Clinamen

Sources: Wikipedia and this rather strange article

Clinamen is the Latin name Lucretius gave to the unpredictable swerve of atoms, in order to defend the atomistic doctrine of Epicurus.

When atoms move straight down through the void (kenon) by their own weight, they deflect a bit in space at a quite uncertain time and in uncertain places, just enough that you could say that their motion has changed.  But if they were not in the habit of swerving, they would all fall straight down through the depths of the void, like drops of rain, and no collision would occur, nor would any blow be produced among the atoms. In that case, nature would never have produced anything

Clinamen is the word that Lucretius, in his 2nd century book, The Nature of Things, used to describe how the world works. Today, people are not inclined to read a physics book that is 2000 years old, but it is not the particular beliefs that Lucretius may have held that interest us but, rather, the way he used inversion to uncover a key truth that is just as true in the world of particle colliders and Hibbs’ Fields as ever.

Instead of describing solid things as fixed and resting in space, he got his readers to imagine that the whole solid spatial world was moving along in the same direction. Our analogy would be a 12 lane highway where commuter traffic is all moving along at exactly the same speed. In terms of the cars and trucks on the highway, there is no apparent motion, although they are all traveling, if they are lucky, at 60 mph.

What creates a sensation, however, is when something swerves. He called this a “clinamen,” and we can imagine how velocity — a car shooting forward or one slowing down — creates an issue.

zupancic the real

Zupančič Realism in Psychoanalysis
ICI Conference Berlin 2011 Lecture on the second day, 29 March 2011

The absolutely crucial point of this ‘psychoanalytic realism’ is that the real is not a substance or being, but precisely its limit.

That is to say, the real is that which traditional ontology had to cut off in order to be able to speak of ‘being qua being’.

We only arrive at being qua being by subtracting something from it – and this something is precisely the ‘hole’, that which it lacks in order to be fully constituted as being;

the zone of the real is the interval within being itself, on account of which no being is ‘being qua being’, but can only be by being something else than it is.

One can ask, of course, how can it matter if one cuts off something that is not there to begin with?

It matters very much not only because it becomes something when it is cut off, but also since the something it becomes is the very object of psychoanalysis.

zupancic materialism and real

Zupančič Realism in Psychoanalysis

Conference ICI Berlin
One Divides Into Two: Dialectics, Negativity & Clinamen
Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupančič, and Mladen Dolar
March  2011

One of the great merits of Meillassoux’s book is that it has (re)opened, not so much the question of the relationship between philosophy and science, as the question of whether they are speaking about the same world.

I emphasize … another dimension of his [Meillassoux’s] gesture, a dimension enthusiastically embraced by our Zeitgeist, even though it has little philosophical (or scientific) value, and is based on free associations related to some more or less obscure feelings of the present Unbehagen in der Kultur. Let us call it its psychological dimension, which can be summed up by the following story:

After Descartes we have lost the great outdoors, the absolute outside, the Real, and have become prisoners of our own subjective or discursive cage. The only outside we are dealing with is the outside posited or constituted by ourselves or different discursive practices. And there is a growing discomfort, claustrophobia in this imprisonment, this constant obsession with ourselves, this impossibility to ever get out of the external inside that we have thus constructed.

There is also a political discomfort that is put into play here, that feeling of frustrating impotence, of the impossibility of really changing anything, of soaking in small and big disappointments of recent and not so recent history. Hence a certain additional redemptive charm of a project that promises again to break out into the great Outside, to reinstitute the Real in its absolute dimension, and to ontologically ground the possibility of radical change.

One should insist, however, that the crucial aspect of Meillassoux lies entirely elsewhere than in this story which has found in him (perhaps not all together without his complicity) the support of a certain fantasy, namely and precisely the fantasy of the ‘great Outside’ which will save us – from what, finally?…

it is a fantasy in the strict psychoanalytic sense: a screen that covers up the fact that the discursive reality is itself leaking, contradictory, and entangled with the Real as its irreducible other side. That is to say: the great Outside is the fantasy that covers up the Real that is already right here.

