zupančič 2

Kantian ethics is an ethics of alienation since it forces us to reject all that “which is most truly ours.” and to submit ourselves to the abstract priciple that takes neither love nor sympathiy into account. 23

Guilt is the way in which the subject originally participates in freedom.

Freedom manifests itself in the split of the subject. The crucial point here is that freedom is not incompatible with the fact that ‘I couldn’t do anything else’, and that I was ‘carried along by the stream of natural necessity’.

Paradoxically, it is at the very moment when the subject is conscious of being carried along by the stream of natural necessity that she also becomes aware of her freedom. 27

I am guilty even if things were beyond my control, even if I truly ‘could not have done anything else’

Yet at this point we should push the discussion a little further in order to account for how these two apparently opposite conclusions seem to follow from Kant’s view – how Kant’s argument leads in two apparently mutually exclusive directions.

1. On the one hand, Kant seems persistent in his attempt to persuade us that none of our actions is really free; that we can never establish with certainty the nonexistence of pathological motives affecting our actions; that so-called ‘inner’ or ‘psychological’ motives are really just another form of ( natural ) causality.

2. On the other hand, he never tires of stressing, with equal persistence, that we are responsible for all our actions, that there is no excuse for our immoral acts; that we cannot appeal to any kind of ‘necessity’ as a way of justifying such actions – in brief, that we always act as free subjects.

In other words, where the subject believes herself autonomous, Kant insists on the irreducibility of the Other, a causal order beyond her control. But where the subject becomes aware of her dependence on the Other (such and such laws, inclinations, hidden motives . . . ) and is ready to give up, saying to herself: ‘This isn’t worth the trouble’, Kant indicates a ‘crack’ in the Other, a crack in which he situates the autonomy and freedom of the subject.

He does not try to disclose the freedom of the subject somewhere beyond causal determination; on the contrary, he enables it to become manifest by insisting to the bitter end on the reign of causal determination.

What he shows is that there is in causal determination a ‘stumbling block’ in the relation between cause and effect. In this we encounter the (ethical) subject in the strict sense of the word: the subject as such is the effect of causal determination, but not in a direct way — the subject is the effect of this something which only makes the relation between the cause and (its) effect possible. 29

zupančič 1

This is the real ‘miracle’ involved in ethics. The crucial question of Kantian ethics is thus not “how can we eliminate all the pathological elements of will, so that only the pure form of duty remains?” but, rather, “how can the pure form of duty itself function as a pathological element, that is, as an element capable of assuming the role of the driving force or incentive of our actions?”. 15-16

Pure form of duty as the sole motive for performing an act that is called ethical. Alenka wants to propose an ethics based solely on the drive.

surplus jouissance equals the objet petit a

What both Lacan and Kant are trying to get their heads arounds is articulating, conceptualizing a certain SURPLUS. 17

Triebfeder (drive or incentive) as one of the pivotal points of Kant’s practical philosophy. This Triebfeder is nothing but the object drive of the will. Now even if Kant makes a point of stressing that the ethical act is distinguished by its lack of any Triebfeder, he also introduces what he calls the echte Triebfeder, the ‘genuine drive’ of pure practical reason.

This genuine object-drive of the will is itself defined precisely in terms of pure form as an absence of any Triebfeder.

We can see here, as well, that the Lacanian notion of the objet petit a is not far off: the objet petit a designates nothing but the absence, the lack of the object, the void around which desire turns.

After a need is satisfied, and the subject gets the demanded object, desire continues on its own ; it is not ‘extinguished’ by the satisfaction of need. The moment the subject attains the object she demands, the objet petit a appears, as a marker of that which the subject still ‘has not got’, or does not have — and this itself constitutes the ‘echte’ object of desire.

Thus we can see that the object-drive involved in Kant’s conceptualization of ethics is not just like any other pathological motivation, but neither is it simply the absence of all motives or incentives.

The point, rather, is that this very absence must at a certain point begin to function as an incentive. It must attain a certain ‘material weight’ and ‘positivity’, otherwise it will never be capable of exerting any influence whatsoever on human conduct. 18

dolar keeping the ball in the air persistence perseverance

Mladen_Dolar2009small

 Here is the interview online

Badiou’s four truth procedures, four areas where truth emerges.

