{"id":8358,"date":"2011-10-01T15:41:53","date_gmt":"2011-10-01T20:41:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=8358"},"modified":"2012-10-03T03:31:00","modified_gmt":"2012-10-03T08:31:00","slug":"8358","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2011\/10\/01\/8358\/","title":{"rendered":"\u017di\u017eek cartestian subject cogito"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u017di\u017eek, Slavoj. SIC Cogito and the Unconscious<\/em>. Durham: Duke University Press 1998<\/p>\n

Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth<\/em><\/p>\n

There\u00a0 are\u00a0 two\u00a0 standard\u00a0 ways\u00a0 to\u00a0 approach\u00a0 the\u00a0 relationship\u00a0 between\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 and psychoanalysis.\u00a0 Philosophers\u00a0 usually\u00a0 search\u00a0 for\u00a0 so-called philosophical\u00a0 foundations\u00a0 of psychoanalysis”:\u00a0 their\u00a0 premise\u00a0 is\u00a0 that,\u00a0 no\u00a0 matter\u00a0 how\u00a0 dismissive\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 is\u00a0 of philosophy, it nonetheless has to rely on a series of conceptual presuppositions (about the nature\u00a0 of\u00a0 drives,\u00a0 of\u00a0 reality,\u00a0 etc.)\u00a0 that\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 itself\u00a0 does\u00a0 not\u00a0 render\u00a0 thematic\u00a0 and that\u00a0 bear\u00a0 witness\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 way\u00a0 in\u00a0 which\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 is\u00a0 only\u00a0 possible\u00a0 within\u00a0 a\u00a0 certain philosophical\u00a0 horizon.<\/p>\n

On\u00a0 the\u00a0 other\u00a0 hand,\u00a0 psychoanalysts\u00a0 at\u00a0 their\u00a0 worst,\u00a0 indulge\u00a0 in\u00a0 so-called “psychoanalyzing of philosophers,” trying to discern pathological psychic motivations beneath\u00a0 fundamental\u00a0 philosophical attitudes\u00a0 (philosophical\u00a0 idealism\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 last\u00a0 vestige\u00a0 of the\u00a0 childish\u00a0 belief\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 omnipotency\u00a0 of\u00a0 thoughts;\u00a0 paranoiac\u00a0 systematizing\u00a0 as\u00a0 the foundation\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 need\u00a0 to\u00a0 form\u00a0 all-embracing\u00a0 philosophical\u00a0 systems,\u00a0 etc.).\u00a0 Both\u00a0 these approaches\u00a0 are\u00a0 to\u00a0 be\u00a0 rejected.<\/strong>\u00a0 While\u00a0 the\u00a0 psychoanalytic\u00a0 reduction\u00a0 of\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 to\u00a0 an expression of psychic pathology is today, deservedly, no longer taken seriously, it is much more difficult to counter the seemingly self-evident claim that psychoanalysis cannot relate anything\u00a0 truly\u00a0 relevant\u00a0 to\u00a0 philosophy,\u00a0 since\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 must\u00a0 itself\u00a0 rely\u00a0 on\u00a0 a\u00a0 set\u00a0 of philosophical presuppositions that it is unable to reflect upon.<\/p>\n

What if, however, references to the Freudian subject are not external to philosophy, but can, in fact, tell us something about\u00a0 the\u00a0 modern,\u00a0 Cartesian\u00a0 subject?<\/p>\n

What\u00a0 if\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 renders\u00a0 visible\u00a0 something that\u00a0 the\u00a0 modern\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 of\u00a0 subjectivity\u00a0 accomplishes\u00a0 without\u00a0 knowing\u00a0 it,\u00a0 its\u00a0 own grounding\u00a0 gesture,\u00a0 which\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 has\u00a0 to\u00a0 disavow\u00a0 if\u00a0 it\u00a0 is\u00a0 to\u00a0 assume\u00a0 its\u00a0 place\u00a0 within academic\u00a0 knowledge?<\/p>\n