In Lacan we find a whole series of such, very strong statements, for example: ‘Energy is not a substance…, it’s a numerical constant that a physicist has to find in his calculations, so as to be able to work’.

The fact that science speaks about this or that law of nature and about the universe does not mean that it preserves the perspective of the great Outside (as not discursively constituted in any way), rather the opposite is the case. Modern science starts when it produces its object.

This is not to be understood in the Kantian sense of the transcendental constitution of phenomena, but in a slightly different, and stronger sense.

Modern science literally creates a new real(ity); it is not that the object of science is ‘mediated’ by its formulas, rather, it is indistinguishable from them; it does not exist outside them, yet it is real.

It has real consequences or consequences in the real. More precisely: the new real that emerges with the Galilean scientific revolution (the complete mathematisation of science) is a real in which – and this is decisive – (the scientific) discourse has consequences.

Such as, for example, landing on the moon. For, the fact that this discourse has consequences in the real does not hold for nature in the broad and lax sense of the word, it only holds for nature as physics or for physical nature.

At stake is a key dimension of a possible definition of materialism, which one could formulate as follows: materialism is not guaranteed by any matter. It is not the reference to matter as the ultimate substance from which all emerges (and which, in this conceptual perspective, is often highly spiritualized), that leads to true materialism.

The true materialism, which – as Lacan puts is with a stunning directness in another significant passage – can only be a dialectical materialism, is not grounded in the primacy of matter nor in matter as first principle, but in the notion of conflict, of split, and of the ‘parallax of the real’ produced in it.

In other words, the fundamental axiom of materialism is not ‘matter is all’ or ‘matter is primary’, but relates rather to the primacy of a cut. And, of course, this is not without consequences for the kind of realism that pertains to this materialism.

dolar 1 into 2 pt1

Dolar, Mladen “One Divides into Two.” e-flux journal #33 March 2012.

This was an old Maoist slogan from the 1960s. Despite its air of universal truth it has become dated, and I fully realize the danger of appearing dated myself by starting in this way. Nowadays, one can recite this slogan in front of a class full of students and none will have ever heard it or have any inkling as to its bearing or its author — it’s almost like speaking Chinese.

However much we count, however many ones we add to the first one, we cannot count to the two of the Other. The progression of counting extends the initial one into a homogeneous and uniform process, while the Other presents a dimension that would be precisely “other” in relation to this uniformity.

In a nutshell, the otherness of the Other, if it can be conceived, is a dimension that cannot be accounted for in terms of One. If the Other exists, then we have some hope of escaping from the circle, or the ban, of One.

The dimension of the Other might present a two that would really make a difference, not merely a difference between one and another, that is, ultimately, between the one and itself, the count based on the internal splitting of one, but rather another difference altogether, beyond the delightful oxymoronic phrase “same difference.”

One can immediately appreciate the high philosophical stakes here. A large part of modern philosophy, if not all of it, has aligned under the banner of the Other, in one way or another, whatever particular names have been used to designate it, and if philosophy has thus espoused the slogan of the Other it has done so in order to establish a dimension that would beable to break the spell of One, in particular its complicity with totality, with forming a whole.

There is a hidden propensity of One to form a whole, to encompass multiplicity and heterogeneity within a single first principle. That program was pronounced at the dawn of philosophy, spelled out by Parmenides in three simple words, the slogan hen kai pan, one and all

So if the Other exists, if it can be conceived in terms other than the terms of one, it would permit us to get out of this ban and this circle.

Indeed, the task of modern philosophy, if I may take the liberty of using this grossly simplified and massive language, was to think the Other that would not be complicit in collusion with the One of hen kai pan, and thus, ultimately, the task to think the two, to conceive the Other that wouldn’t fall into the register of the One

***

I will invoke Freud and now I will take the tricky path of conceiving the two in terms of the Other in psychoanalysis, the Other being a key psychoanalytic term

I said above “If the Other exists …” and this brings me to a very basic asset that lies at the heart of psychoanalysis and the work of Jacques Lacan. There is something like a spectacular antinomy at the foundation of psychoanalytic theory,

an antinomy worthy of Kantian antinomies, and Kant has brought the notion of antinomy to a pinnacle  where reason, as a striving for unity, runs into an irremediable two, an opposition that cannot be reduced.