  1. Science, and above all the completely constructed science like mathematics. It doesn’t refer to anything in the world, it just creates its own entities, pure entities.
  2. Poetry and art as such.
  3. Politics not of opinions but politics of truth. There’s an opposition between the two. Democracy basically is a democracy of opinions. Anybody is free to hold any kind of opinion and then you count the votes. This is not a politics of truth. There is a sort of truth at stake in politics which has to do with justice and equality, it has to do with an idea.
  4. Love, which is the emergence of a truth event. A subjective truth event.

Badiou lists the four areas as the areas in which this break happens. I am not sure that this list is the best, exhaustive or conclusive. Maybe this list is too neat in some way. I think things are messier in life. In many everyday situations, even trivial ones, there may be a sudden and unexpected break, people show an inventive creativity and do something very unexpected, and actually change the parameters of the situation and their own lives and the lives of others. I would leave this field open.

I think passion is what drives you, drives you towards something. But it’s not that passion as such is enough. It’s not that it just drives you and you let yourself be driven. It actually demands a hell of a lot if you want to pursue this passion! It demands that you put something, everything at stake.

To risk the usual ways of your life, the ‘bequemes Leben’, if you are lucky enough to have a comfortable social position. There is the spontaneous hang to pursue your social survival within a certain slot, the script for your career is waiting for you. And this is where the question of break comes in.

The passion is what makes a break.

But the break, it demands a hell of a lot of ‘Anstrengung’ and you have to put things at risk. Sometimes drastically at risk. You risk everything for the question of passion, to pursue your passion.

What Freud names ‘Todestrieb’ (death drive) in Jenseits des Lustprinzips (Beyond the Pleasure Principle) is not some striving towards death, but too much of life. There’s too much life, more than you can bear.

So this is the excessive moment which derails the usual course of things and in order to pursue this it takes a lot of courage and persistence, perseverance.

I think most people give up at a certain point. There are many ways of giving up, also as an artist. One way of giving up is to somehow be content with your role or to… ‘übereinstimmen’.

So that you consent to being that role. And this is a socially assigned role which can bring glory and awards. If it started with a break, then the big danger is that the break starts functioning as the institution of the break. The break itself gets institutionalised and highly valued.

Dolar: Yes, it has a place then. Freud has this wonderful phrase “people ruined by their own success“. And I think that in art many people are ruined by their own success. Precisely by succeeding in what they wanted to do and then they fit into this.

They have made an institution of themselves and somehow started to believe that they are this.

You have this wonderful phrase in Lacan: who is a madman? It’s not just an ordinary person who thinks that he’s a king. The definition of a madman is a king who thinks that he’s a king. And you have this madness among artists who believe that they are artists. This is psychosis, in a certain sense, if you really think that you are what you are. You really think that you are an artist. This is the end of art, I think.

Dolar: Feeling at home. Is there a good way to feel at home? I don’t know. I think there’s always an ideological trap in this. What you mostly feel at home with is always ideology because it offers a sort of security. I mean security in the sense of providing a certain status within which you can dwell. And also security of meaning, which means that it provides you with some answers as to ‘What does it all mean?’ ‘We live in parliamentary democracy, we’re a free society, in the era of progress and prosperity’, etc.

I mean the words which fulfil a certain horizon of meaning which situates you within a certain social moment and social structure, within a certain type of social relations. And this is always ideology, ideology is what makes this run. And I think that the break that we are talking about – the break with meaning or the break with the continuity of things – it could be described as a break with ideology.

Art and ideology are at the opposite ends. Art always makes a break, a cut into the ideological continuity of what you most feel at home with. And what you feel at home with is entrusted upon you. But this is not to say that art is immune to ideology, it can easily be made into ideology.

WgK: At that point when you feel content.

Dolar: Yes. When you feel content in your role. One could make a certain opposition between art and culture. I think culture is a sort of domestication of art. You establish canonical artworks which you are taught at school. And it’s a question of what comes into the canon and is it a good thing to have a canon or how to include or exclude works. Of course you always have a canon. There’s no escaping this, but at the same time you have to understand that culture is always a domestification of what is dangerous or excessive in art. It domesticates things by giving them a sort of proper place and value. You can say: ‘Well, Shakespeare is the greatest dramatist of all time.’ I mean it’s quite true, but it’s also a very forced statement to domesticate Shakespeare’s work. You glorify it instead of dealing with it.