To\u00a0 use\u00a0 Lacan’s\u00a0 pun,\u00a0 what\u00a0 if\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 renders\u00a0 visible\u00a0 the ex-timate\u00a0 kernel\u00a0 of\u00a0 modern\u00a0 subjectivity,\u00a0 its\u00a0 innermost\u00a0 core\u00a0 that\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 is\u00a0 not\u00a0 ready\u00a0 to assume, which it tries to keep at a distanceor, to put it in a more fashionable way, what if psychoanalysis\u00a0 renders\u00a0 visible\u00a0 the\u00a0 constitutive\u00a0 madness\u00a0 of\u00a0 modern\u00a0 philosophy?<\/p>\n

We\u00a0 are thus\u00a0 playing\u00a0 a\u00a0 double\u00a0 strategic\u00a0 game:\u00a0 this\u00a0 ex-timate\u00a0 kernel\u00a0 of\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 is\u00a0 not\u00a0 directly accessible\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 conceived\u00a0 of as a\u00a0 branch\u00a0 of psychology\u00a0 or psychiatry\u00a0 — what we encounter at this level are, of course, the “naive” pre-philosophical theses. What one has to do, is to bring to light the philosophical implications of psychoanalysis, that is, to\u00a0 retranslate,\u00a0 to\u00a0 transpose psychoanalytic\u00a0 propositions\u00a0 back\u00a0 into\u00a0 philosophy, to “elevate them\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 dignity\u00a0 of\u00a0 philosophical\u00a0 propositions”:\u00a0 in\u00a0 this\u00a0 way,\u00a0 one\u00a0 is able\u00a0 to discern\u00a0 the ex-timate\u00a0 philosophical\u00a0 kernel\u00a0 of\u00a0 psychoanalysis,\u00a0 since\u00a0 this\u00a0 transposition\u00a0 back\u00a0 into philosophy explodes the standard philosophical frame. This is what Lacan was doing all the time:\u00a0 reading\u00a0 hysteria\u00a0 or\u00a0 obsessional\u00a0 neurosis\u00a0 as\u00a0 a philosophical\u00a0 “attitude\u00a0 of\u00a0 thought towards\u00a0 reality”\u00a0 (the\u00a0 obsessional\u00a0 compulsion\u00a0 to\u00a0 think” if\u00a0 I\u00a0 stop\u00a0 thinking,\u00a0 I\u00a0 will\u00a0 cease\u00a0 to exist” — as the truth of the Cartesian cogito ergo sum), etc., etc. Are we thus not again engaged in “psychoanalyzing philosophy”? No, since this reference to\u00a0 madness\u00a0 is\u00a0 strictly\u00a0 internal\u00a0 to\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 —\u00a0 the\u00a0 whole\u00a0 of\u00a0 modern\u00a0 philosophy,\u00a0 from Descartes onward, involves an inherent reference to the threat of madness, and is thus a desperate attempt to draw a clear line that separates the transcendental philosopher from the madman ( Descartes: how do I know I’m not hallucinating reality? Kant: how to delimit metaphysical\u00a0 speculation\u00a0 from\u00a0 Swedenborgian\u00a0 hallucinatory\u00a0 rambling?\u00a0 ).<\/span><\/p>\n

This\u00a0 excess\u00a0 of madness against which modern philosophy fights is the very founding gesture of Cartesian subjectivity.<\/span><\/p>\n

