{"id":9998,"date":"2012-11-30T10:31:11","date_gmt":"2012-11-30T15:31:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/?p=9998"},"modified":"2013-10-03T11:38:33","modified_gmt":"2013-10-03T16:38:33","slug":"from-repetition-to-drive-p-496","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/2012\/11\/30\/from-repetition-to-drive-p-496\/","title":{"rendered":"from repetition to drive p.496 lost object to loss itself as object"},"content":{"rendered":"

What does the drive<\/span> mean from a philosophical standpoint? In a vague general sense, there is a homology between the shift from Kant to Hegel and the shift from desire to drive<\/span>: the Kantian universe is that of desire (structured around the lack, the inaccessible Thing-in-itself), of endlessly approaching the goal, which is why, in order to guarantee the meaningfulness of our ethical activity, Kant has to postulate the immortality of the soul (since we cannot reach the goal in our terrestrial life, we must be allowed to go on ad infinitum).<\/p>\n

For Hegel, on the contrary, the Thing-in-itself is not inaccessible, the impossible does happen here and now\u2015not, of course, in the na\u00efve pre-critical sense of gaining access to the transcendent order of things, but in the properly dialectical sense of shifting the perspective and conceiving the gap (that separates us from the Thing) as the Real. With regard to satisfaction<\/span>, this does not mean that, in contrast to desire which is constitutively non-satisfied, the drive<\/span> achieves satisfaction<\/span> by way of reaching the object which eludes desire. True, in contrast to desire, the drive<\/span> is by definition satisfied, but this is because, in it, satisfaction<\/span> is achieved in the repeated failure to reach the object, in repeatedly circling around the object.<\/span> Following Jacques-Alain Miller, a distinction has to be introduced here between a lack and a hole: a lack is spatial, designating a void within a space, while a hole is more radical, it designates the point at which this spatial order itself breaks down (as in the \u201cblack hole\u201d in physics).<\/p>\n

Therein lies the difference between desire and drive<\/span>: desire is grounded in its constitutive lack, while the drive<\/span> circulates around a hole, a gap in the order of being. In other words, the circular movement of the drive<\/span> obeys the weird logic of the curved space in which the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line, but a curve: the drive<\/span> \u201cknows\u201d that the quickest way to realize its aim is to circulate around its goal-object. At the immediate level of addressing individuals, capitalism of course interpellates them as consumers, as subjects of desire, soliciting in them ever new perverse and excessive desires (for which it offers products to satisfy them); furthermore, it obviously also manipulates the \u201cdesire to desire,\u201d celebrating the very desire to desire ever new objects and modes of pleasure. However, even if it already manipulates desire in a way which takes into account the fact that the most elementary desire is the desire to reproduce itself as desire (and not to find satisfaction<\/span>), at this level, we do not yet reach the drive<\/span>.<\/p>\n

The drive<\/span> inheres in capitalism<\/span><\/strong> at a more fundamental, systemic, level: the drive<\/span> is that which propels forward the entire capitalist machinery, it is the impersonal compulsion to engage in the endless circular movement of expanded self-reproduction.<\/p>\n

We enter the mode of the drive<\/span> the moment the circulation of money as capital becomes an end in itself, since the expansion of value takes place only within this constantly renewed movement. (One should bear in mind here Lacan\u2019s well-known distinction between the aim and the goal of drive<\/span>: while the goal is the object around which the drive<\/span> circulates, its true aim is the endless continuation of this circulation as such.)<\/p>\n

The capitalist drive<\/span> thus belongs to no particular individual<\/span><\/strong>\u2015it is rather that those individuals who act as the direct \u201cagents\u201d of capital (capitalists themselves, top managers) have to display it.<\/p>\n

Miller recently proposed a Benjaminian distinction between \u201cconstituted anxiety\u201d and \u201cconstituent anxiety,\u201d which is crucial with regard to the shift from desire to drive<\/span>: while the first designates the standard notion of the terrifying and fascinating abyss of anxiety which haunts us, its infernal circle which threatens to draw us in, the second stands for the \u201cpure\u201d confrontation with the : objet petit a<\/span> as constituted in its very loss.<\/p>\n

Miller is right to emphasize here two features: the difference which separates constituted from constituent anxiety concerns the status of the object with regard to fantasy. In a case of constituted anxiety, the object dwells within the confines of a fantasy, while we get only the constituent anxiety when the subject “traverses the fantasy<\/span>” and confronts the void, the gap, filled up by the fantasmatic object. Clear and convincing as it is, Miller\u2019s formula misses the true paradox or, rather, ambiguity of the objet a<\/span>, the ambiguity which concerns the question: does the objet a<\/span> function as the object of desire or of the drive<\/span>?<\/p>\n

That is to say, when Miller defines the objet a<\/span> as the object which overlaps with its loss, which emerges at the very moment of its loss (so that all its fantasmatic incarnations, from breast to voice to gaze, are metonymic figurations of the void, of nothing), he remains within the horizon of desire\u2015the true object-cause of desire is the void filled in by its fantasmatic incarnations. While, as Lacan emphasizes, the objet a<\/span> is also the object of the drive<\/span>, the relationship is here thoroughly different: although in both cases the link between object and loss is crucial, in the case of the objet a<\/span> as the object-cause of desire, we have an object which is originally lost, which coincides with its own loss, which emerges as lost,<\/strong> while, in the case of the objet a<\/span> as the object of the drive<\/span>, the \u201cobject\u201d is directly the loss itself\u2015in the shift from desire to drive, we pass from the lost object to loss itself as an object.<\/span><\/p>\n

That is to say, the weird movement called “drive”<\/span> is not driven by the \u201cimpossible\u201d quest for the lost object; it is a drive<\/span> to directly enact the \u201closs\u201d\u2015 the gap, cut, distance \u2015 itself. There is thus a double distinction to be drawn here: not only between the objet a<\/span> in its fantasmatic and post-fantasmatic status, but also, within this post-fantasmatic domain itself, between the lost object-cause of desire and the object-loss of the<\/strong> drive<\/span>.\u00a0 497<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

What does the drive mean from a philosophical standpoint? In a vague general sense, there is a homology between the shift from Kant to Hegel and the shift from desire to drive: the Kantian universe is that of desire (structured around the lack, the inaccessible Thing-in-itself), of endlessly approaching the goal, which is why, in … Continue reading “from repetition to drive p.496 lost object to loss itself as object”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[65,125,21,142,72,16,76,70,20],"tags":[116],"class_list":["post-9998","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-dia-mat","category-drive","category-jouissance","category-nightworld","category-objet-a","category-ontology","category-sub-destitute","category-traversing-the-fantasy","category-zizek","tag-ltn"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9998","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=9998"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9998\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12081,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9998\/revisions\/12081"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=9998"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=9998"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.terada.ca\/discourse\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=9998"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}