WgK: It ends their quality of being a break by giving them a place.

Dolar: Yeah. You reinscribe them into a continuity of a tradition, of a cultural identity.

WgK: I have the feeling it’s a regressive desire.

Dolar: For home?

WgK: Yeah. Isn’t it?

Dolar: Yes. Ultimately yes. I think that being at home means being in the ideology and being in the meaning and having some sort of meaning secured. And I think that creating a home as a way of being with yourself – or being with another person – is precisely to try to deal with the unhomely element of it. To keep the unhomely element of it alive. What Freud called das Unheimliche, litterally the unhomely, but with the utter ambiguity where it can be given the comic twist. I think that love is keeping the non-homely element alive. It’s not to finally ‘go home’ with someone, but actually to keep this thing in the air. Keep this thing in the air. And comedy is precisely – to keep the ball in the air. Keep the ball in the air, I mean constantly.

Žižek ethics of the real

Ágota Kristóf’s The Notebook awoke in me a cold and cruel passion

Slavoj Žižek The Guardian, Monday 12 August 2013

The young twins are thoroughly immoral – they lie, blackmail, kill – yet they stand for authentic ethical naivety at its purest

There is a book through which I discovered what kind of a person I really want to be: The Notebook, the first volume of Ágota Kristóf’s trilogy, which was followed by The Proof and The Third Lie.

When I first heard someone talk about Ágota Kristóf, I thought it was an east European mispronunciation of Agatha Christie; but I soon discovered not only that Ágota is not Agatha, but that Ágota’s horror is much more terrifying than Agatha’s.

The Notebook tells the story of young twins living with their grandmother in a small Hungarian town during the last years of the second world war and the early years of communism. The twins are thoroughly immoral – they lie, blackmail, kill – yet they stand for authentic ethical naivety at its purest.

A couple of examples should suffice. One day they meet a starving deserter in a forest and bring him some things he asks them for.

When we come back with the food and blanket, he says: ‘You’re very kind.’
We say: ‘We weren’t trying to be kind. We’ve brought you these things because you absolutely need them. That’s all.’

If there ever was a Christian ethical stance, this is it: no matter how weird their neighbour’s demands, the twins naively try to meet them. One night, they find themselves sleeping in the same bed as a German officer, a tormented gay masochist. Early in the morning, they awaken and want to leave the bed, but the officer holds them back:

Don’t move. Keep sleeping.’
‘We want to urinate. We have to go.’
‘Don’t go. Do it here.’
We ask: ‘Where?’
He says: ‘On me. Yes. Don’t be afraid. Piss! On my face.’
We do it, then we go out into the garden, because the bed is all wet.

A true work of love, if there ever was one! The twins’ closest friend is a priest’s housekeeper, a young voluptuous woman who washes them, playing erotic games with them. Then something happens when a procession of starved Jews is led through the town on their way to the camp:

Right in front of us, a thin arm emerges from the crowd, a dirty hand stretches out, a voice asks: ‘Bread.’
The housekeeper smiles and pretends to offer the rest of her bread; she holds it close to the outstretched hand, then, with a great laugh, brings the piece of bread back to her mouth, takes a bite, and says: ‘I’m hungry too.’

The boys decide to punish her: they put some ammunition into her kitchen stove so that when she lights it in the morning, it explodes and disfigures her. Along these lines, it is easy for me to imagine a situation in which I would be ready, without any moral qualms, to murder someone, even if I knew that this person did not kill anyone directly.

Reading reports about torture in Latin American military regimes, I found particularly repulsive the (regular) figure of a doctor who helped the actual torturers conduct their business in the most efficient way: he examined the victim and monitored the process, letting the torturers know how much the victim will be able to endure, what kind of tortures would inflict the most unbearable pain, etc.

I must admit that if I were to encounter such a person, knowing that there is little chance of bringing him to legal justice, and be given the opportunity to murder him discreetly, I would simply do it, with a minimum of remorse about taking justice in my own hands.

What is crucial in such cases is to avoid the fascination of evil that propels us to elevate torturers into demonic transgressors who have the strength to overcome our petty moral considerations and act freely. Torturers are not beyond good and evil, they are beneath it. They do not heroically transgress our shared ethical rules, they simply lack them.