…At\u00a0 this point,\u00a0 anyone\u00a0 versed\u00a0 in\u00a0 postmodern\u00a0 deconstructionism will\u00a0 utter\u00a0 a sigh\u00a0 of\u00a0 bored\u00a0 recognition:\u00a0 of\u00a0 course,\u00a0 the\u00a0 Cartesian\u00a0 ego,\u00a0 the\u00a0 selftransparent\u00a0 subject\u00a0 of Reason,\u00a0 is\u00a0 an\u00a0 illusion;\u00a0 its\u00a0 truth\u00a0 is\u00a0 the\u00a0 decentered,\u00a0 split,\u00a0 finite\u00a0 subject\u00a0 thrown\u00a0 into\u00a0 a contingent,\u00a0 nontransparent\u00a0 context,\u00a0 and\u00a0 this\u00a0 is\u00a0 what\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 renders\u00a0 visible…. Things,\u00a0 however,\u00a0 are\u00a0 more\u00a0 complicated.<\/p>\n

[…]<\/p>\n

1<\/p>\n

It\u00a0 is\u00a0 against\u00a0 this\u00a0 background\u00a0 that\u00a0 one\u00a0 should\u00a0 appreciate\u00a0 the\u00a0 paradoxical\u00a0 achievement\u00a0 of Lacan,\u00a0 which\u00a0 usually\u00a0 passes\u00a0 unnoticed\u00a0 even\u00a0 by\u00a0 his\u00a0 advocates:\u00a0 on\u00a0 the\u00a0 very\u00a0 behalf\u00a0 of psychoanalysis,\u00a0he\u00a0 returns\u00a0 to\u00a0 the\u00a0 modern\u00a0 rationalist\u00a0 notion\u00a0 of\u00a0 subject.<\/span>\u00a0 Philosophers\u00a0 and psychoanalysts,\u00a0 of\u00a0 course,\u00a0 promptly\u00a0 exclaim\u00a0 “We\u00a0 are\u00a0 here\u00a0 on\u00a0 our\u00a0 home\u00a0 terrain!”\u00a0 and proceed\u00a0 to\u00a0 reduce\u00a0 the\u00a0 Freudian\u00a0 subject\u00a0 to\u00a0 a\u00a0 psychological\u00a0 subject\u00a0 of\u00a0 introspection,\u00a0 to philosophical self-consciousness, to Nietzschean will to power…. Lacan’s underlying thesis here\u00a0 is\u00a0 even\u00a0 more\u00a0 radical\u00a0 than\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 unconscious:<\/p>\n

not\u00a0 only\u00a0 has\u00a0 the\u00a0 Freudian\u00a0 subject nothing\u00a0 to\u00a0 do\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 self-transparent,\u00a0 unified\u00a0 self-consciousness,\u00a0 it\u00a0 is\u00a0 the\u00a0 Cartesian subject\u00a0 itself\u00a0 (and\u00a0 its\u00a0 radicalization\u00a0 in\u00a0 German\u00a0 Idealism,\u00a0 from\u00a0 Kant’s\u00a0 transcendental apperception to self-consciousness from Fichte onward) … the\u00a0 standard\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 of\u00a0 subjectivity,\u00a0… misrecognize\u00a0the gap that separates the Cartesian subject (when it is “brought to its\u00a0 notion”\u00a0 with\u00a0 Kant)\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 self-transparent\u00a0 ego,\u00a0 or\u00a0 from\u00a0 man,\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 “human person.”<\/span><\/p>\n

What\u00a0 they fail to\u00a0 see\u00a0 is that\u00a0 the Cartesian subject\u00a0 emerges\u00a0 precisely\u00a0 out of\u00a0 the “death of man” “transcendental subjectivity” is philosophical antihumanism at its purest.<\/span><\/p>\n

One\u00a0 can\u00a0 see,\u00a0 now,\u00a0 why,\u00a0 in\u00a0 his\u00a0 seminar\u00a0 on\u00a0 The\u00a0 Four\u00a0 Fundamental\u00a0 Concepts\u00a0 of\u00a0 Psycho-Analysis<\/em>, Lacan asserts that the subject of psychoanalysis is none other than the Cartesian cogito:\u00a0 the\u00a0 Freudian\u00a0 unconscious\u00a0 emerges\u00a0 through\u00a0 the\u00a0 very\u00a0 reduction\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 “person’s” substantial content to the evanescent punctuality of the cogito.<\/span><\/p>\n

