{"id":4947,"date":"2010-02-19T14:43:21","date_gmt":"2010-02-19T18:43:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=4947"},"modified":"2012-10-12T23:14:50","modified_gmt":"2012-10-13T04:14:50","slug":"hegel-phenomenology","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2010\/02\/19\/hegel-phenomenology\/","title":{"rendered":"houlgate phenomenology desire"},"content":{"rendered":"

Houlgate, Stephen. “G.W.F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit.” \u00a0Solomon, Robert C. and David Sherman eds. The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy<\/em>. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. \u00a0Print.<\/p>\n

According to Hegel, I cannot fully understand who I am, if I remain alone by myself with only the objects of nature to attend to. I gain a proper consciousness of myself only when my self-understanding is recognized and confirmed by others.<\/p>\n

The Phenomenology<\/em> describes … the development of consciousness from its most primitive or naive form which Hegel names “sensuous certainty” to its most mature form: self-knowing spirit or “absolute knowing.”<\/p>\n

Sensuous certainty<\/strong>: form of consciousness that takes itself to be aware of the simple immediate presence of things, eschewing all mediating categories and is certain in its own mind that what it has before it is nothing but this, here, now <\/em>in all its simplicity.<\/p>\n

Perception<\/strong>: the more developed standpoint of perception is logically<\/em> implicit in that of sense certainty, and those wedded to immediate sensuous certainty should acknowledge that the objects they relate to are more complex than they first think. \u00a0Hegel argues that perception grasps its object as a complex unity of many “nows” and many “heres,” but that it cannot decide whether the true nature of the object lies more in its unity or in its multiplicity. \u00a0Perception ends up distinguishing between the manifold character and the inner<\/em> unity of the object. \u00a0As soon as it regards its object as having an inner unity, however, it ceases to be mere perception and becomes understanding.<\/p>\n

Understanding<\/strong>: then learns that inner unity of the thing actually consists in lawfulness, reason, and life. \u00a0When this happens, Hegel claims, understanding proves to be not just consciousness of objects, but also self-consciousness<\/em> — because it finds in its objects the very qualities that constitute its own nature.<\/p>\n

Prior to its mutation into self-consciousness, understanding already incorporates an element of self-understanding: it knows that it is precisely the <\/span>understanding, <\/span><\/em>rather than mere perception of objects.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Yet only when it encounters in the objects themselves nothing but qualities belonging to itself does it come to be self-consciousness<\/em><\/span> in the full sense, that is, consciousness of itself above all else.<\/em><\/p>\n

Hegel points out that understanding always takes itself to be conscious of what is other than it and does not realize that it is self-conscious<\/span>. \u00a0It is we phenomenologists, not understanding itself, who recognize that understanding is in fact conscious of itself. \u00a0In Hegel’s own words, “it is only <\/span>for us<\/em> that this truth exists, not yet for consciousness.” \u00a0Nevertheless, in understanding something else to be rational and law-like, understanding is, indeed, “communing directly with itself, enjoying only itself” … Hegel’s next task is to examine what is involved in being explicitly self-conscious<\/span>, or “<\/span>what consciousness knows in knowing itself.”<\/em><\/p>\n

We become explicitly self-conscious when we make our selves and our own identity the explicit and all consuming object of our concern, when we become wholly and overtly absorbed by ourselves.<\/p>\n

1. consciousness comes to be wholly absorbed by itself while remaining conscious of what is other<\/em> than it. \u00a0When consciousness wakes up to the fact that it is primarily conscious of and concerned with itself, the objects of perception and understanding do not suddenly disappear from view. ON the contrary, they remain before us as the external objects in relation to which<\/em> we are principally conscious of ourselves. For Hegel, self-consciousness<\/em> is thus not exclusively consciousness of oneself; it is a relation to something other than me in which I relate to myself above all.<\/p>\n

This is not to deny that, like Descartes in the Mediations<\/em>, I can “shut my eyes, stop my ears, withdraw all my senses” and “converse with myself” in total separation from things.\u00a0 What can be reached through Cartesian doubt, however, is no more than abstract<\/em> self-consciousness<\/span>, because such doubt abstracts from the conditions under which alone concrete, all-embracing self-consciousness is possible: namely, consciousness of an external world in relation to which we find ourselves. … Hegel acknowledges that such abstract self-consciousness is possible and is an important moment of true, concrete self-consciousness.<\/strong> He claims, however, that true self-consciousness itself does not merely abstract from but (to borrow Kant’s term) “accompanies” our consciousness of objects.<\/p>\n

From Hegel’s point of view Descartes overlooks the moment of other-relatedness that is essential to true consciousness of oneself<\/span>. \u00a0Yet there is nevertheless something to be learned from Descartes about true self-consciousness<\/span><\/em>: for in remaining conscious of real, external objects, self-consciousness<\/em><\/span> must also seek to negate<\/em> those objects. Consciousness finds itself in what is other than it; but the very otherness of the objects I encounter inevitably prevents me from relating wholly to myself. \u00a0In order to achieve unalloyed self-consciousness, therefore, I must regard the object before me as something that is not<\/em> essentailly other than or independent of me after all, but there merely for <\/em>me. \u00a0I continue to consider the object to be real, and (unlike Descartes) do not declare it to be a figment of my imagination: but I deem it to offer no resistance to me and to yield to my ability to negate or consume it for my own satisfaction and self-enjoyment. \u00a0Insofar as self-consciousness relates to itself through negating objects around it, it is, in Hegel’s word, desire (Begierde).<\/em> Self-consciousness<\/span> necessarily takes the form of desire, therefore, because Descartes is half-right: consciousness does enhance its sense of itself by negating the objects around it, but it directs its activity of negation at a realm of objects whose reality is not in doubt and that, consequently, forever <\/span>remains<\/em> to be negated. <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Note that desire arises at this point in the Phenomenology<\/em> not (or, rather, not just) because we are organic, embodied beings, but because of the very nature of self-consciousness itself. Concrete self-consciousness is not immediate self-awareness, but self-awareness mediated by and inseparable from the awareness of what is other. \u00a0Self-consciousness is interested in itself above all, and yet, as a complex form of consciousness<\/em>, it is <\/span><\/strong>necessarily related to external things<\/span>. <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

If it is to attain an undiluted consciousness of itself<\/em>, it must thus negate and destroy the other things in encounters. <\/span>As this activity of negating what is other than itself, self-consciousness is desire. <\/strong>In Hegel’s own words, the origin of desire is thus the fact that “self-consciousness is … essentially the return from otherness<\/em>.” <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Note that what we desire, in Hegel’s view, is not the object as such, but rather, as Jean Hyppolite puts it, “the unity of the I with itself.” \u00a0If Hegel is right, in seeking to enjoy the object, we are in fact seeking to enjoy ourselves<\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Houlgate, Stephen. “G.W.F. Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit.” \u00a0Solomon, Robert C. and David Sherman eds. The Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. \u00a0Print. According to Hegel, I cannot fully understand who I am, if I remain alone by myself with only the objects of nature to attend to. I gain a … Continue reading “houlgate phenomenology desire”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[111,38,100,15],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4947","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-desire","category-ethics","category-hegel","category-subjectivity"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4947","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4947"}],"version-history":[{"count":20,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4947\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9548,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4947\/revisions\/9548"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4947"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4947"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4947"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}