full imposition; while Lacan\u2019s edifice is, rather, centred on the tension between some traumatic \u2018particular absolute\u2019, some kernel which resists symbolization, and the \u2018competing universalities\u2019 (to use Butler\u2019s appropriate term) that endeavour in vain to symbolize\/normalize it.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u017di\u017eek [According to Butler] Lacan gets stuck in a negative-transcendental gesture. That is to say: while Butler acknowledges that, for Lacan, the subject never achieves full identity, that the process of subject-formation is always incomplete, condemned to ultimate failure, her criticism is that Lacan elevates the very obstacle that prevents the subject’s complete realization into … Continue reading “\u017di\u017eek Butler 2000 CHU historicism sexual difference”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[78,86,24,40,69,16,98,94,15,118,41,20],"tags":[105,109],"class_list":["post-2011","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-butler","category-gender","category-lacan","category-lack","category-laclau","category-ontology","category-resignify","category-sexual-difference","category-subjectivity","category-symbolic","category-the-real","category-zizek","tag-thedebate","tag-whoa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2011","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2011"}],"version-history":[{"count":29,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2011\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2015,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2011\/revisions\/2015"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2011"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2011"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2011"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}