In\u00a0 this\u00a0 precise\u00a0 sense, one\u00a0 could\u00a0 say\u00a0 that\u00a0 Martin Luther\u00a0 was\u00a0 the first\u00a0 great antihumanist: modern subjectivity is not announced in the Renaissance humanist celebration of man as the\u00a0 “crown\u00a0 of\u00a0 creation”<\/span>, that\u00a0 is,\u00a0 in\u00a0 the\u00a0 tradition\u00a0 of\u00a0 Erasmus\u00a0 and\u00a0 others\u00a0 (to\u00a0 which\u00a0 Luther cannot but appear as a “barbarian”), but rather in Luther’s famous statement that<\/p>\n

man is the excrement who fell out of God’s anus.<\/span><\/p>\n

Modern subjectivity has nothing to do with the notion of man as the highest creature in the “great chain of being,” as the final point of the\u00a0 evolution\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 universe:<\/strong>\u00a0 modern\u00a0 subjectivity\u00a0 emerges\u00a0 when\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 perceives himself\u00a0 as\u00a0 “out\u00a0 of\u00a0 joint,”\u00a0 as\u00a0 excluded\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 “order\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 things,”\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 positive order of entities.<\/span> For that reason, the ontic equivalent of the modern subject is inherently excremental:\u00a0 there\u00a0 is\u00a0 no\u00a0 subjectivity\u00a0 proper\u00a0 without\u00a0 the\u00a0 notion\u00a0 that,\u00a0 at\u00a0 a\u00a0 different\u00a0 level, from\u00a0 another\u00a0 perspective,\u00a0 I\u00a0 am\u00a0 a\u00a0 mere\u00a0 piece\u00a0 of\u00a0 shit.<\/span><\/p>\n

For\u00a0 Marx,\u00a0 the\u00a0 emergence\u00a0 of\u00a0 working-class subjectivity<\/span> is strictly codependent to the fact that the worker is compelled to sell the very substance of his being (his creative power) as a commodity on the market, that is, to reduce the agalma, the treasure, the precious kernel of his being, to an object that can be bought for a piece of money<\/strong> — there is no subjectivity without the reduction of the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 positive-substantial\u00a0 being\u00a0 to\u00a0 a\u00a0 disposable\u00a0 “piece\u00a0 of\u00a0 shit.”<\/span><\/p>\n

In\u00a0 this\u00a0 case\u00a0 of\u00a0 the correlation between the Cartesian subjectivity and its excremental objectal counterpart, we are\u00a0 not\u00a0 dealing\u00a0 merely\u00a0 with\u00a0 an\u00a0 example\u00a0 of\u00a0 what\u00a0 Foucault\u00a0 called\u00a0 the\u00a0 empirico- transcendental couple that characterizes modern anthropology, but, rather, with the split between\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 enunciation<\/span>\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 enunciated:<\/span><\/p>\n

2<\/p>\n

If\u00a0 the Cartesian subject is to emerge at the level of the enunciation, he is to be reduced to the “almost-nothing” of a disposable excrement at the level of the enunciated content.<\/span><\/p>\n