The two brothers also blackmail the priest: they threaten to let everybody know how he sexually molested Harelip, a girl who needs help to survive, demanding a weekly sum of money from him. The shocked priest asks them:

‘It’s monstrous. Have you any idea what you’re doing?’
‘Yes, sir. Blackmail.’
‘At your age … It’s deplorable.’
‘Yes, it’s deplorable that we’ve been forced to this. But Harelip and her mother absolutely need money.’

There is nothing personal in this blackmail: later, they even become close friends with the priest. When Harelip and her mother are able to survive on their own, they refuse further cash from the priest:

‘Keep it. You have given enough. We took your money when it was absolutely necessary. Now we earn enough money to give some to Harelip. We have also taught her to work.’

Their cold-serving of others extends to killing them if asked: when their grandmother asks them to put poison into her cup of milk, they say:

‘Don’t cry, Grandmother. We’ll do it; if you really want us to, we’ll do it.’

Naive as it is, such a subjective attitude in no way precludes a monstrously cold reflexive distance. One day, the twins put on torn clothes and go begging. Passing women give them apples and biscuits and one of them even strokes their hair. Another woman invites them to her home to do some work, for which she will feed them.

We answer: ‘We don’t want to work for you, madam. We don’t want to eat your soup or your bread. We are not hungry.’
She asks: ‘Then why are you begging?’
‘To find out what effect it has and to observe people’s reactions.’
She walks off, shouting: ‘Dirty little hooligans! And impertinent too!’
On our way home, we throw the apples, the biscuits, the chocolate, and the coins in the tall grass by the roadside.
It is impossible to throw away the stroking on our hair.

This is where I stand, how I would love to be: an ethical monster without empathy, doing what is to be done in a weird coincidence of blind spontaneity and reflexive distance, helping others while avoiding their disgusting proximity.

With more people like this, the world would have been a pleasant place in which sentimentality would be replaced by a cold and cruel passion.

For Lacan the crucial question is how can we preserve within our symbolisations a space for the recognition of the impossibility of their closure?

The Lacanian system is perhaps the closest we can get to a discourse opening itself up to what exceeds its limits.

Besides, the ethics of psychoanalysis, as formulated in the Lacanian tradition, point to the possibility and the ethical superiority of a symbolic recognition and institutionalisation of the political moment of real lack and this opens a huge field of creation of which the democratic revolution constitutes only one example—perhaps the most important.

Even if this move is possible—encircling the unavoidable political modality of the real—is it really desirable, is it ethically and politically satisfactory?

the ethics of the real entails a recognition of the irreducibility of the real and an attempt to institutionalise social lack. Thus it might be possible to achieve an ethically and politically satisfactory institution of the social field beyond the fantasy of closure which has proved so problematic, if not catastrophic. In other words, the best way to organise the social might be one which recognises the ultimate impossibility around which it is always structured.

neill lacanian subjectivity 2011 pt1

Neill, Calum. Lacanian Ethics and the Assumption of Subjectivity 2011

Against what one might characterise as the ‘common-sense’ notion that language (pre)exists as a tool to be utilised by a subject (or person) in the expression of their (pre-linguistic) needs, wants, beliefs etc., the notion of subjectivity in Lacan’s work posits a subject who only ever comes to be anything at all because of the signifying chain of language, because of the (pre)existence of a symbolic order in which it comes to operate.

What is crucial here is that, if it is the order of signifiers which takes logical precedence, then signifiers are not arsenal to be deployed between subjects, or, to oversimplify, words are not carriers of meaning between people, but, rather, it is the subject which is constituted in the movement of signifiance between signifiers.  45

It is in this sense that Lacan borrows Hegel’s dictum that ‘the symbol manifests itself first of all as the murder of the thing’ and adds that ‘this death constitutes in the subject the eternalization of his desire’ (Ibid.).

