Neill, Calum. \u201cAn Idiotic Act: On the Non-Example of Antigone.\u201d The Letter , 34, 2005, 1-28.<\/p>\n
The Symbolic order<\/strong> is necessarily experienced by the subject as Other<\/span>, as an Other <\/span>of which there is available no objective and totalising conception. That is to say, the Symbolic<\/strong> as Other<\/span> figures only insofar as it figures in relation to the subject who would encounter it. The Symbolic<\/strong> order is a structural condition which, as it manifests for and in relation to the subject, can only be seen to exist insofar as it exists for that subject.<\/p>\n Conjoined with this, the Symbolic<\/strong> would be the field in which the subject would assume its constitution and, thus, from which it would retroactively posit its emergence. While, then, the Symbolic<\/strong> and the subject obviously cannot be reduced to (aspects of) one another, neither can they, in this context, be separated from one another.<\/p>\n The conception of the act as a reconfiguration of the Symbolic would then have to figure as a subjective undertaking<\/span>. In terms of Antigone\u2019s act<\/strong>, the act would not only be Antigone\u2019s in the sense that she performs it but it would be hers in the sense that it is performed in relation to the Symbolic order as it manifests for her. This would be to acknowledge that the act can only be experienced by the subject. But even in order for the subject to be understood to have experienced the act or to have experienced itself as acting this would necessitate the act\u2019s (re)inscription in the Symbolic<\/strong>.<\/p>\n The act, as coterminous with the assumption of subjectivity, is necessarily pulsational. One cannot (permanently) occupy the act.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n We should perhaps remember here Lacan\u2019s claim from Television that \u2018Suicide is the only act which can succeed without misfiring<\/em>\u2019. Suicide would be such an act precisely because it is not, from the subjective perspective, reinscribed in the Symbolic.<\/p>\n There is in suicide no continuation, no possibility of recuperation by or to the Symbolic<\/strong> but also, quite clearly, no possibility of subjectivity either. That suicide is the only act which can succeed without misfiring is not to advocate suicide, it is, rather, to recognise the impossibility of other acts not misfiring. Suicide is the only act which would not entail a recuperation to the Symbolic by the subject who would have committed it.<\/p>\n The point remains here, however, even acknowledging this subjective relation to the Other <\/span>, that any act at all, in \u017di\u017eek\u2019s understanding of it, might figure as ethical<\/span> even if this means that it only figures as ethical<\/span> for the particular subject who has acted. Which is precisely to say that there is available no means to differentiate the ethical<\/span> from the unethical. To paraphrase Simon Critchley\u2019s question concerning Badiou\u2019s notion of the event, and there does appear to be some theoretical resemblance between \u017di\u017eek\u2019s \u2018act\u2019 and Badiou\u2019s \u2018event\u2019<\/strong>, how and in virtue of what is one to distinguish an ethical<\/span> act from a non-ethical act<\/em>?<\/p>\n Invoking Kant, \u017di\u017eek represents the \u2018proper ethical act<\/span>\u2019 as \u2018doubly Moreover, the proper ethical act<\/span> is inherently transgressive. It is not merely a matter of allegiance to a universal duty without pathological motives but it is an allegiance to a form of action which will redefine the very form of the prior conception of what would constitute the good, the norm, the Symbolic order<\/strong>. \u017di\u017eek\u2019s \u2018moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as \u2018Good\u2019\u2019. The proper ethical act<\/span> is then, for \u017di\u017eek, not so much defined by its irrational nature but is that which would institute a new conception or criteria for what counts as rational at all. Nothing which precedes an act is adequate to the task of judging the act.<\/span><\/p>\n As \u017di\u017eek himself makes clear, the act is radically distinguished from \u2018a simple criminal violation\u2019. This, not because the act is necessarily a violation without pathological intent or because the act is a violation in the name of a competing conception of right or justice but precisely because the act entails the assumption of cause by the subject without illusory appeal to some other (or Other) foundation for action<\/span>. It is in this sense that the act would be properly described as a suspension of the Other<\/span>.<\/p>\n The act is located at the limits of the authority of the Other, the act is the point of subjective intervention without appeal to an Other authority.