Or,\u00a0 to\u00a0 put\u00a0 it\u00a0 in\u00a0 a\u00a0 slightly\u00a0 different\u00a0 way,\u00a0 the\u00a0 intervention\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 undermines\u00a0 the standard premodern opposition between the universal order and the hubris of a particular force whose egotistic excess perturbs the balance of the universal order: “subject” is the name\u00a0 for\u00a0 the\u00a0 hubris,\u00a0 the\u00a0 excessive\u00a0 gesture,\u00a0 whose\u00a0 very\u00a0 excess\u00a0 grounds\u00a0 the\u00a0 universal order;\u00a0 it\u00a0 is\u00a0 the\u00a0 name\u00a0 for\u00a0 the\u00a0 pathological\u00a0 abject,\u00a0 clinamen,\u00a0 deviation\u00a0 from\u00a0 the\u00a0 universal order,\u00a0 that\u00a0 sustains\u00a0 this\u00a0 very\u00a0 universal\u00a0 order.\u00a0 The\u00a0 transcendental\u00a0 subject\u00a0 is\u00a0 the “ontological\u00a0 scandal,”\u00a0 neither\u00a0 phenomenal\u00a0 nor\u00a0 noumenal,\u00a0 but\u00a0 an\u00a0 excess\u00a0 that\u00a0 sticks\u00a0 out from the “great chain of being,” a hole, a gap in the order of reality, and, simultaneously, the agent whose “spontaneous” activity constitutes the order of (phenomenal) reality. If, for\u00a0 the\u00a0 traditional\u00a0 ontology,\u00a0 the\u00a0 problem\u00a0 was\u00a0 how\u00a0 to\u00a0 deduce\u00a0 chaotic\u00a0 phenomenal\u00a0 reality background image from the eternal order of the true reality (how to account for the gradual “degeneration” of the\u00a0 eternal\u00a0 order),\u00a0 the\u00a0 problem\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 is\u00a0 that\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 imbalanced\u00a0 excess,\u00a0 hubris, deviation, that sustains the order itself. The central paradox of the Kantian transcendental constitution\u00a0 is\u00a0 that\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 is\u00a0 not\u00a0 the\u00a0 absolute,\u00a0 the\u00a0 eternal\u00a0 grounding\u00a0 principle\u00a0 of reality, but a finite, temporal entity<\/span> — precisely as such, it provides the ultimate horizon of reality.<\/p>\n

The very idea of the universe, of the all of reality, as a totality that exists in itself, is\u00a0 thus\u00a0 rejected\u00a0 as\u00a0 a\u00a0 paralogism:\u00a0 what\u00a0 appears\u00a0 as\u00a0 an\u00a0 epistemological\u00a0 limitation\u00a0 of\u00a0 our capacity\u00a0 to\u00a0 grasp\u00a0 reality\u00a0 (the\u00a0 fact\u00a0 that\u00a0 we\u00a0 are\u00a0 forever\u00a0 perceiving\u00a0 reality\u00a0 from\u00a0 our\u00a0 finite, temporal standpoint), is the positive ontological condition of reality itself. Our\u00a0 philosophical\u00a0 and\u00a0 everyday\u00a0 common\u00a0 sense\u00a0 identifies\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 with\u00a0 a\u00a0 series\u00a0 of features:\u00a0 the\u00a0 autonomous\u00a0 source\u00a0 of\u00a0 spontaneous,\u00a0 self-originating\u00a0 activity\u00a0 (what\u00a0 German Idealists called “self-positing”); the capacity of free choice; the presence of some kind of “inner\u00a0 life”\u00a0 (fantasizing);\u00a0 etc.<\/p>\n

Lacan\u00a0 endorses\u00a0 these\u00a0 features,\u00a0 but\u00a0 with\u00a0 a\u00a0 twist:\u00a0 the autonomous\u00a0 source\u00a0 of\u00a0 activity\u00a0 —\u00a0 yes,\u00a0 but\u00a0 only\u00a0 insofar\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 displaces\u00a0 onto\u00a0 an Other the fundamental passivity of his being (when I am active, I am simultaneously interpassive, i.e., there is an Other who is passive for me, in my place, like the weepers, the hired women who cry for me at funerals in so-called “primitive” societies); the free choice —\u00a0 yes,\u00a0 but,\u00a0 at\u00a0 its\u00a0 most\u00a0 radical,\u00a0 the\u00a0 choice\u00a0 is\u00a0 a\u00a0 forced\u00a0 one\u00a0 (i.e.,\u00a0 ultimately,\u00a0 I\u00a0 have\u00a0 a freedom of choice only insofar as I make the right choice); the presence of fantasizing — yes,\u00a0 but,\u00a0 far\u00a0 from\u00a0 coinciding\u00a0 with\u00a0 the\u00a0 subject\u00a0 in\u00a0 a\u00a0 direct\u00a0 experience\u00a0 of\u00a0 “inner\u00a0 life,”\u00a0 the fundamental fantasy is that which cannot ever be “subjectivized,” that which is forever cut off from the subject<\/span>….<\/p>\n