An example of this notion of the signifier representing the subject for another signifier is already apparent in Freud when he writes, in A Project for a Scientific Psychology, of a soldier’s willingness to sacrifice himself for his country’s flag or, as Freud emphasises it, for ‘a many coloured scrap of stuff’ (Freud, 1966: 349). Here, the soldier is clearly not concerned with the thing of the flag, the flag as material object. The flag only assumes its significance in relation to another signifier, in this instance, the ‘fatherland’ (Ibid.). The soldier, the subject, is given his subjectivity through the mediating representation between one signifier, ‘the flag’, and another, ‘the fatherland’. 45

johnston ethics desire Seminar VII part 2 das Ding

Johnston, Adrian. “The Vicious Circle of the Super-Ego: The Pathological Trap of Guilt and the Beginning of Ethics.” Psychoanalytic Studies. 3.3/4 (2001): 411-424.

🙂 Johnston does not agree with Žižek’s take on das Ding.

Žižek’s definition: das Ding doesn’t exist prior to the ‘backwards glance’ of the nostalgic subject of the Symbolic wishing to have lost something he/she never possessed in the Žfirst place (das Ding is a result of the fundamental strategy of fantasy, wherein the structural impossibility of the drives’ ‘full satisfaction’ quajouissance obtained’ is concealed from the subject by making it seem as if this enjoyment is hypothetically re-obtainable).

However, this is a misleading exaggeration that treats Lacan as wholly Hegelian.

The most misleading feature of virtually every extant commentary on Lacan’s ethics of psychoanalysis is the attribution to him of the imperative “Do not give way on your desire!”

In the seventh seminar, Lacan does not present the link between desire and guilt in the form of a command, an injunction to ‘persist’ in one’s desire.

Instead, he merely states that guilt is the result of ‘ceding on’ (i.e., not enacting in reality, refraining from concrete actualization ) one’s desires“Je propose que la seule chose don t on puisse être coupable, au moins dans la perspective analytique, c’est d’avoir cédé sur son désir”.

At the beginning of this seminar, Lacan remarks that psychoanalysis is confronted , across the range of its analysands, with the omnipresence of guilt in human life.

Lacan is not so much interested in proposing a new prescriptive ethics as in comprehending the precise nature of ‘moral masochism’, in fully grasping how the constellation of the id, the super-ego, and the socio-symbolic Umwelt of reality ‘pathologize ’ the ethical Žfield.

At most, this Lacanian analytic diagnosis of moral masochism should be interpreted as a preparatory clearing of the ground for a genuine ethics, as a mapping out of the obstacles hindering the construction and enactment of a non-pathological ‘metaphysics of morals’. 417

Lacan repeatedly makes reference to the Freudian super-ego as an excessive, greedy, and out-of-control agency. Echoing Freud, he observes that, “the more one sacrifiŽces to it, the more it demands”.

The super-ego isn’t satisfied with mere external/behavioral conformity to ethico-moral precepts; it uncompromisingly insists upon the impossible purification of intentionality itself (thus, the super-ego is, in a manner of speaking, a spontaneous Kantian). 418

when Lacan speaks about being guilty for having ‘ceded’ or ‘given ground’ relative to one’s desire, what he really means is the following: the more the subject surrenders (to) his/her desires by obeying the restrictions of the Law, the more guilty he/she feels, since such concessions only aggravate the (unconscious) volatility and intensity of these same desires (namely,‘internal’ repressed desires which never fail to escape the notice of the omniscient authority of the sadistic super-ego).

Near the end of his 1974 television interview, Lacan clearly advances this claim in saying that, “Freud reminds us that it’s not evil, but good, that engenders guilt” (Lacan, p. 45).
To be Continued …

 

 

johnston desire ethics Kant Antigone seminar VII

Johnston, Adrian. “The Vicious Circle of the Super-Ego: The Pathological Trap of Guilt and the Beginning of Ethics.” Psychoanalytic Studies. 3.3/4 (2001): 411-424.

🙂 In this article Johnston takes on Lacan’s “Do not give way on your desire!” What does this mean? It does not mean, “do not give way on your jouissance!”

AJ starts with Nietzsche. Why? Because Nietzsche is totally against Kant.

In the standard version of the Kantian schema, the subject’s intentions are most ethical when they are least tied to the particularity of the individual (i.e., his/her inclinations, desires, wishes, circumstances, etc.).

The categorical imperative (“I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law”) functions as a kind of ‘sieve’ meant to strain out, as much as possible, these pathological materials tainting the intentional purity of duty.

