{"id":4380,"date":"2009-10-30T14:03:54","date_gmt":"2009-10-30T18:03:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=4380"},"modified":"2014-05-13T14:05:31","modified_gmt":"2014-05-13T18:05:31","slug":"zizek-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2009\/10\/30\/zizek-3\/","title":{"rendered":"\u017di\u017eek desire drive review of Fink 1996"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.lacan.com\/zizlola.htm\" target=\"_blank\">On the web here at lacan.com<\/a><\/p>\n<p>This paper was first published in the <em>Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society<\/em> 1 (1996), 160-61, as a review of Bruce Fink&#8217;s <em>The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance<\/em> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).<\/p>\n<p>Insofar as, according to Lacan, at the conclusion of psychoanalytic treatment, the <strong>subject assumes the drive beyond fantasy and beyond (the Law of) desire<\/strong>, this problematic also compels us to confront the question of the conclusion of treatment in all its urgency. If we discard the discredited standard formulas (&#8220;reintegration into the symbolic space&#8221;, etc.), only two options remain open: <strong>desire or drive.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8211; That is to say, either we conceive the conclusion of treatment as the assertion of the subject&#8217;s radical openness to the enigma of the Other&#8217;s desire no longer veiled by fantasmatic formations,<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; or we risk the step beyond desire itself and adopt the position of the saint who is no longer bothered by the Other&#8217;s desire as its decentred cause.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of the saint, the subject, in an unheard-of way, &#8220;causes itself&#8221;, <strong>becomes its own cause<\/strong>. Its cause is no longer decentred, i.e.,<strong> the enigma of the Other&#8217;s desire no longer has any hold over it<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>How are we to understand this strange reversal on which Fink is quite justified to insist? In principle, things are clear enough: by way of positing itself as its own cause, the subject fully assumes the fact that the <strong>object-cause<\/strong> of its desire is not a cause that precedes its effects but is<strong> retroactively posited by the network <\/strong>of its effects: <strong>an event is never simply in itself traumatic, it only becomes a trauma retroactively<\/strong>, by being &#8216;secreted&#8217; from the subject&#8217;s symbolic space as its inassimilable point of reference.<\/p>\n<p><strong>In this precise sense, the subject &#8220;causes itself&#8221; by way of retroactively positing that X which acts as the object-cause of its desire. This loop is constitutive of the subject.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>That is, an entity that does not &#8217;cause itself&#8217; is precisely not a subject but an object. However, one should avoid conceiving this assumption as a kind of symbolic integration of the decentred Real, whereby the subject &#8216;symbolizes&#8217;, assumes as an act of its free choice, the imposed trauma of the contingent encounter with the Real.<\/p>\n<p>One should always bear in mind that the status of the subject as such is hysterical:<strong> the subject &#8216;is&#8217; only insofar as it confronts the enigma of Che vuoi? -&#8220;What do you want?&#8221;- insofar as the Other&#8217;s desire remains impenetrable, insofar as the subject doesn&#8217;t know what kind of object it is for the Other.<\/strong> Suspending this decentring of the cause is thus strictly equivalent to what Lacan called <span style=\"color: #ff0000;\"><strong>&#8220;subjective destitution&#8221;<\/strong><\/span>, the de-hystericization by means of which the subject loses its status as subject.<\/p>\n<p>The most elementary matrix of fantasy, of its temporal loop, is that of the &#8220;impossible&#8221; gaze by means of which the subject is present at the act of his\/her own conception. What is at stake in it is the enigma of the Other&#8217;s desire: by means of the fantasy-formation, the subject provides an answer to the question, &#8216;What am I for my parents, for their desire?&#8217; and thus endeavours to arrive at the &#8216;deeper meaning&#8217; of his or her existence, to discern the Fate involved in it.<\/p>\n<p>The reassuring lesson of fantasy is that &#8220;I was brought about with a special purpose&#8221;. Consequently, when, at the end of psychoanalytic treatment, I <span style=\"background-color: yellow;\">&#8220;traverse my fundamental fantasy&#8221;<\/span>, the point of it <span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">is not<\/span> that, instead of being bothered by the enigma of the Other&#8217;s desire, of what I am for the others, I &#8220;subjectivize&#8221; my fate in the sense of its symbolization, of recognizing myself in a symbolic network or narrative for which I am fully responsible, but rather that<strong> I fully assume the uttermost contingency of my being.<\/strong><span style=\"background-color: yellow;\">The subject becomes &#8217;cause of itself&#8217; in the sense of no longer looking for a guarantee of his or her existence in another&#8217;s desire.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Another way to put it is to say that the <strong><span style=\"color: #ff0000;\">&#8220;subjective destitution&#8221;<\/span> changes the register from desire to drive. <\/strong>Desire is historical and subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one object to another, since I do not actually desire what I want. What I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded moment of its satisfaction.<\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"color: #0000ff;\">Drive<\/span><\/strong>, on the other hand, involves a kind of inert satisfaction which always finds its way. Drive is non-subjectivized (&#8220;acephalic&#8221;); perhaps its paradigmatic expressions are the repulsive private rituals (sniffing one&#8217;s own sweat, sticking one&#8217;s finger into one&#8217;s nose, etc.) that bring us intense satisfaction without our being aware of it-or, insofar as we are aware of it, without our being able to do anything to prevent it.<\/p>\n<p>In Andersen&#8217;s fairy tale <em>The Red Shoes,<\/em> an impoverished young woman puts on a pair of magical shoes and almost dies when her feet won&#8217;t stop dancing. She is only saved when an executioner cuts off her feet with his axe. Her still-shod feet dance on, whereas she is given wooden feet and finds peace in religion.<\/p>\n<p>These shoes stand for <strong>drive<\/strong> <strong>at its purest<\/strong>: <strong>an &#8216;undead&#8217; partial object that functions as a kind of impersonal willing<\/strong>: &#8216;it wants&#8217;, it persists in its repetitive movement (of dancing), it follows its path and exacts its satisfaction at any price, <strong>irrespective of the subject&#8217;s well-being<\/strong>. This <strong>drive<\/strong> is that which is &#8216;in the subject more than herself&#8217;: although the subject cannot ever &#8216;subjectivize&#8217; it, assume it as &#8216;her own&#8217; by way of saying &#8216;It is I who want to do this!&#8217;<strong> it nonetheless operates in her very kernel<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>As Fink&#8217;s book reminds us, Lacan&#8217;s wager is that it is possible to sublimate this dull satisfaction. This is what, ultimately, art and religion are about.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>On the web here at lacan.com This paper was first published in the Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 1 (1996), 160-61, as a review of Bruce Fink&#8217;s The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Insofar as, according to Lacan, at the conclusion of psychoanalytic treatment, the subject &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2009\/10\/30\/zizek-3\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;\u017di\u017eek desire drive review of Fink 1996&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[111,125,21,24,142,72,76,15,41,20],"tags":[109],"class_list":["post-4380","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-desire","category-drive","category-jouissance","category-lacan","category-nightworld","category-objet-a","category-sub-destitute","category-subjectivity","category-the-real","category-zizek","tag-whoa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4380","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4380"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4380\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12842,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4380\/revisions\/12842"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4380"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4380"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4380"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}