What Lacan focuses on is this specific twist, this additional turn of the screw that confronts us with the most radical dimension of subjectivity. How, then, does this endeavor of ours relate to Heidegger’s well known attempt to “think through” the horizon of subjectivity? From our perspective, the problem with Heidegger is, in\u00a0 ultima\u00a0 analisi,\u00a0 the\u00a0 following\u00a0 one:<\/p>\n

the\u00a0 Lacanian\u00a0 reading\u00a0 enables\u00a0 us\u00a0 to\u00a0 unearth\u00a0 in\u00a0 the Cartesian subjectivity its inherent tension between the moment of excess (the “diabolical Evil” in Kant, the “night of the world” in Hegel) and the subsequent attempts to gentrify-domesticate-normalize\u00a0 this\u00a0 excess.<\/p>\n

Again\u00a0 and\u00a0 again,\u00a0 post-Cartesian\u00a0 philosophers\u00a0 are compelled,\u00a0 by\u00a0 the\u00a0 inherent\u00a0 logic\u00a0 of\u00a0 their\u00a0 philosophical\u00a0 project,\u00a0 to\u00a0 articulate\u00a0 a\u00a0 certain excessive moment of “madness” inherent to cogito, which they then immediately endeavor to “renormalize.”<\/span> And the problem with Heidegger is that his notion of modern subjectivity does not seem to account for this inherent excess — in short, this notion simply does not “cover” that aspect of cogito on account of which Lacan claims that cogito is the subject of the unconscious.<\/p>\n

3<\/p>\n

One of the basic presumptions of contemporary doxa is that the Cartesian cogito paved the way for the unheard-of progress of modern science that profoundly affected the everyday life of mankind. Today, however, it seems as if the Cartesian cogito itself has acquired the status of a prescientific myth, superseded by the very progress of knowledge it unleashed. For\u00a0 that\u00a0 reason,\u00a0 the\u00a0 title\u00a0 Cogito\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 Unconscious\u00a0 is\u00a0 bound\u00a0 to\u00a0 give\u00a0 rise\u00a0 to\u00a0 two immediate associations: that it is to be understood as designating the antagonism between cogito\u00a0 (the\u00a0 transparent\u00a0 subject\u00a0 of\u00a0 self-consciousness)\u00a0 and\u00a0 the\u00a0 unconscious,\u00a0 its\u00a0 opaque Other that subverts the certitudes of consciousness; and, consequently, that cogito is to be repudiated\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 agency\u00a0 of\u00a0 manipulative\u00a0 domination\u00a0 responsible\u00a0 for\u00a0 all\u00a0 present\u00a0 woes, from\u00a0 patriarchal\u00a0 oppression\u00a0 to\u00a0 ecological\u00a0 catastrophes.\u00a0 The\u00a0 specter\u00a0 of\u00a0 the\u00a0 “Cartesian paradigm”\u00a0 roams\u00a0 around,\u00a0 simultaneously\u00a0 proclaimed\u00a0 dead\u00a0 and\u00a0 feared\u00a0 as\u00a0 the\u00a0 ultimate threat\u00a0 to\u00a0 our\u00a0 survival.<\/p>\n