Conversely, the injunction of the eternal return—perhaps this injunction is capable of being rendered in the imperative form as “I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my concrete, unique , and utterly individual act should be ‘universalized’, namely, should endlessly recur for all eternity ”—demands exactly the opposite of the categorical imperative.

In a Nietzschean ‘system of valuation’, rather than being the basest, most unworthy of intentional states , the particular, idiosyncratic desires of the individual subject are the highest standards by which to measure actions.

Only if an action expresses the strongest of subjective urges, urges so strong that the subject would will them to infinitely manifest themselves again and again in all their singular uniqueness, is it of any worth.  412

Most reading s of the Lacanian dictum “Do not give way on your desire!” understand him to be proposing something similar to Nietzsche: (pure) desire is conceived of as jouissance, as the uncompromising , unconditional thrust of Trieb once operative outside the confining consequentialist calculus of the pleasure principle.

The subjective particularity of pure desire is ethical precisely when its strength overwhelms the mitigating influence of the pleasure-oriented ego.

Various commentaries on the seventh seminar point to the tragic Žfigure of Antigone as proof that this is exactly what Lacan intends to convey. Antigone’s passionate attachment to her dead brother Polyneices drives her to transgress Creon’s edict forbidding the burial of the corpse. Her excessive ‘love’ is then compared with the Todestrieb, since Antigone is compelled to disregard the tragic consequences that she is fully aware await her in the wake of her act.

A Real passage á l’acte (i.e., Antigone’s burial of her brother as a result of her desire) transgressively disrupts the reign of a Symbolic system of Law (i.e., Creon’s denial of funerary rites for Polyneices on the grounds of the interests of the polis).

Is this the distilled essence of Lacan’s ‘ethics of psychoanalysis?’ Is he, like Nietzsche, simply interested in turning Kant on his head, in unreservedly transforming Kant into Sade?

Lacan explicitly states that desire arises from the sacrifice of jouissance: <span style=”font-weight: bold; font-size: 11pt;”>not ceding on one’s desire</span> would seem to entail not surrendering to the siren-song of jouissance, not capitulating to the uncompromising demands of Trieb.

Lacan describes desire as opposing jouissance—“desire is a defense, a prohibition against going beyond a certain limit in jouissance” 413

Lacan means, then “not giving ground on desire” is a translation of Kant’s insistence on the exclusion of pathological drives from properly ethical intentionality, with the psychoanalytic qualiŽfication that the detachment from these drives is itself achieved through and sustained by a subl(im)ation of inclination, a ‘self-subversion’ of Trieb. 413

Lacanian Desire

One of the easiest ways to gain a preliminary understanding of Lacanian desire is by returning to the Freudian concepts of Trieb and sublimation. For Freud, sublimation is the typical means by which Trieb adapts itself to the constraints and obstacles it comes to encounter at the level of the reality principle. Reality forbids certain drive-aims qua the attainment of satisfaction linked to determinate drive-objects. Thus, reality is said to be responsible for what Freud designates as ‘aim-inhibition ’ (a catalyst for sublimation).

The aim-inhibited drive then seeks other forms of satisfaction via different objects; and, if these alternate modes of securing gratiŽcation are not at odd s with the various prohibitions of the reality principle (usually, socio-cultural laws and norms), then the new libidinal arrangement is dubbed a successful sublimation of the drive .

Furthermore in Civilization and Its Discontents, he argues that ‘instinctual renunciation’ (i.e., the aim-inhibition of the drives demanded by human reality) is, despite appearances to the contrary, an unavoidable libidinal fate for all subjects.

As such, the Freudian subject lives in a state of unsatisfactory compromise: sublimation provides pleasurable outlets for Trieb, but Trieb itself is incapable of ever being fully satisfied with these compromises, since they are, by the very definition of the mechanism of sublimation, deviations from the original cathetic trajectory (i.e., the ‘earliest state of affairs’ which all drives struggle in vain to recover; in the seventh seminar, Lacan designates this posited ‘ground zero’ of the libidinal economy das Ding). The libidinal life of the human being is therefore marked by certain constitutive ‘lacks’ or ‘absences’—as Lacan puts it, the ‘sovereign Good’ of das Ding is always missing from the reality of subjective ‘ex-sistence’ — and this condition of (non-)existence is precisely what Lacan intends for his notion of ‘desire’ to designate.  413