This Lacanian antinomy of the two pertains to the nature of the Other.

One can pose it as the antinomy of two massively opposing statements:

1.  There is the Other, which is the essential dimension that psychoanalysis has to deal with. Notoriously, Freud spoke of the unconscious as “ein anderer Schauplatz,” the other scene, another stage, a stage inherently other in relation to the one of consciousness, to its count and to what it can account for. It defies the count of consciousness, which is ultimately the homogeneous count providing sense as a unitary prospect

So there is the Other of the unconscious. … “The unconscious is the discourse of the Other.”

And another of his formulas runs: “Desire is the desire of the Other”

There is an Other that agitates our desires and prevents us from assuming them simply our own. These two short statements, in no uncertain terms, place the unconscious and desire under the banner of the Other.

There is the unconscious, and there is desire only insofar as each intimately pertains to the Other, they are “of the Other,” and the Other is what stirs their intimacy.

There is the Other at the heart of all entities that psychoanalysis has to deal with, … the Other of a qualitatively different nature in relation to the realm of One.

2. The second part of this antinomy, in stark contradiction to the first, states bluntly: The Other lacks.

There is a lack in the Other, the Other is haunted by a lack, or to extend it a bit further: The Other doesn’t exist.

“There is the Other” vs. “The Other doesn’t exist.”

How can the very dimension on which psychoanalysis is ultimately premised not exist?

What is the status of this Other that is emphatically there, permeating the very notion of the unconscious, of desire, and so forth, and that yet at the same time emphatically lacks?

Can the two statements be reconciled in their glaring contradiction?

Is this a case of a Kantian antinomy, exceeding the limits of knowledge and unitary reasoning?

And how can one posit the Other as the very notion surpassing the boundaries and the framework of One while maintaining that it lacks?

Is this an exhaustive alternative?

johnston harman interview pt 6

Graham – Two full chapters of the book are dedicated to your ongoing friendly dispute with the prominent young Swedish philosopher Martin Hägglund of Yale University. Having seen the two of you debate in person on one occasion (in New York in 2012), I can say that it does seem to be an unusually fruitful dialogue between friends. What is the major philosophical difference between you and Hägglund? Is there any way it can be resolved, or does it ultimately boil down to two “irreducible and competing intuitions,” as the phrase goes? Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 6”

johnston harman interview pt 5

Graham – The third chapter of your book targets what you call “neo-Spinozism.” Where can we find this philosophy today, and why is it not the path we ought to pursue?

As I describe it therein, neo-Spinozism is a big tent today, especially in Continental philosophical circles. Amongst Continentalists, much of this is to be attributed to the lasting influences of Althusser and Deleuze.

The third chapter you ask about is set up by the second chapter of Adventures in Transcendental Materialism (“For a Thoughtful Ontology: Hegel’s Immanent Critique of Spinoza”). I revisit Hegel’s various interrelated criticisms of Spinoza (and of those, such as Schelling at certain moments, who fail to maintain sufficient distance from Spinozism) with an eye to their enduring relevance. Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 5”

johnston harman interview pt 4

Graham – Along with Žižek you have worked closely with another leading European philosopher, Catherine Malabou. What has been Malabou’s significance for you, and what is the most important thing present-day philosophy can learn from her?

Žižek was responsible for first drawing my attention to Malabou’s work— specifically, her groundbreaking 2004 text Que faire de notre cerveau? (What Should We Do with our Brain?). It was around 2006 that I read this book, which was a real experience that compelled me promptly to devour the rest of her published writings then available. Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 4”

johnston harman interview pt 3

In short, my immanent critique consists in pitting Žižek’s dialectical/transcendental materialism against his glosses on quantum physics.

In terms of a contemporary materialist interfacing with the natural sciences, I favor biology generally and neurobiology particularly for several reasons. Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 3”

johnston harman interview pt 2

Adrian Johnston is interviewed by Graham Harman about his new book out in May 2014, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers.