In\u00a0 clear\u00a0 contrast\u00a0 to\u00a0 this\u00a0 predominant\u00a0 doxa,\u00a0 Lacan\u00a0 pleads\u00a0 for\u00a0 a psychoanalytic return to cogito.<\/span><\/p>\n

Today’s\u00a0 predominant\u00a0 position\u00a0 involves\u00a0 the\u00a0 assertion\u00a0 of\u00a0 multiple\u00a0 subjectivities\u00a0 against\u00a0 the specter\u00a0 of\u00a0 (transcendental)\u00a0 Subject:\u00a0 the\u00a0 unified\u00a0 Subject,\u00a0 the\u00a0 topic\u00a0 of\u00a0 transcendental philosophy, the constitutive source of all reality, is dead (or so we are told), and the void of its absence is filled in by the liberating proliferation of the multiple forms of subjectivity– feminine, gay, ethnic…. <\/span><\/p>\n

One should thus abandon the impossible search for the Subject that\u00a0 is\u00a0 constitutive\u00a0 of\u00a0 reality,\u00a0 and,\u00a0 instead,\u00a0 focus\u00a0 attention\u00a0 on\u00a0 the\u00a0 diverse\u00a0 forms\u00a0 of asserting\u00a0 one’s\u00a0 subjectivity\u00a0 in\u00a0 our\u00a0 complex\u00a0 and\u00a0 dispersed\u00a0 postmodern\u00a0 universe…. <\/strong><\/p>\n

What, however,\u00a0 if\u00a0 we\u00a0 perform\u00a0 the\u00a0 exact\u00a0 opposite\u00a0 of\u00a0 this\u00a0 standard\u00a0 operation,<\/strong>\u00a0 and\u00a0 endeavor\u00a0 to think a subject bereft of subjectivity<\/span> (of the self-experience of a historical agent embedded in a finite horizon of meaning)?<\/p>\n

What kind of monster remains when we subtract from the background image subject\u00a0 the\u00a0 wealth\u00a0 of\u00a0 self experience\u00a0 that\u00a0 constitutes\u00a0 subjectivity?<\/span>\u00a0 The\u00a0 present\u00a0 volume provides an answer to this question: its underlying premise is that<\/p>\n

the Cartesian subject is this monster, that it emerges precisely when we deprive the subject of all the wealth of the “human person.”<\/span><\/p>\n

Notes […]<\/p>\n

2. See Jacques Lacan, \u00c9rits: A Selection ( New York: Norton, 1977), 300.<\/p>\n

3. For a more detailed account of this excess, see, in the present volume, Slavoj \u017di\u017eek, The Cartesian Subject versus the Cartesian Theater<\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u017di\u017eek, Slavoj. SIC Cogito and the Unconscious. Durham: Duke University Press 1998 Introduction: Cogito as a Shibboleth There\u00a0 are\u00a0 two\u00a0 standard\u00a0 ways\u00a0 to\u00a0 approach\u00a0 the\u00a0 relationship\u00a0 between\u00a0 philosophy\u00a0 and psychoanalysis.\u00a0 Philosophers\u00a0 usually\u00a0 search\u00a0 for\u00a0 so-called philosophical\u00a0 foundations\u00a0 of psychoanalysis”:\u00a0 their\u00a0 premise\u00a0 is\u00a0 that,\u00a0 no\u00a0 matter\u00a0 how\u00a0 dismissive\u00a0 psychoanalysis\u00a0 is\u00a0 of philosophy, it nonetheless has to … Continue reading “\u017di\u017eek cartestian subject cogito”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[59,125,24,76,15,41,70,48,20],"tags":[109],"class_list":["post-8358","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dislocation","category-drive","category-lacan","category-sub-destitute","category-subjectivity","category-the-real","category-traversing-the-fantasy","category-unconscious","category-zizek","tag-whoa"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8358","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8358"}],"version-history":[{"count":19,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8358\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":8360,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8358\/revisions\/8360"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8358"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8358"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8358"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}