Desire is the residual remainder/by-product of the subjection of jouissance (i.e., Trieb an sich, the unconditional attachment to das Ding) to the ego-mediated negotiations between the pleasure and reality principles. 414

In other words, desire is symptomatic of the drives’ dissatisfaction with the pleasure-yielding compromises of sublimation. 414

Lacan’s seventh seminar contains two separate lines of argumentation:

1. Lacan seeks to clarify and further develop Freud’s analyses of conscience as a manifestation of a pathological ‘moral masochism’ fueled by an insatiable super-ego;

2. Lacan lays down the preliminary groundwork for a psychoanalytic meta-ethical theory based on the possibility of desire coming to function in a ‘pure’, properly ethical fashion.

These two dimensions of Lacan’s so-called ‘ethics of psychoanalysis’ must not be conflated, since doing so results in either muddleheaded confusion or outright error.

 

To be continued …

ethics is not w/in framework of law

We might say that the ethical dimension of an action is ‘supernumerary’ to the conceptual pair legal/illegal.

This in turn suggests a structural connection with the Lacanian notion of the Real. As Alain Badiou has noted, Lacan conceives of the Real in a way that removes it from the logic of the apparently mutually exclusive alternatives of the knowable and the unknowable. The unknowable is just a type of the knowable; it is the limit or degenerate case of the knowable; whereas the Real belongs to another register entirely.

Analogously, for Kant the illegal still falls within the category of legality -they both belong to the same register, that of things conforming or failing to conform with duty. Ethics – to continue the analogy – escapes this register.

Even though an ethical act will conform with duty, this by itself is not and cannot be what makes it ethical. So the ethical cannot be situated within the framework of the law and violations of the law. Again, in relation to legality, the ethical always presents a surplus or excess. The question then becomes: ‘what exactly is the nature of this excess?’ The simple answer is that it has something to do with the Kantian conception of ‘form’. The exact meaning of this requires more careful consideration. EOR 12

ethical maxim discourse of master

The ethical maxim behind the discourse of the master is perhaps best formulated in the famous verse from Juvenal: ‘Summum crede nefas animam praeferre pudori, et propter vitam vivendi perdere causas

Count it the greatest of all sins to prefer life to honour, and to lose, for the sake of living, all that makes life worth living.

Another version of this credo might be found in Paul Claude!: ‘Sadder than to lose one’s life is it to lose one’s reason for living.’

In ‘Kant with Sade’ Lacan proposes his own ‘translation’ of this ethical motto:’desire, what is called desire, suffices to make life have no sense in playing a coward.’ (EOR 5)

Kant introduced dimension of desire into ethics

Kant was the one who introduced the dimension of desire into ethics, and brought it to its ‘pure state’. This step, crucial as it was, nevertheless needs another ‘supplementary’ step, which Kant — at least according to Lacan — did not take: the step that leads beyond desire and its logic, into the realm of the drive.

An ethics of the Real is not an ethics orientated towards the Real, but an attempt to rethink ethics by recognizing and acknowledging the dimension of the Real (in the Lacanian sense of the term ) as it is already operative in ethics. The term ethics is often taken to refer to a set of norms which restrict or ‘bridle’ desire – which aim to keep our conduct (or, say, the ‘conduct’ of science) free of all excess. Yet this understanding of ethics fails to acknowledge that ethics is by nature excessive, that excess is a component of ethics which cannot simply be eliminated without ethics itself losing all meaning. In relation to the ‘smooth course of events’, life as governed by the ‘reality principle’, ethics always appears as something excessive, as a disturbing ‘interruption’. (EOR 4)

zupancic ethics of real 1

By insisting on the fact that the moral imperative is not concerned with what might or might not be done, Kant discovered the essential dimension of ethics: the dimension of desire , which circles around the real qua impossible. This dimen­sion was excluded from the purview of traditional ethics, and could therefore appear to it only as an excess.

So Kant’s crucial first step involves taking the very thing excluded from the traditional field of ethics, and turning it into the only legitimate territory for ethics. If critics often criticize Kant for demanding the impossible, Lacan attributes an incontestable theoretical value to this Kantian demand. 3