Having said all of the above, I nonetheless deliberately preserve and play upon certain senses of the (apparent) tension between the terms “transcendental” and “materialism.”

As the preceding already reveals, transcendental materialism fundamentally is preoccupied with two of the biggest of big issues in the history of philosophy, ones closely interrelated: the freedom-determinism dispute and the mind-body problem. Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 2”

johnston harman interview pt 1

Adrian Johnston is interviewed by Graham Harman about his new book out in May 2014, Adventures in Transcendental Materialism Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers.

Here are some important excerpts

Graham – Your title contains the phrase “transcendental materialism.” There is a tension between these two words that in some sense drives all of your intellectual work. “Transcendental” generally refers to a sort of philosophy, like Kant’s, that asks about our conditions of knowing the world rather than about the world itself. Meanwhile, “materialism” has always been a philosophy that turns in the most hardnosed fashion towards the world itself, viewing humans as a material thing just like everything else. Stated briefly, how does one reconcile the transcendental and materialist standpoints? Continue reading “johnston harman interview pt 1”

Badiou on truth and the event and politics

A Discussion of and around Incident at Antioch: An Interview with Alain Badiou.” by Ward Blanton and Susan Spitzer Art and Research A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods. Vol 3. No. 2 Summer 2010.

This interview took place at the Western Infirmary Lecture Theatre, University of Glasgow on 13 February 2009 and was conducted as part of ‘Paul, Political Fidelity and the Philosophy of Alain Badiou: a Discussion of Incident at Antioch’ a conference at the University of Glasgow, 13 – 14 February 2009.

The conference was organized in response to the forthcoming translation by Susan Spitzer of Badiou’s Incident at Antioch, a play completed in the mid-1980s and described by the conference organizers as ‘a work of political theatre which stages the “turn” of an ancient apostle in the context of haunting contemporary questions about revolutionary creativity and political violence’.

The interview was immediately preceded by the first public reading of scenes of the play in English.

What I say is that we can find in Paul a very complete theory of the construction of a new truth.

Allors! Why so, the theory of the construction of a new truth.

The beginning of the truth is not the structure of a fact but it’s an event. So something which is not predictable, something without calculation, something which is not reducible to specificity. At the beginning of all new creation we have something like that that I name an event.

After that we have a subjective process, the process of creation, of construction, which is defined by faithfulness to the event itself. Or, if you want, the subjective construction is to organise consequences of the event in the world, the concept world.

The event is like a rupture and after that we must organise consequences of this rupture, and that is the subjective process of the creation of a new truth.

And finally the result is a new form of universality.

So we can summarise that arrangement in a very simple manner: The beginning of the construction of a new truth is an event. The subjective process of that sort of construction is the organisation of consequences of the event. And the production, the final production is something which is universal in a precise sense that I won’t explain exactly but we can define really in what sense the result is universal.

The three points are explained in a very pure manner by Paul. First an event: the resurrection of Christ. After that a subjective process: faith, faith in that sort of event. And organisation of the consequences of the event, which is a subjective construction that is a debate, maybe an objective one in the form of the Church.

So it’s all a bit deficient in the field of Christianty. And universality of the results, very fundamental in Paul, that is the new faith is for everybody: it’s not for Jews, it’s not for Romans, it’s not for Greeks, it’s not for males, it’s not for females, it’s really for everybody.

The very famous advance that: ‘There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female’ (Gal. 3.28).

All categories, social differences are dissolved from the point of view of the construction of the truth. So we can understand this theory as a particular new religious thought, certainly we can. But we also can understand this theory as an abstract formalisation of what is the process of the truth, with religious words naturally, but the general formalisation is good enough for any truth. […]

And so the same idea, the same abstract or formal idea concerning what is the new truth. And it is not the opposition between Catholic interpretation and Protestant interpretation, it’s a difference between an interpretation which assumes the signification of the words themselves, the iteration ‘God’, ‘the son’, and so on, and an interpretation which is a purely formal label and we say that Paul is not only the apostle of a new religion but is also the philosopher of the new formal construction of what is a universal truth.

