{"id":7664,"date":"2011-04-23T18:33:26","date_gmt":"2011-04-23T23:33:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=7664"},"modified":"2011-04-23T19:21:45","modified_gmt":"2011-04-24T00:21:45","slug":"7664","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2011\/04\/23\/7664\/","title":{"rendered":"ethics pluth"},"content":{"rendered":"

Tutt, Daniel. The Object of Proximity: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis in \u017di\u017eek and Santner via Lacan<\/a>.<\/em> American University Also available here<\/a> danielp.tutt(at)gmail.com<\/p>\n

In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis<\/em>, Lacan develops the neighbor as \u201cdas Ding<\/span>\u201d, (the Thing) a pre-symbolic object characterized primarily by affect and appearing in the symbolic realm prior to any and all representation.[5]<\/p>\n

Das Ding <\/span>is a substanceless void, and in structure it is equivalent to the neighbor, or the Other.<\/p>\n

The Other[6] takes on a \u201cthing-like\u201d character based on an excess materiality that always resists symbolization in the register of the real. This Other as object is filled in by a certain distance, what Lacan refers to as proximity, a proximity that is identical to the neighbor. As Lacan comments, \u201cthe neighbor is identical to the subject, in the same way that one can say the Nebenmensch that Freud speaks of as the foundation of das Ding as his neighbor.\u201d[8] Lacan\u2019s theory of the neighbor-as-das-Ding is rooted in Freud\u2019s conception of das Ding: \u201cand so the complex of the neighbor divides into two constituent parts the first of which impresses through the constancy of its compos[i]tion, its persistence as a Thing, while the other is understood by means of memory-work\u2026\u201d[9]<\/p>\n

Lacan characterizes das Ding<\/span> as \u201ca primordial function located at the level of the unconscious Vorstellungen.\u201d[10] Das Ding ultimately indicates that there is no sovereign good; and thus no possibility to constitute the good in the realm of the subject. \u201cThere is good and bad and then there is das Ding<\/span>\u201d \u2013 the Thing remains unfathomable, an excess, outside of the moral relationship.<\/p>\n

Lacan\u2019s Ethics: A Matter of Form and Freedom<\/strong><\/p>\n

… Lacanian ethics, as Zupancic correctly points out,… it is something that happens to us, it throws us out of joint, because it always inscribes itself in a given continuity as a rupture, a break or interruption. This is when ethics comes into play; i.e. will I act in conformity to what threw me out of joint? For Lacan, emphasis is placed on desire, \u201chave you acted in conformity with the desire which inhabits you?\u201d<\/span> for after all, it is desire that aims at the real<\/span>.[17]<\/p>\n

Das Ding<\/span>, in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis<\/em> … [is] that which manifests desire for the real<\/span>. Thus, the real<\/span>, in ethical terms is an extra moral matter, similar to what we find in Kant\u2019s moral system.<\/p>\n

\u201cIf a man is to become not merely legally, but morally, a good man\u2026 this cannot be brought about by gradual reformation so long as the basis of the maxims remain impure, but must be affected through a revolution in the man\u2019s disposition\u2026 He can become a new man only by a kind of rebirth, as it were through a new creation.\u201d[Kant, Immanuel Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone<\/em>, Pg. 42 \u2013 43]<\/p>\n

Kant and Lacan are both placing ethics, and ethical change ex nihilo<\/em>, and both develop their ethical systems out of a material excess, for Kant the excess is pathology, and for Lacan it is objet petite a<\/span>. [21] Both systems are seeking to manage the \u201cexcess of the real<\/strong>,\u201d and Zupancic argues, Lacan\u2019s passage a la act<\/strong> is identical to Kant\u2019s allegiance on form in his development of the Groundwork<\/em>. For Lacan, the faculty of desire does not point to any particular act of desiring but to the frame of desiring as such, similar to how Kantian form points to duty.<\/p>\n

The surplus in relation to legality and to the ethical is what is dealt with by form \u2013 the main point being that for Kant it is incumbent to follow the form of duty. Kantian ethics demands that an action not only conform to duty, but it mandates this conformity be the only content or motive of that action. Form itself must be appropriated as a material surplus, in order for it to determine the will, and Kantian form is the same as Lacan\u2019s conception of objet petite a<\/span>, the thing that persists beyond surplus enjoyment. The metaphysical question to both systems of ethics is virtually the same, how can form become matter?<\/p>\n

Yet, both Lacanian and Kantian ethics seek to solve the problem of form, or how if Kantian form and Lacanian objet petite a<\/span> force the subject to follow a sort of second nature, then ethics functions as a drive and isn\u2019t ethics at all. As Zupancic argues, how Lacan dealt with objet petite a<\/span>, or the surplus enjoyment left over in the domain of the real<\/span> that persists for the sake of enjoyment is similar to how Kant dealt with the excess of pathology. Since the Kantian object drive is nothing but the drive of the will, and the Lacanain subject\u2019s separation from the pathological objet petite a<\/span> produces a certain remainder, a remainder that constitutes the drive of the ethical subject<\/strong>, both systems of thought construct ethics from very similar conceptual problems.<\/p>\n

We are beginning to see the contours of a Lacanian subject forming that is not rooted in a nightmarish ontological rut as many have criticized Lacan, particularly those that argue his subjectivity is purely a subject constructed from language.<\/p>\n

To the contrary, as Ed Pluth<\/strong> has noted in Signifiers and Acts: Freedom in Lacan\u2019s Theory of the Subject<\/em>, Lacan\u2019s ethics are rooted in a view of freedom of the subject. Importantly, the Lacanian subject can change the destiny of an unconscious desire to the point of \u201cbeing verbal to the second power\u201d \u2013 since \u201cevery act of speaking involves an act of addressing an other \u2013 always implying a search for recognition from a third party other,\u201d a true ethical act is one that does not address the big Other<\/span>.<\/p>\n

As Pluth observes, \u201can act does not receive recognition for its identity from an other\u2026 it is thus not the subject that acts, an \u2018act subjects.\u2019\u201d<\/span> Thus, the Lacanain subject can never locate the good in the subject, but the subject is able to overturn their lack of capacity to assume their own symbolic identity<\/strong>. The capacity of the subject to overturn their symbolic situation will be examined via Slavoj \u017di\u017eek and Eric Santner\u2019s reading of the ethics of psychoanalysis.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Tutt, Daniel. The Object of Proximity: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis in \u017di\u017eek and Santner via Lacan. American University Also available here danielp.tutt(at)gmail.com In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan develops the neighbor as \u201cdas Ding\u201d, (the Thing) a pre-symbolic object characterized primarily by affect and appearing in the symbolic realm prior to any and all representation.[5] … Continue reading “ethics pluth”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[125,38,24,55,15,118,106,41,20],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-7664","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-drive","category-ethics","category-lacan","category-normative","category-subjectivity","category-symbolic","category-the-act","category-the-real","category-zizek"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7664","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7664"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7664\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7667,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7664\/revisions\/7667"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7664"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7664"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7664"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}