<\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n The Other<\/span>, as we have seen, can be understood as coterminous with the Symbolic<\/strong> order insofar as it manifests as a subjective experience. The Other<\/span>, that is, is the Symbolic<\/strong> order as it is, and with the specificity with which it is, encountered by the subject. <\/strong><\/p>\n Das Ding<\/strong> is that which cannot be recuperated to either the Symbolic<\/strong> order or to the Imaginary order. It is that of the Real<\/strong> which would insist at the limits of subjective experience. It is, in the context of \u2018intersubjectivity\u2019, that of the other which cannot be\u00a0accommodated to a point of recognition, that in the other which can neither form an aspect of identity nor be reduced to a point of signification. It is also, then, that in and of the subject which can neither be reduced to imaginary identification nor recuperated to a system of signification.<\/p>\n What \u017di\u017eek characterises as the insistence of \u2018the Other-Thing<\/span>\u2019 would be more accurately described as that in any encounter which cannot be recuperated to a totalising comprehension. It is the insistence of this Thing<\/span> which cannot adequately be accommodated which would be indicative of the lack in both the other and the Other<\/span>.<\/p>\n In the encounter with the Other<\/span>, the Other<\/span> is experienced as demanding of the subject. It is such a demand which would be indicative of das Ding<\/span>, insofar as das Ding<\/span> might be that which would satisfy this demand. In this sense, das Ding<\/span> can be understood to be a name for that which the Other<\/span> is experienced as lacking.<\/p>\n It is clear then that, as \u017di\u017eek appears to acknowledge, there is no possible correlation between the (particular) insistence of the subject and das Ding. If there were, then this would be to simultaneously \u2018solve\u2019 the lack in the Other and the lack in the subject.<\/p>\n Which would be to say that there is no subject and no Other for the subject. There would be, that is, no Symbolic order in which the act could be (re)inscribed.<\/p>\n The act should rather be understood as the subject\u2019s always inadequate response to the Other (and the other).<\/strong><\/p>\n The act is the moment of production of something in response to the other and the Other, precisely in the sense that that something is not the Thing, is not adequate to das Ding. The act would be the moment of subjective assumption, the moment of the subject\u2019s causing its desire to come forth.<\/p>\n But such desire is never something which would be \u2018entirely given\u2019,\u00a0 it is something which must be brought into the world anew. Insofar as the subject\u2019s act is to be understood, it must be reinscribed in the Symbolic and, in being so inscribed, it does necessarily alter the Symbolic. It is in this sense that, as \u017di\u017eek correctly notes, the act is a creatio ex nihilo.<\/p>\n It is in the act that \u2018the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world\u2019.<\/p>\n It must however by emphasised that it, the act, is commensurate with the moment of subjective assumption.<\/p>\n That is, that the act is the act for the subject who would have constituted itself in the act.<\/p>\n Or, phrased otherwise, the act is the subjective moment of assumption and is thus only experienced as such by the subject.<\/strong><\/p>\n This is not to argue that Antigone is a non-ethical example.<\/p>\n It is rather to emphasise that the very concept of an ethical example is nonsensical.<\/p>\n The ethical consists in the moment of assumption of and as the cause of one\u2019s existence as subject. It is availed of no exterior support or justification.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Neill, Calum. \u201cAn Idiotic Act: On the Non-Example of Antigone.\u201d The Letter , 34, 2005, 1-28. The Symbolic order is necessarily experienced by the subject as Other, as an Other of which there is available no objective and totalising conception. That is to say, the Symbolic as Other figures only insofar as it figures in … Continue reading “calum on \u017d the Other part 5”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[38,24,90,15,118,106,20],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7620","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ethics","category-lacan","category-resistance","category-subjectivity","category-symbolic","category-the-act","category-zizek"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7620"}],"version-history":[{"count":13,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7646,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7620\/revisions\/7646"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7620"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7620"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7620"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nformal: not only does it obey the universal form of law, but this universal form is also its sole motive\u2019. 45<\/p>\n