*****
So for the readers of this text, or for the audience of this text’s future performance, what do you hope the performance of Paulinism can incite today?

That’s a political question, directly: What is the new grouping of today? I’ll tell you something about that concerning maybe the situation in France, of the political situation. You know I think that in our societies, the societies of the Western word, the rich societies – they become poor today, more and more. They are exposed to disaster. But in their general existence, I think there exist four groups – I don’t use the word class because it’s too classical now – four components, if you want, of power societies, which can support some possibilities of revolt.

There exist four groups which are able in some circumstances which are able to play a role in the direction of real change, the form of a movement of revolt.

First, the educated youth of today in universities, in campuses, in high schools and so on.

Two, the popular youth in the banlieues in French, the popular suburbs.

Third what I shall name the ordinary workers, the big mass of people which are not absolutely poor, not at all rich, with hard work, precarity sometimes, and so on.

And four the workers coming from other countries, immigrants, including undocumented workers and so on.

In France we can say that there exist different movements concerning these four groups, for example mainly demonstrations of students concerning many points, riots in the banlieues of the popular youths, with many cars burned and so on, a sort of violent revolt without community, we have the big demonstrations of ordinary workers, in France in December 1995, for example, with millions of people during many weeks.

And we have also organisations and important demonstrations of immigrants in the workforce. So all these four groups are capable of revolt. But the point is that that sort of revolt is always practically the revolt of one of these four components. And so I can say something like that is your idea of a new grouping.

I name revolt of movement simply when we have demonstrations, riots and so on, of one of these groups. And politics begins when we have something which is not reducible to revolt of movement because there are two, three or four components engaged in the movement.

So politics is really the construction of the new grouping which is not reducible to the four groups. And politics is always to create a passage, a passage between one group and another group. So ‘surprising grouping’ is a mixture of two, three or four because that involves components of our society.

One-by-one we have only revolt of movements when we have beyond one-by-one we are in a political possibility. And a very important part of the action of the state is to create the impossibility of something like that, to create impossibility of union between two or more components of the social organisation.

On this point I have a proof. I have the proof that many laws, many decisions of the state, many activities of the police and so on are entirely organised not only by the possibility to escape movement and so on but more, it’s much more important to create the impossibility of politics, if we name politics the creation of the passage between two different groups. And so the situation today is again that sort of activity of the state.

Sometimes politics engaging two components exists. For example a union, limited but real, between some students and some workers coming from other countries. The movement of undocumented workers in France, which is a significant movement, with normal difficulty, is really a movement which is a mixture, a union between some intellectuals, some young students and some workers coming from Africa and it is something which has existed now for practically more than ten years, it’s not something which vanished.

You know also sometimes the relationship between a part of the students and ordinary workers, that being the case during the strike last year. So the relationship between two groups, which is the beginning of a new grouping, so the beginning of politics, exists in the limited sense. The union of four groups would be the revolution, which is why the state is the absolute impossibility of union.

And I don’t know any circumstances which is really the union of the four components. And maybe it’s only in extraordinary circumstance that something like that is possible I think, for example war. For example war.

And in any case it’s also a lesson of the last century, because the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the movement of liberation of people and so on, have all been in the form of a war. So the question is also, what is revolutionary politics when it’s not war but peace? And we don’t know, really. We do not have an example of a complete union of the different popular components of the situation without that sort of terrible circumstances, exceptional circumstance like war.

So the political problem of today is really first, I agree with you, one of a new grouping, and is probably the problem to pass from two to three, something like that. Because two exists in some limited manner, but then the passage from two to three, and three creates maybe the possibility of four, the possibility of global change.

So my answer, my complete answer, we can define precisely not only what is the beginning of politics which is always to create maybe a small passage from a group to another group, and so a small, real novelty in the organisation of politics.

But we know also what is the present stage of all that, which is in my position the passage from two to three. Four is an event. Four is the number of an event. And three, the number of new forms of organisation. One is nothing, movement and revolt. Two is the beginning of politics. Three is beginning of new forms of organisation. And four is change.

So we can hope.